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Building Baghdad: The Construction of Urban Space in Iraq, 1921 – 1963

By
Andrew Alger
Adviser: Beth Baron

This dissertation examines the production of space in Baghdad during the monarchical
and early republican eras (1921 – 1963). As the capital of the new nation of Iraq following the
First World War, Baghdad expanded along the banks of the Tigris River into new residential and
commercial spaces, establishing schools, boutique stores, sporting venues, electricity and
running water that transformed how Iraqis conceived of the mundane activities associated with
daily life. Employing a theoretical framework drawing on Henri Lefebvre’s production of space, I
argue that participation in the creation of new neighborhoods and streets was uneven across
differences of class, national origin, and generation. In a sharp departure from previous
scholarship, my research indicates that such cleavages began as early as the paving of Rashid
Street in the 1920’s, three decades before the national development projects of the late
monarchical period exposed the limitations of the state to meet all of its citizens’ basic needs
for housing, employment, and healthcare. These cleavages were reflected in the susceptibility
of utility and road networks to strikes and boycotts in the 1930’s, the range of health outcomes
across the city’s hospitals, and the mounting housing inequalities of the Second World War that
arose from an influx of rural migrant laborers and their families.
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Building Baghdad: The Construction of Urban Space in Iraq’s Capital, 1921 – 1963

Introduction
The poet Ma‘ruf al-Rusafi (1875 – 1945) captured the aspirations many Baghdadis had for their
city in the early twentieth century when he said that the sidewalks of Rashid Street, its first major
boulevard, should each be “a lofty edifice,” bedecked with “a globe of light” and “trees amidst whose
shady and verdant foliage the sun flickers, delighting passersby.”1 The trappings of modern city life,
which Baghdadis had supposedly done without while it had been a provincial Ottoman town, offered a
glimpse of a bright future to come for the capital of a new nation. “Building Baghdad” seeks to follow
that tincture of feeling through its many permutations in the tapestry of the city’s development.

Whereas historians have catalogued and analyzed a great many Baghdad buildings, they have
yet to examine at length how Iraqis built Baghdad; in other words, how the residents of this city
strove to create and maintain an urban space that met the needs of their daily lives as well as
the long-term needs of their communities. Baghdad was not a stage on which the major
political events of twentieth-century Iraq simply took place. Like all other major cities in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, development projects in Baghdad deeply affected how
residents construed the possibilities of communal life. Construction, in this sense, does not
refer merely to the creation of physical infrastructure; it means the manner in which an
individual makes sense of how the parts of the city, like the words in a text, combine to create
certain meanings. Construction, in this sense, is something engaged in by all residents of a city,
though each goes about it in her or his own way, drawing differently on one’s feelings, tastes,
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morality, and formal and informal education to do so. What unites the residents of a city in this
manner of making sense, then, is not method, nor necessarily sensory inputs, but a shared
language of space.
Scholars of the city have long sought to understand how states bring together town
planning, architecture, and the social sciences, in the making, destruction, and remaking of
urban space. They have also examined how city residents variously contested the remaking of
space, adapted its processes toward their own ends, or acquiesced to it. Paris, London, and
New York have featured prominently in this discussion, yielding important insights into how
states and citizens mobilize their resources and how urban planning ideals spread across
Europe and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.2 Cities of the Middle East
have been no less important, providing a myriad of case studies in which developments of
Europe were influential, but not wholly determinative of the goals, methods, or outcomes of
urban expansion.3
This dissertation aims to show that space is made, not simply found, and that the
particulars of its making contribute to the production of difference in terms of social class. Not
only the locus of one’s family of origin or the type and amount of one’s resources, serves to
stratify individuals into classes. The tendency of space, with the greater and greater
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accumulation of persons, goods, and wants, is to differentiate itself according to ever more
precise configurations of acceptable activities and behaviors. As this tendency continues, the
capacity of any given space to accommodate a wide range of personal and communal interests
and activities diminishes. Crucial, furthermore, is that the rate at which space differentiates
itself, outstrips the rate at which new space can be made to meet the needs of those individuals
and communities no longer able to continue in the old.
Twentieth-century Baghdad is an especially important case through which to study this
tendency of space because of the relatively free reign that government bureaucrats had to
direct the making of it. Located over three hundred miles from the Persian Gulf and over five
hundred miles from the Mediterranean Sea, Baghdad is an inland city without a large port to
serve as catalyst for the accumulation of merchant capital. In the nineteenth century, European
commodity traders exerted considerably less influence over the development of Baghdad than
they did over Istanbul, Alexandria, or Beirut. Consequently, at the start of the Iraqi monarchy in
1921, government bureaucrats encountered few local precedents for the layout and use of
urban space and few private corporate interests standing in the way of planning city roads,
railroads, schools, or hospitals. At the same time, however, they were limited in the plans they
could bring to fruition until the 1950’s, when national oil rent-sharing agreements provided the
necessary amounts of capital to expedite projects. The most interesting characteristic of
twentieth-century Baghdad, however, is not how well or how quickly planners were able to
accomplish their projects in the absence of private capital’s controlling interests, but how
elaborate and intricate popular expectations were for the eventual transformation of the city
into a modern one befitting its new position as the capital of Iraq.
3

In the chapters that follow, this dissertation takes space to be a product whose making
and remaking is shared in by both the expert planners aligned with capital and the state, on the
one hand, and by the many communities living in Baghdad. In this introduction, I set out to
show how prior scholarship on the production of space first articulated multiple subject
positions within its making and contestation, and subsequently clarified and reaffirmed that
multiplicity. I then demonstrate how recent histories of Iraq have considered space primarily as
a frame of reference for the nation, without explicitly examining how the production of space
Baghdad shaped the lives of its citizens.
The work of Henri Lefebvre has been instrumental to the analysis of space as an
articulation of political power subject to historical change. In La Production de l’espace,
Lefebvre traced the development of space as an analytical category from Aristotle through
Descartes and on to the many modern knowledge disciplines that analyze kinds of space. A
fundamental problem of understanding emerges, however, when geographers, historians,
urban planners, and architects each develop methods for ordering space, but never succeed in
bringing lasting order to space. Lefebvre’s project is then to show that the science of space
represents “the political use of knowledge” and “implies an ideology to conceal its use.” 4
Geography, urban planning, architecture, and other sciences of space gradually remake space
along lines suitable to capitalist development, imposing restrictions on its use that exclude
inhabitants who bring a different understanding to the use of space. Among these
transformations are city development projects that seize privately owned land through eminent
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domain. Somewhat more subtle manipulations of space, such as the institution of
neighborhood watches and the design of park benches to prevent persons from sleeping on
them, are an equally pervasive instance of this world historical trend. The realization of power
in space restricts the freedoms of individuals to live in the city as they please and is therefore a
threat to what Lefebvre conceptualized in his earlier work as the individual’s fundamental right
to the city.
To aid in understanding the political use of knowledge as it relates to space, Lefebvre
outlined a conceptual triad distinguishing scientific from non-scientific approaches to space.
Perceived space (Fr. éspace perçu) is that space which individuals navigate as part of their daily
lives. Conceived space (éspace conçu) is represented by the maps, schematics, and blueprint
plans drawn up for new orderings of space. Lived space (éspace vécu) is the space that forms an
integral part of the creation of meaning for individuals and communities, such as the space of
communal dances and gatherings on street corners.5 The expertise of urban planners,
architects, and engineers fall squarely within conceived space, but its effects are felt, directly
and indirectly, in lived space.
David Harvey and Edward Soja each furthered the analysis of space through clarifying
and expanding on the conceptual groundwork laid by Lefebvre. In an essay first published in
1974, the same year as La Production de l’espace, Harvey identified the geographer as having a
moral obligation to “confront the tension between the humanistic tradition and the pervasive
needs of the corporate state directly, to raise our consciousness of the contradiction and
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thereby to learn how to exploit the contradiction within the corporate state structure itself.” 6
Geography, as the other sciences of space that Lefebvre identified, owed much of its practice
and principles to the management of empire, and therefore geographers needed to adjust their
practices to make the corporate state work in the interests of all its subjects. Soja, similarly,
sought to incorporate all citizens’ experiences of the city into the analysis of space, finding that
Lefebvre’s original conceptual triad was too often distorted into a “bicameral” spatiality, in
which space is either planned material progress or the mental lives of its citizens. Soja
countered that the perpetual openness of marginal space to yet other possibilities of human
existence constituted a “thirdspace” that was inextricable from the functioning of space.7
Space, though constituted initially by the corporate state and the myriad of expertise ingrained
in it, is no less significantly the product of non-expert citizens as well.
The capacity of revolutionary actors to take over the streets demonstrates the power of
the masses to subvert urban space that has been shaped by town planners and engineers doing
the work of the state. For Asef Bayat, the street typifies “the spatiality of discontents - how
particular spatial forms shape, galvanize, and accommodate insurgent sentiments and
solidarities.”8 Although the major thoroughfares of Tehran, Cairo, and Istanbul were designed
to facilitate the dispersal and defeat of revolutionary masses, they remain connected to
networks of minor streets and alleys to which the revolutionary masses can stage a strategic
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retreat. Streets enable the extension of protest from the realm of individual revolutionaries’
ideas and sentiments to the other members of the public who inhabit the major streets of the
city. Major thoroughfares also enable the coming together of socioeconomically and culturally
distinctive groups to move together and articulate a shared language of protest. It is these two
aspects of the street, not just the disruption of traffic, that Asef Bayat identifies as the threat
that governments seek to dispel through the deployment of troops and police. 9 Space, then, is
not merely the outcome of state planning initiatives aimed at the maintenance of order. Space
acquires new functionality in the course of revolutionary actions, and it acquires it from the
masses who take to the streets to forge new solidarities.
The potential for space to facilitate revolutionary action would not exist if space did not
also shape political dynamics in the form of daily life. The routines of individuals, together with
the periodic gatherings of communities for business and celebrations, constitutes no less
important a spatial field for the casting and recasting of solidarities and cleavages among
groups, and thus the recalibration of group identities and the production of social differences.
The spaces of daily life actively accomplish this, as Berna Turam observes for twenty-first
century Istanbul and Berlin, “not only because they are remarkably capable of absorbing and
coping with conflict, but also because they attract controversy as they generate safe spaces for
contestation and negotiation.”10 Daily life is never mundane, or of no significance to the
political organization of society, if in its rhythms and necessities it provides both individuals and
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communities with the means to manage stresses coming from a challenging shift in the wider
political order.
It may be objected that space has proven too elastic a concept to be of much analytical
value. Timur Hammond identified this problem with the difficulty in conceiving of space
consistently. Hammond asked, “To what are we referring when we talk about ‘urban space’? Is
it the work of planners and architects, the concrete, brick, stone, and steel of a city’s buildings,
the volumes of air in those buildings, those buildings’ environs, or the ineffable experiences of
people of the city?” 11 Hammond’s proposed solution is to turn away from space altogether in
favor of place, a concept that has its own lineage of scholarship within geography. Place,
however, leaves us with the opposite problem: it may be liable to be used too consistently,
ignoring or smoothing out the conflicts that arise between groups who conceive of a place in
radically different terms. Place, furthermore, tends to immunize itself against time, presenting
itself as mostly the same to generation after generation, as if it were possible or even desirable
to be unchanging over time. Space, on the other hand, is where the actions of one generation
set discoverable constraints on the actions of the next. Discovery of these constraints brings us
closer to an understanding of how differences in culture arise between successive generations.
Most histories of Iraq written in the past thirty years have not discussed space except to
analyze its usefulness for the production of national belonging. Eric Davis wrote of his project in
Memories of State, for example, that it studies “the processes of nation building and state
formation” that are “ongoing and incomplete because Iraqis have yet to agree upon a
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commonly accepted model of political community.”12 Orit Bashkin concurred that “the story of
Hashemite Iraq is that of nation building,” noting further that “regardless of its success or
failure a national project cannot occur without intellectuals fostering new notions of both time
and space.”13 Both Davis and Bashkin draw inspiration from Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities, finding that newspapers, textbooks, and other published works maintain the
nation in the minds of its citizens through acts of reading, listening, discussing, and writing. The
preponderance of these activities took place in schools and in cafes, making both institutions
especially important to the discursive production of nationhood. Schools, in particular, have
been very useful for understanding the relationship between space and nationalism, as school
activities in Iraq were documented extensively during the Hashemite monarchy. Schools,
furthermore, bear enough resemblance to one another across national boundaries that the
relationships between Iraqi schools and Iraqi nationalism can be gauged in comparison to the
rise of the state school in the late Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
among other nations.
Historians of architecture in Iraq have also discussed space, particularly with respect to
the proliferation of modernist forms in Baghdad after the Second World War. Monumental
architecture, such as Frank Lloyd Wright’s never-realized Baghdad opera house, Walter Gropius’
building for Baghdad University, and Le Corbusier’s national gymnasium, again explore the
significance of space to national development.14 Alongside this literature, John Warren, Ihsan
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Fathi, and more recently Caecilia Pieri have documented exemplars of the traditional house in
Baghdad, illustrating how its features both practical and aesthetic became lost in the rapid
expansion of the city during the twentieth century.15 Reading these works, I find it is possible to
glimpse how the occupants of Baghdad’s buildings both big and small might have felt about the
spaces they inhabited, but from only one vantage point: looking at the building itself. A great
deal of life takes place outdoors, whether in the course of moving from one structure to
another or for the sake of removing oneself to nature. So long as these outdoor spaces remain
out of view, then not only must the Iraqi experience of nationalism remain partially understood,
but so too the production of space and its effects on the lives of Iraqis.

Fortunately, Iraqi writers have commented extensively, if in a somewhat piecemeal
fashion, about the significance certain places held at different points in the twentieth century.
Baghdad has been the locus of much of this discussion. In Baghdad as I Knew It, Amin
Mumayyiz wrote of an old Ottoman cannon on view in the citadel grounds that took on a
special significance for Baghdadis of his generation. The cannon was secured with a rope
through a piercing across its muzzle that Baghdadis likened to a rural woman’s nose piercing,
giving the cannon the nickname, Abu Khizzama. According to Mumayyiz, mothers took their
young children to the cannon to receive its blessing by placing the child in its muzzle, and it was
this ritual that made a child into a Baghdadi more than any other. Abu Khizzama was later
moved to Rashid Street and bedecked with flowers as a symbol of fecundity. 16 The significance
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of the cannon owes not to its locations on the citadel grounds and Rashid Street, but to the
rituals through which Baghdadis of Mumayyiz’s generation imbued it with meanings opposite
to the ones associated with its original purpose. An instrument of death was, through the
daring of mothers and their children, remade into an evocation of the perseverance of life.
Later generations attached new symbolic significance to the cannon, as happened in
Mumayyiz’s lifetime when the cannon was moved and redecorated, in a manner consistent
with their ideas for the use of space. Ritual transcended the limits of location and, as it was
reproduced by each generation, insinuated subtle differences of meaning into space.
Informing Iraqis’ writings on space in Baghdad is its medieval history writ large,
according to which its significance as a center of politics and culture ebbed and flowed from its
founding in 762 C.E. up to the twentieth century. An economic hub connecting the goods of the
Persian Gulf and India to traders as far as Scandinavia, medieval Baghdad boasted vast
patronage networks that supported scholars of Islam alongside the translation of Greek and
Persian learning into Arabic and an innovative poetical tradition in the eighth and ninth
centuries. The city went into decline after a Mongol army under Hulegu Khan destroyed it in
1258. Following centuries of alleged Ottoman neglect and misrule, Baghdad emerged from the
First World War as the capital of an independent Iraqi kingdom in 1921 under a British
mandate. The new modern Iraq sought thereafter to marshal the history of Baghdad much as it
did the history of the region: an ancient tradition of achievement to be restored through the
rationalization of politics, society, and the economy.
The effects of this grand narrative are discernible in writings on Baghdad throughout the
twentieth century, but those of the Syrian journalist Amin Sa‘id (1890 – 1967) are particularly
11

useful for revealing how the grand narrative contains within itself the seeds for a quotidian and
spatial rendering of Baghdad’s history. As part of the Syrian delegation to King Faisal’s funeral
in 1933, Sa‘id (1890 - 1967) observed all that was promising about the city’s future direction,
noting changes both great and small.17 When the cars carrying the delegation arrived on the
city outskirts, they passed by al-Harithiyya, the model farm and botanical garden that the late
king had set up and furnished with forty different species of trees. Shortly thereafter, the
delegation was greeted by schoolchildren singing nationalist songs before it went to the
memorial service on the scouting grounds, which had been decorated with black flags for the
occasion. Reflecting on his trip to the city, Sa‘id later construed the possibilities for Baghdad’s
communal life in terms of material progress, emphasizing how different the city had been
under Ottoman rule:
In reality, Baghdad was nothing more in the Turkish era than a big village devoid of what the
greatest cities have: no rectified roads, wide avenues, filtered water, electric lighting or fans,
modern hotels, or schools. Instead, there was a city of narrow streets and joined buildings in
the manner of medieval-era cities. Not one of its many storehouses had a glass front to prevent
flies from gorging on their contents, swarming people’s noses and eyes in the millions and
blotting out the horizon with their armies like a fog rolling in.18

Sa‘id’s impression of Ottoman Baghdad did not take into account the steps its governors had
taken to bring hospitals and wider streets to the city. The accuracy of his views
notwithstanding, it was important to Baghdadis and Arab visitors alike that the smallest units of
city space were now being thought of as standing in need of management in order to stimulate
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economic development, improve public health, and foster national consciousness among the
diverse religious and ethnic communities of Iraq. By the second quarter of the twentieth
century, Baghdadis were thinking of their city in terms of space; in other words, as thinkable in
terms of constituent parts, and with the condition of each part contributing to an overall state
of progress and well-being in the city.
Iraqis were also active in the discussion of space as geographers. Jassim Muhammad
Khalaf organized his geography of Iraq into separate sections covering the physical, economic,
and human geography of the country. His work on human geography recapitulated some
theorizations of an erstwhile American collaborator, the anthropologist, Henry Frield. Iraq
featured many racial groups, having distinct skeletal and cranial features, who entered Iraq
from Asia and Africa. Subsequently, there was extensive sharing of customs among the region’s
different tribes.19 Khalaf then went on to explain that the reasons for settlement on the
floodplains between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers were that they contained “the most
important agricultural region in Iraq and because the residents prefer these areas for its
agricultural abundance.”20 This was a circular explanation that left unanswered the question of
how the residents had made it an important agricultural region in the first place. As in the
geography of Field, patterns of migration into Iraq from elsewhere in Asia during prehistory
were given greater attention than the nuances of tribal organization and culture in the
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twentieth century. The features of the land were taken as intrinsically attractive and the labor
necessary to make it productive was only hinted at.
Even as the region-focused view of Iraqi geography continued to be dominant, it was
nevertheless possible to consider geographical problems on a smaller scale. Ali al-Wardi, an
Iraqi sociologist and a contemporary of Khalaf, conducted research into matters of human
geography at the level of individual towns and villages. Wardi held that the better
discriminating factor between groups in Iraq was not the population size of a given area, but
whether its inhabitants were engaged in commercial services or as cultivators. Wardi gave the
example of Khurnabat, a town in the Diyala province that, in terms of numbers, would be
classified along with the villages of cultivators, but whose occupants ran orchards primarily to
sell produce to neighboring cities and towns. The profit motive had overtaken agriculture in
Khurnabat, making its economic activity closer in kind to that of a major city.21 Relatedly, Wardi
observed that the influence of governmental organizations on an outlying town was only ever
partial. During a trip to the town of Dujayl, about 65 kilometers outside of Baghdad, Wardi and
his students found that “the government’s influence was discernible on one side of the city, the
side where the train first stopped.”22 For the town notables who built houses in the style of
government buildings there, it “became a sign of pride among them to be near the government
and to send their children to its schools.”23 For Wardi, a different kind of human geography was
made visible through interviewing townsfolk, one in which the traditional categorization of
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rural and urban areas broke down under the weight of evidence pointing to a mixed state of
affairs in communities undergoing a political and economic restructuring.
Another concern of the dissertation is to show that the absence of a state archive has
not proven to be a major impediment to writing the history of modern Iraq. The many
collections of source material in public and private archives on three continents support the
generation of valuable insight into the nature of the contingencies and gaps in all historical
narratives. It is perhaps because of the difficulty conducting research in Iraq over the past thirty
years that Iraq scholars regularly encounter colleagues working in other areas who doubt the
feasibility, if not also the merit, in writing new histories of Iraq. Weren’t the state archives
destroyed, looted, or otherwise made inaccessible after the American-led invasion in 2003?
Another common refrain is skepticism toward the possibility of learning anything from Iraq that
has not been learned elsewhere, a question that manages somehow simultaneously to criticize
the exceptionalism of Middle Eastern studies and invoke the alleged superiority of other
geographic regions and eras for historical and social scientific study. My answer to these
concerns is that in fact there are many sources for Iraqi history that have not been used at all,
or stand in need of further interpretation in light of new theoretical and historiographical
concerns. Furthermore, the presumed paucity of sources and the lack of anything new to say
are challenges attributable to many fields of inquiry until the right questions arise to overcome
them. Iraq is not exceptional in this regard, although the frequency with which critics highlight
its artificiality and inscrutability is perhaps exceptional.
Many of the sources I used for the dissertation I located in archives in Athens, London,
New York, and Beirut. They consisted of colonial officers’ political reports, correspondence and
15

agreements between the Iraqi state and international construction and energy companies, and
the in-office memoranda and working documents of design and planning firms working in
Baghdad. These sources regularly featured order lists of construction materials, blueprints and
other design specifications, and tables of personnel arranged according to compensation,
national origin, and position within a company hierarchy. The archives have a tendency to
reduce the complexity of human relationships and their interests in material goods to thin
strips of meaning meant to correspond neatly with the goals of a given development project.
An IBEC Housing Corporation order list for type and quantities of house paints and hardware,
for example, specifies which suppliers in New York and New Jersey could be relied upon to
deliver the goods in a timely fashion to construction sites in Baghdad. It does not reveal on its
own what Iraqi project managers and construction foremen thought about this reliance on
American-made goods. Similarly, blueprints for a new Eastern Bank Limited building indicate
separate tiffin rooms for Iraqi and British staff, but offer no record of how the Bank governance
justified this segregation to itself, if it even offered a rationale at all. Wherever such archival
lacunae persist despite the efforts of the researcher to address them with relevant perspectives
from another source, and this is regrettably often the case, the resulting picture shows the
particular interests of power to emphasize certain kinds of knowledge over others, with what is
left out assigned to the same political margins occupied by subaltern subjects.
Fortunately, the dreary picture begun by archival sources was much brightened by the
pens of Iraqi journalists, historians, and memoirists addressing the material development of
Baghdad in their own work. Here it would be incorrect to speak of data as the means by which
Iraqi writers sought to describe and analyze neighborhood development in Baghdad. Anecdote
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and description, of the kind that scholars of Arabic literature refer to as wasf, was the medium
in which aspects of daily life were incorporated into an appraisal of the significance material
culture had to Iraqis. Abbas al-Baghdadi perfected this art form in Lest We Forget Baghdad of
the Twenties, a memoir that envelopes the reader with a panoply of activities, material goods,
and personalities marked as being simultaneously usual and nearly vanished from the everyday,
a conundrum that is only explicable with the gradualness of one time’s passing into another.
The journalists who wrote for the Ahali paper offer historians a similar bid on the completeness
of their assessment through the sheer breadth of topics they covered with the same sense of
urgency for their bearing on the present and near future. The Arabic writings of journalists,
historians, and memoirists reveal the dynamic markings of a historical score for which archives
can only provide a partial reconstruction of its notes. Reading the two categories of sources
relationally is the only way through which we can hear something of twentieth-century
Baghdad’s music.
The Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation consists of five chapters arranged thematically. Each chapter covers
both the years of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq (1921 – 1958) and the early republican period,
from the July 14 Revolution in 1958 to approximately the end of the Qasim period in 1963.
There is also a chronology of sorts to the chapters, as Chapters I, II, and III focus on the first
three decades of the monarchy while Chapters IV and V turn increasingly to the postwar
decades. The decision to begin with the Iraqi monarchy reflects the turn away from the
government of Baghdad formulating its purpose in terms of managing an outpost of empire
remote from the Ottoman center. It was also a turn toward the management of minute and
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intimate configurations of space so as to bring about the realization of aspirations for national
unity, economic expansion, cultural refinement and progress for the new Iraqi nation. The
decision to end with the rise of the Ba‘th party in 1963 and 1968 reflects the extent of available
sources for historical research as well as the shift in the state’s raison d’être from protecting
cultural pluralism and collaborating with international forces to one in which the well-being of
the multitudes and the fight against imperialism were paramount.
Chapter I demonstrates how Baghdadis contested the subordination of their economy
to foreign interests. It examines how networks for transportation, food delivery, and electricity
were shaped by politicians and striking laborers in their bids to preserve as much control over
the city’s resources as possible. The chapter highlights the influence sought by the Londonbased Baghdad Light & Power Company over the electric grid in Baghdad and the negotiations
they pursued with the Iraqi government to have trams installed on Rashid Street. When
politicians’ efforts to block its influence failed, Baghdadi citizens used a boycott in 1933 to win a
reprieve from higher utility prices. The boycott paralleled the general strike of 1931, during
which strikers prevented the delivery of foodstuffs to the city in a successful bid to have new
taxes repealed. These actions presaged the smuggling of goods during the Second World War.
Chapter II zeroes in on how hospitals and clinics transformed Baghdad into spaces that
bridged the gap between rural and urban populations. Hospitals and clinics served as both
destination for the sick coming from the provinces for treatment and as integral parts of the
neighborhoods in which they operated. It begins by showing how state medicine in Ottoman
Iraq, though limited in terms of the areas of the city it could reach, succeeded in choosing sites
for hospitals that British and Iraqi health officials expanded upon in the monarchical era.
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Starting in the 1920’s, clinics were crucial to the habituation of ever more Baghdadis to
medicine, an exercise in forming new popular expectations achieved primarily through the
treatment of widespread eye conditions, especially trachoma. The two major hospitals of the
monarchical era, the Royal Hospital and the Isolation Hospital, are then demonstrated to have
attracted patients from inside the city and out to specific neighborhoods for particular courses
of treatment. Because Royal Hospital specialized in the latest diagnostic and laboratory
methods, it served Baghdadis who could be cured and return to society. The Isolation Hospital,
on the other hand, had the effect of separating the sick from their loved ones and preventing
them from spending their periods of convalescence at home. Ultimately, the effect of this twotiered approach to public health was the designation of certain areas for curative medicine and
others for preventative medicine, a distinction that manifested in the awareness of Iraqis for
where in the city they had to go in order to get better. As a consequence of the concentration
of medicine in a few neighborhood-specific institutions, there remained throughout the period
populations and neighborhoods that received little to no state-sponsored care.
Chapter III examines the transformation of Baghdad into the capital of Iraq, using as its
analytical lens the discourse on work that took shape in the 1920’s and subsequently came to
inform how Baghdadis interpreted each other’s presence in the daily goings on of the
neighborhood. It begins with an example of work rhythms and standards of competence from
before the monarchical era. Boatmen on the Tigris leveraged their personal familiarity with a
changing river landscape to maintain control over the transport of goods into Baghdad, a
presence they maintained into the early monarchical era and through the ascendancy of the
steamship. During the 1920’s, journalists and other intellectuals articulated a new spatial order
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that placed Baghdad at the center of a nation at the crossroads of international trade. This
discourse encouraged Baghdadis to draw inspiration from examples of hard work reported in
Europe and the United States and adapt them to the needs and customs of Iraq. The spread of
this discourse through public schools and the press led Baghdadis to interpret each other’s
behavior in terms of national progress. Baghdad became the stage on which its residents would
demonstrate the new work ethic supporting national unity, and others would follow. During the
Second World War, resistance to military occupation and rationing schemes took the form of
smuggling operations that preserved for Baghdadis a measure of control over national
resources.
Chapter IV charts the rise of sports culture in Baghdad, situating the pursuit of football
and horse racing in the contexts of a new appropriation of space that had previously been
considered empty, marginal, or peripheral to the areas of habitation. It sheds light on the
popularity of horseracing in the Hinaidi cantonment, finding that the races attracted jockeys,
horses, and veterinary expertise from the Najd and India to a sport that Iraqis could spectate
and gamble on. Spectators also spectated each other under the novel circumstances of
association provided by the race track. At the same time, football (soccer) attracted a following
among spectators and athletes alike, providing young Iraqis with a form of orderly recreation
that they adapted to the needs and interests of neighborhood gatherings. Sports culture had
the important effects of providing an outlet for self-expression as well as a means of disciplining
the self in preparation for the physical and mental demands of a career in the future, but it also
exposed Iraqis to the difficult emotions and hardship associated with gambling and the violence
of competition at the horseraces. In the generation that came of age during the 1920’s and
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1930’s, this mixture of positive and negative outcomes shaped a discourse on healthy and
unhealthy forms of entertainment and relaxation.
Finally, Chapter V draws attention to the public housing program that took off after the
Iraqi government negotiated a large increase in its share of the country’s oil revenues. The
chapter examines the creation of the West Baghdad Housing Development that was overseen
by the Greek town planning firm, Doxiadis Associates. Unlike earlier treatments of the topic, the
chapter highlights the contributions of laborers who had migrated to Baghdad from the rural
‘Amara and set up neighborhoods of their own at the city’s margins. These communities of
mud-and-reed huts, called sarifas, were home to workers who were skilled in construction
techniques that were necessary to build in concrete, the preferred medium of international
housing during the Cold War. In addition to the migrant laborers, the chapter discusses the
contributions of Iraqi office workers, watchmen, and consultants to the public housing project,
highlighting their involvement in the vocational school it sponsored. The chapter also
incorporates heretofore unused archival material pertaining to the International Basic Economy
Corporation’s Housing Corporation (yes, that’s right – two “corporations” in one title), a branch
of the Rockefeller Foundation that also built houses in concrete at the Mansur Estates just
south of the Western Baghdad Housing Development. The chapter comes last because the
public housing project, which was continued under ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and his successors in
the republican government, anticipates the state’s embrace of its own labor history as a
justification of its continued authority over a postcolonial Iraq. The successes and limitations of
the public housing project in the 1950’s anticipate the challenges that the state continued to
face in providing for all of its citizens during the 1960’s and 1970’s.
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Chapter I.
More than Rashid Street:
Sustenance, Strikes, Power, and Mobility in the Streets of Baghdad
In the 1968 film Al-Jabi, As‘ad ‘Abd al-Raziq plays the titular character, a fare collector
on a Baghdad bus route from the Bab al-Mu‘azzam area to the Iskan neighborhood on the
Karkh side of the city. Midway through its route, the bus becomes overcrowded, and the fare
collector must force his way through two levels of disruptive passengers to do his job. On the
second floor, he encounters a woman seated at a window with a duck and two chickens
occupying the seat next to her. After gently reminding her that the seat is for other riders, the
fare collector has another disruptive passenger sit down next to the woman and hold the birds
on his lap. The scene is open to multiple interpretations, but in the context of Baghdad’s history
with public transportation, the conflict over who (or what) gets a seat on the bus is evocative of
how official and popular appropriations of transportation space clashed in Baghdad over the
course of the twentieth century. Bringing the birds on a bus stands in for the myriad ways in
which residents of Baghdad met practical needs in a manner that clashed with official
prescriptions for orderly behavior in public space. Furthermore, the fare collector’s solution
satisfies the letter of the law, but neither he nor the two passengers seem entirely pleased with
it. Similarly, resolutions to conflicts over the creation of space are seldom settled to the
complete satisfaction of either state or city inhabitants.
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This chapter reexamines what was at stake for various actors in Baghdad over the
creation of streets and the means to travel them in monarchical and early republican Baghdad.
It seeks to build on scholarship that has identified some of the short- and long-term effects of
cutting new streets into cities in general and Baghdad in particular. In addition to the
destruction of homes and disruptions of neighborhoods that major thoroughfares cause, this
chapter finds that street modernization enabled new forms of collective action against the state
and corporate actors. Streets that had been widened, leveled, and paved allowed for delivery of
food and electricity in ways that could be disrupted to manifest the popular will against new
taxes and concessions to European companies. While these efforts were only partially or
temporarily successful at achieving their immediate goals, they had the long-term effect of
making public transportation a matter of civic pride and excellence that further transformed
Baghdad into a stage for the enactment of national progress.
Certain streets in Baghdad have loomed larger than others in its twentieth-century
history, perhaps none more so than Rashid Street, which runs east to west through the Rusafa
section of the city, north of the Tigris River. During his 1933 visit to Baghdad, Amin Sa‘id
observed that at its northern terminus, Rashid Street branched off into a road leading to one of
the city’s fashionable new neighborhoods and another, paved with tar, leading to A‘zamiyya,
where the tomb and mosque of Abu Hanifa was located. At its southern terminus, Rashid Street
led in one direction to the British airbase and cantonment at Hinaidi and, in another direction,
to the gardens of Karrada via Abu Nuwas Street.1 Rashid Street was noteworthy to Sa‘id as a
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major thoroughfare connecting the historic centers of Baghdad with its modern amenities, the
literal connection in space between bastions of the city’s Islamic heritage and the hubs of its
progress as a modern national capital. According to this view of Rashid Street, the significance
of any major street in a city is to order time according to a line that can be traversed on foot,
back and forth, allowing the individual to experience different points in a path of progress
within the space of a single day.
Since Amin Sa‘id and others made these observations of Rashid Street and its peers in
other cities, scholars of urban space have sought to situate this manner of interpreting street
space in its historical context, uncovering how city residents make use of streets in ways that
are not commensurate with the march of linear-progressive time. Henri Lefebvre, in terming
the street the site of an “incision-suture” into the lived spaces of city life, identified some
streets as heterotopic, evincing a highly marked contrast, as between architecture and patterns
of use, or political conflict between groups within the city.2 Rashid Street offers a compelling
case study for Lefebvre’s theorization of heterotopic space, especially during the first decade or
so after the Ottoman army cut the street to facilitate troop movements through Baghdad in
1916. The rapid pace at which houses in its way were demolished left some homes sliced open
like a piece of layered chocolate cake, exposing the rooms of former residents to the public
view. While those houses remained standing, it was possible to see how military and economic
considerations clashed with residents’ needs for a home. As the street commercialized over the
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course of the 1920’s and 1930’s, the old neighborhood use of the space receded from view
almost entirely, and the heterotopic character of the street mutated to embrace other conflicts.
Rashid Street created a new set of tensions between groups of men and women that
added a layer of complexity to the heterotopic conflict between city residents of different class
backgrounds and positions of power. Shortly after Rashid Street was paved in the middle of the
1920’s, the coffee shops overlooking the street became popular for watching the crowds go by.
For young men in particular, a perch in a coffee shop let one keep an eye out for one of
Baghdad’s celebrated singers, Zahra ‘Ajam, Salima Pasha, Sabiha Kisra, or Khadija Bisra making
her way down the street in open carts. Baghdadi relates that the municipal government
required singers to wear dark blue clothes, abayas, and stockings and their drivers to wear
yellow skullcaps, but that within a year, no one followed this regulation.3 The increased visibility
of members of the opposite sex went partway toward redefining norms of behavior in open
spaces.
As important as Rashid Street was to the residents of Baghdad, it was not the only major
commercial thoroughfare to determine how Baghdadis from throughout the city lived. River
Street, which ran parallel to Rashid Street closer to the Tigris River, hosted hotels, embassies
and legations and the city’s first department stores. Abu Nuwas Street connected Karrada, with
its vegetable gardens and private riverfront homes, to Rusafa through the growing
neighborhood of Batawin via Sa‘dun Street. These streets connected to one another and the
various city neighborhoods through a patchwork of narrow streets and alleys called darbuna.
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Many of these darbuna lacked standard names into the 1940’s.4 They were nevertheless an
integral feature of neighborhood life, supporting local markets, providing space for children to
play, and putting city residents into communication with the city’s hospitals, clinics, schools,
and other municipal institutions.
Networks for the distribution of food and electricity imbued streets with the potential
for popular agitation against state directives. During the early 1930’s, Baghdadi laborers and
their allies took control of networks for the distribution of food and electricity in a series of
strikes that exposed the networks’ shortcomings and allowed laborers to win modest but
significant concessions on prices. Boycotts on goods and services were the chief means of
shutting down these networks because they prevented the continuation of commerce that was
essential to the ongoing transformation of Baghdad into a nexus of markets for labor, land, and
imported commodities. The success of these boycotts reaffirmed the importance of the masses
to urban politics and encouraged the Communists to foment greater opposition to the
monarchy during the last two decades of monarchical rule.
Upsetting the Watermelon Truck: The 1931 General Strike
In the 1920’s, the residents of Baghdad depended on local bakeries, food shops, and
local gardens for basic food items that made up most meals on an average day. Women
generally baked two types of bread, an unleavened bread from whole meal flour mixed with
barley called khubz and a white bread called sammun, which they sold to itinerant hawkers.5
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Workers bought bread from the hawkers along with turshi, pickled vegetables including olives
and cauliflower, for a lunch known by the synecdoche garsat khubuz, a “disc of bread.”6 Shops
selling cheeses and a thick cream called qaymar added variety and an additional source of
protein to Baghdadis’ diets. Local gardens in the Bab al-Mu‘azzam, Kazimiyya, and Karrada
areas produced “pumpkins, brinjals, beetroot, cucumbers, lettuce and tomatoes” as well as
“carrots, turnips, cabbages, and cauliflowers” for citywide consumption.7 Butchers, fish
markets, coffee shops, and fruit vendors supplied some of the more expensive foodstuffs. 8 Each
of these foods was necessary, in varying amounts, to fortify individuals against the stresses and
demands of the day’s toils. As in most cities of the time, food production involved a great many
specialized laboring groups working in concert to feed the city.
Foods imported into the city came from the Iraq’s southern and northern provinces,
where extensive irrigation and more frequent rainfall, respectively, enabled agriculture on a
scale that could take care of local needs and supply a regular trade to Baghdad. Sheep, goats,
and camels were brought in for their meat and milk. Wheat arrived from the north, while the
south sent rice and barley. From Kurdistan and Persia, there came walnuts, almonds, pistachios,
and raisins, and from India, dried coconut.9 Even ice cream from Damascus was to be had at the
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shop of ‘Abdu al-Suri.10 These goods attest to the purchasing power of Baghdad’s markets and
the growing sophistication of its tastes in the early twentieth century, if not earlier.
A crucial feature of food production in Baghdad of the 1920’s was that it continued to
have local inputs for many of its staples. The gardens around Bab al-Mu‘azzam, Kazimiyya, and
Karrada were within walking distance of the main centers of habitation in Rusafa and Karkh,
obviating the need for long supply routes into the city. The milk used for making cheese, ghee,
and qaymar were sourced from water buffalos kept in Karkh and cows kept in the Fadl, Sur, and
‘Awayna neighborhoods of Rusafa.11 Wheat and barley were the two major staples for which
Baghdadis did not have a local source, although municipal grain warehouses and the large
Ottoman-era military bakery that gave its name to Ekmekhane Street allowed for grains to be
stockpiled in large quantities.12 These local and localized food sources provided the city with a
basic level of sustenance in times when tribal strife, war, or epidemics slowed or entirely
disrupted the supply of animals for meat and other food imports from distant areas.
Early in the morning on July 16, 1931, enforcers for a general strike in Baghdad stopped
two delivery trucks and toppled it over, sending their cargo of watermelons crashing into the
street. British intelligence officials reported the incident as one of many similar disruptions of
commerce during the strike and did not find anything significant about the cargo that had been
lost.13 Shipments of watermelons, however, had long been subject to minor losses as the
cumbersome fruits were brought into city. Before delivery by trucks, watermelons were

10

Abbas Baghdadi, Li-a-la Nansa Baghdad fi al-‘Ashrinat, 250.
T. Barrett Heggs, City of Baghdad Annual Report of the Health Department for the Year 1920, 27.
12
Abbas Baghdadi, Li-a-la Nansa Baghdad fi al-‘Ashrinat, 250.
13
Special Service Officer to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters, Hinaidi. July 16th, 1932. AIR 23/382.
11

28

transferred from guffas (coracles) on the Tigris River to the backs of donkeys. Children
sometimes stole individual watermelons from these carriers, working in groups to take as many
they could by distracting the donkey’s minder or tossing the watermelons from the guffa into
the river for later retrieval.14 Trucks overcame this susceptibility to loss, but at the greater risk
of losing an entire delivery if the truck were to be overturned. The strike enforcers who
knocked over the trucks recognized this new capacity for disruption as an opportunity newly
afforded them by the widened streets and the highly visible delivery routes they had
engendered.
The strike of 1931 had been started by a loose coalition of Baghdadi laborers and small
business owners in protest of a new tax on goods and services. Stevedores desisted from
offloading goods at the port. Rail yard workers stopped their maintenance and inventory work.
Café owners, grocers, and shopkeepers closed their businesses. Much of the city’s economic
activity, which the government had counted on to pay for its new taxes, ground to a halt. Soon
the strikers received the support of the opposition National Brotherhood Party, whose leaders
took to the Arabic press in order to present the strike as part of a larger pattern of resistance
against the ruling administration. As the strike entered its second week, workers from Basra,
Nasiriya and other southern towns joined in. Tribes along the southern reaches of the
Euphrates, who had sparked the first national uprisings in 1920, also received word of the strike
and threatened to join in open rebellion.15
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At first, the Iraqi government did little to communicate with the strikers until Nuri alSa‘id, then the principal architect of Iraq’s post-independence collaboration with British
diplomats, returned to Baghdad. Sa‘id first reached out to the neighborhood mukhtars to
persuade the strikers to desist, but after they convinced him that their authority did not extend
to matters of labor organization, he was compelled to rescind the new taxes on some of the
trades it had been scheduled for. Sa‘id’s offer, however, did not go far enough for the leaders of
the strike. The strike continued with pamphlets admonishing shopkeepers to stay closed, the
overturning of vehicles transporting goods in violation of the strike, and intimidation of café
owners who attempted to open their businesses. Consequently, one shop owner was killed,
and police officers protecting defiant shopkeepers were pelted with stones. Unable to
negotiate and mindful of the dangers in letting the strike continue, Sa‘id ordered the leaders of
the strike arrested. In a last gesture of solidarity between workers and party officials, attorneys
from the National Brotherhood Party offered to defend the accused pro bono. With its
leadership suppressed, however, the strike gradually dissipated.
The strike took place a year after the signing of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, a document
that was to govern the two countries’ relationship after the mandate was set to end. Between
the signing of the treaty in June of that year and Iraqi independence in 1932, British and Iraqi
officials were wary of how joint action in times of crisis would shape expectations for
collaboration between the two governments once Iraq attained its independence. Early on in
the strike, the British rebuffed Iraqi requests for armored cars in an effort to avoid a military
buildup within the city like the one in Kazimiyya that had unnerved Baghdadis in 1927. A
military buildup on the street might have done more to aggravate tensions over the taxes than
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soothe them. Instead, until Nuri al-Said returned from Europe, the Iraqi government did
nothing that might strengthen the strikers’ position, counting instead on Baghdadis to abandon
the strike as larders emptied out and business concerns mounted. By refraining from any
concrete action, the Iraq government was acknowledging the substance of the strikers’
grievances – costs of living, especially of food – and were attempting to turn the disruption of
food deliveries against the strikers. They were at least partially successful. The few shopkeepers
who attempted to defy the strikers’ boycott may have done so from a sense of economic
necessity. Shortly after the strike ended, reports circulated at British General Headquarters that
a wealthy merchant had tried to keep up the strike by subsidizing its neediest adherents to the
tune of between sixty and eighty thousand rupees.16 Whether or not the report was true, it
further demonstrates an awareness on the part of government for the limited capacity of the
strikers to keep up their boycott.
A rising cost of living was on the minds of the strikers and their organizers, not only as
an intolerable burden to be rejected, but also as a byproduct of one of the city’s most powerful
economic engines. With European goods arriving in greater quantities off of steamships on the
Tigris and the railroad from Basra, it must have been especially clear to the stevedores, porters,
and rail yard workers that some Iraqis were becoming wealthier and therefore in a position to
pay more for food, clothing, and other basic necessities. Improvements in transportation
between Baghdad’s central Rusafa district and the nearby shrine cities of Azamiyya and
Kazimiyya also bore witness to widening demand for goods purchased in Baghdad. What had
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long been three cities separated by four to seven miles traversable on foot or a horse-drawn
tram were quickly being integrated into a single city with shared economic interests. Aziz al-Haj
describes what this journey from Kazimiyya to Baghdad was like for him as a child in the 1930’s:
Kazimiyya remained one of my favorite places where I rode the tram by myself or with my older
brother from Baghdad to visit my cousins…Near Khan Ka‘buli, we searched for animal bones to
use as pistols for playing cowboys like the ones we saw in American movies…and in front of the
Khan, on the tramway line, there were sewing and tailoring shops with their hand tools called
juma. We knew some of the workers and would stop by sometimes to watch them work.17

The proximity of workplaces to transportation at Kazimiyya was just one end of this economic
engine that reached south and east to the Muazzam gate, where many of the city’s warehouses
and new commercial centers had sprung up over the course of the 1920’s. From there, it
extended further south and east through Rusafa to the city’s port on the Tigris River, where
goods arriving mostly from Basra and foodstuffs from the large agricultural estates of southern
Iraq were first offloaded into the city. The coordination between stevedores, railway workers,
porters, and shopkeepers along this economic corridor during the strike highlights the degree
to which the strikers were familiar with the integration of their trades into the city’s main
economic engine. Even Baghdadis unaffiliated with the strike, who found the taxis not running
and the shops closed that July, must have had to pause to consider how much the past fourteen
years of economic development had reshaped their city. Commercial activity was increasing not
just in terms of pace and volume, but also in terms of visibility and its susceptibility to
disruption. The strikers’ shutdown of the commercial activity called Baghdadis’ attention to the
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structural causes in a manner that showed what strategies were available to those Baghdadis
who wanted to agitate for better living conditions.
As significant a development as the strike was in terms of articulating the limitations of
the city’s economy, the strike did not attract a broad enough base of support for it to last much
longer than a few weeks after its leaders were arrested. The closure of markets and
transportation networks did not starve those Baghdadis who still had access to local sources of
food, nor did it hurt Baghdadis whose incomes were less dependent on the city’s main
economic engine. Orchards and gardens existed along the banks of the Tigris River outside of
Rusafa, in neighboring Karrada, and along the Kazimiyya waterfront, and these could be worked
by nearby city dwellers for payment in kind. Maps of Baghdad and Kazimiyya made via aerial
photography in the 1920’s and 1930’s show that these orchards and gardens were still
extensive at the time of the strike. Their fruits acted as insurance against any disruptions in the
arrival of foods from outside of the city.18
However, had the general strike cut off residents’ food imports after 1945, just a decade
and a half later, the residents of Baghdad would not have been able to fall back on local food
production to anywhere near the same degree. By that point, ownership of the orchard and
garden land around Baghdad had been consolidated in the hands of merchant-landholders (Ar.
mallak), a process begun with the 1856 Ottoman land codes and encouraged by the British in
1917.19 British cartographers marked their maps of city gardens and orchards with landowners’

18

Kadhimain / compiled by Survey Party M. E. F. from air photos taken by Head Quarter 31st. Wing R.A.F. in
February, June & December. [Baghdad]: Army, Middle East Forces, 1920.
19

Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq: 1900 – 1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1997), 43-46.

33

names as a first step toward regulating their sale and purchase. As the export-driven economy
came increasingly to favor production on larger estates, the relatively small city gardens and
orchards accrued value not for what they could grow but for how close they were to the city’s
network for transporting people and goods. Consequently, owners had all the incentive they
needed to sell their land for residential and commercial development. Sasson Somekh gives a
hint of the timeframe on which this transformation took place where he notes in his
autobiography that when his family moved to a new residential area in the 1940’s, it was still
known for its recent past as a garden for growing lettuce.20 The building of residences on
former gardens and orchards reduced Baghdadis’ access to foods produced locally and
increased their reliance on imports from remote agricultural estates. If greater reliance on food
imports tended to enhance the effectiveness of disrupting deliveries as a strategy for labor, it is
surprising that protestors did not resort to it during the last two decades of the Hashemite
monarchy. The city network for the transportation of people and goods was necessarily more
complex than the dynamics of food cultivation and distribution can account for on their own.
The dynamics of food delivery must have been tied up with the distribution of other goods as
part of a multifarious networking of urban space.
Following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, the Iraqi government, once
again under Nuri al-Sa‘id, set up a food rationing system and allowed additional British troops
to land in Iraq at Basra. For Sa‘id, these actions were necessary appeasements of the terms of
mutual defense set out in the treaty of 1930. Food rationing remained in effect during the
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political upheavals that took place in Iraq’s government from then until April and May of 1940.
In that period, a group of Iraqi army officers known as the Golden Square successfully pressed
for a new government that pushed Nuri al-Sa‘id and the regent ‘Abd al-Ilah into exile and
caused tensions with Great Britain to erupt into armed conflict.21 By June of 1940, Great Britain
had effectively re-occupied Iraq and would continue to do so until the end of the war. Wartime
rationing intensified as Great Britain, joined later by the United States, prioritized the
provisioning of their armies in Iran and Iraq. From ports along the Persian Gulf, military supplies
were sent via rail to Baghdad for stockpiling before they were distributed to points in northern
Iraq, Iran, and Syria. As the residents of Baghdad went hungry and underdressed for the cold
seasons, more of the country’s vital resources were directed into Baghdad warehouses via army
trains. The squirreling away of resources within a city of pent up demand was exacerbated by
an influx of labor to meet military needs in construction, transport, and security.
The concerns that had been raised about food during the general strike continued to
inform what Baghdadis said needed to be done in order to have justice for all citizens,
especially the working classes. When the British re-occupied Iraq in 1941, concerns about food
rose to new heights as the Allied war effort placed new demands on agricultural and
commercial production. The British army needed foodstuffs, finished goods, and other raw
materials, including rubber, to maintain its own troops as well as to send to the Soviets via Iran
and the Caucasus. Baghdadis experienced this need most acutely as the prices of meat, grains,
and vegetables rose to exorbitant heights, where they would remain for the duration of the
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war. One wiqiya of lamb, about 250 grams and the smallest portion that butchers were willing
to sell, cost 30 piasters in late 1941, 50 piasters a few months later, and 150 piasters by the end
of 1942. Considering that a laborer earns about 100 piasters a day, observed al-Akhbar, how
can he possibly afford meat? The article’s author further reasoned that since shepherds had not
reported any loss of livestock to disease, it must be that unscrupulous vendors were earning
higher prices selling to the British army.22 Seven months later, al-Akhbar reported that even
vegetables had become very expensive, ending a trend of low vegetable prices in the summer
months. By the end of July 1943, the price of tomatoes was 55 piasters per wiqiya; peas and
pears, 95 piasters; eggplants and apples, 115 piasters. Lamb, at this point, had risen to 180
piasters. These prices were reported for ‘Amara, where much of Iraqi produce was grown
before it reached markets throughout the country.23 In Baghdad, the prices were in all
likelihood higher.
Faced with exorbitant prices due to inflation and the sequestering of goods for military
use, some Iraqis resorted to smuggling in order to provide for their dependents. Railway
workers, police officers, and tribal shaykhs stole weapons, car tires, and uniforms, among other
items, for sale on the black market. In the town of Zubayr, south of Basra, police made thirteen
separate recoveries of stolen goods in January of 1943, including a shipment of woolen flannels
and stockings. On just one day the previous November, Zubayr police recovered three pairs of
stockings, eight pieces of chamois leather, a khaki shirt, three pairs of red shoes, bandages,
matches, and soap.24 The quantity of items recovered was almost certainly less than the
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amount stolen. Clothing was especially valuable on Iraq’s black markets because of rationing
and import limitations, and as Iraq’s winter set in, smugglers focused their attention on those
items that Iraqis needed to stay clothed and keep warm. By far the most common target for
smugglers, however, was tires. One shaykh, Salman Al-Ibrahim, was found to possess twentyseven different stolen tires and five separate tire tubes of all different makes and sizes.25 Some
of these tires were destined for sale to private car owners and operators of passenger bus
services within Iraq, but the biggest return on stolen tires came from buyers in neighboring
Syria, Turkey, and Iran, countries farther removed from Allied supply lines where shortages
were more acute. A single tire could fetch a price of 200 Iraqi dinars, about 70 times an Iraqi
laborer’s income in 1942.
The police work necessary to recover stolen goods illustrates the difficulties that the
military supply line faced in securing shipments as well as the distances that smuggled goods
traveled in order to connect with a buyer. Tires stolen from the RAF base at Habbaniya
changed hands three times on their way to buyers in Faluja before British military police caught
up to them, acting on a tip from another resident of the city. When the police looked into
where the tires had been purchased, they found that the thieves were two Iraqi employees at
the air force base, one of whom worked for its intelligence operations. The investigation also
turned up another stolen tire on a passenger vehicle owned by the head of local government.
Even when Iraqi police and government officials were more cooperative, there were other
political and economic costs associated with recovering stolen goods. Robbers who had twice
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struck a British army camp at Qayyara, south of Mosul, and wounded two soldiers there,
managed to escape with a shipment of rifles. Twenty-five village mukhtars were placed under
arrest by Iraqi authorities in order to bring the thieves to light, but so long as the mukhtars
were under arrest, they could not count the crops their villages had produced for the war
effort. An irate British general further jeopardized cooperation with Iraqi police when he placed
unreasonable demands on the provincial governor to prevent all such thefts of army property
without giving his deputies access to crime scenes.26 Although at least some Iraqi police and
government officials were willing to help safeguard British military supply goods, they did so
reluctantly and with an appreciation for how little the occupying military forces were doing to
help Iraqis meet their own needs for basic goods and services.
Thefts from isolated military outposts, the transfer of stolen goods to another city, and
the fact that the Qayyara robbers were never found all point to the difficulty in securing
supplies in rural areas away from major urban centers. Goods stolen closer to the central nodes
of distribution, however, were easier for Iraqi and British police, working together, to track
down. Farhan Salman, a Baghdad police officer with badge number 811, discovered a cache of
explosives in a guard’s hut near the Fire Brigade building at Baghdad North Railway Station.
Once arrested, the guard confessed that he was holding the stolen munitions for Ibrahim alMana‘a, an alleged gang leader who had been sought previously by Baghdad police. Officer
Salman had been acting on a tip sent to the British embassy that described the explosives as
part of a larger smuggling operation in which several railway workers, police and army officers,
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and commercial drivers were named and their addresses and car license numbers given.27
Efforts to stop smuggling were successful in this case because the stolen goods, although
temporarily outside of Iraq Railways control, nevertheless remained within a heterogeneous
network of informants and likely hiding places. This network coalesced around the densities of
goods and space along Baghdad’s transshipment lines. Such a network did not guarantee
perfect outcomes for any of those caught up in its operation, however. After Baghdad police
turned over the explosives to Iraq Railways, the alleged gangster Ibrahim paid the police
sergeant and another official 30 Iraqi dinars each and went free.
Electricity is Power: The 1933 Baghdad Light & Electric Company Boycott
Starting in the early 1920’s, electricity energized the Baghdad waterfront where the
business, social, and commercial activities crucial to the functioning of the colonial government
were concentrated. Electricity came to Baghdad with the British occupation, when the
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force erected a generating station. After Great Britain was
awarded the mandate for Iraq in 1920, electricity was brought to a limited number of the city’s
commercial establishments and residences, most notably the hotels on River Street. “The
building is lighted with electricity,” announced an ad for the newly opened Zia hotel, where
guests could expect ever-ready meals and a wide assortment of beverages.28 Electricity also
powered hotel fans that allowed guests to escape the midday heat while enjoying thé dansants
and army band concerts. From the Zia, Majestic, Imperial, and Beau Monde hotels, shoppers
walked to Dalton Vase & Company with its “charming selection of down cushions, jewellery,
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sports cups, gold pocket and wrist watches, and…travelling suit case trunks.”29 A few buildings
down, Empire Trading Company sold tennis, hockey, and football (soccer) equipment for use at
the neighboring Y.M.C.A.30 A little further down there was an Orosdi-Back department store,
the first in Baghdad to have an electric elevator.31 Throughout Iraq’s monarchical period,
foreign diplomats, businessmen, and experts stayed at the hotels on River Street and shopped
in its stores, making River Street a hub for leisure activities and consumerism. As the number of
foreign firms doing business in Iraq increased, activity on River Street came to depend ever
more on electricity to assure visitors’ access to creature comforts, including the space to
conduct business with international and Iraqi counterparts on a more informal footing.
Along with electricity came a discourse that promoted its use and highlighted its ties to
the other European and American products that were expected to modernize Iraq. As Ronen
Shamir observed in his study on electrification in mandate Palestine, “the grid is a maker of
groups and a generator of political and economic differences among groups and individuals.”32
In Baghdad, the electric grid contributed to distinctions between the mandatory government
and the politically well-connected elites of Baghdadi society, who consumed electricity as
luxury, and the laborers and merchant classes, who interacted with electricity occasionally, if at
all. Electricity continued to mark class distinctions as it became an object of inquiry in the
imagination of visitors to Iraq. The Austrian archaeologist Wilhelm König, who worked at the
National Museum of Iraq during the 1930s, contended that several ancient Mesopotamian jars
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he had studied were galvanic cells used for electroplating. König believed that silversmiths in
the small Mandaean community in Baghdad still used a form of the technology. 33 The idea that,
in ancient times, the peoples of Mesopotamia had known a technology that had since fallen
into near total disuse, fit a larger pattern in the relationship between archeological knowledge
of Iraq and its potential for future development. With the proper guidance of international
experts, Iraqis could restore their nation to civilizational greatness, for which the proof of
concept lay in the activities of a residual minority population. Electricity was not only important
as a means of marking distinctions of class; it encoded instructions for making progress in the
behavior of Iraqis and in the nation overall.
Beyond River Street, the electrification of Baghdad was the subject of a prolonged
struggle between Iraqi officials in the Council of Ministers, the office of the High Commissioner,
and eventually London shareholders of what would become the Baghdad Light & Power
Company. By 1924, the mandatory government had decided to sell the Baghdad power station
to a public limited company (a limited liability corporation) via a concession agreement.
Subscribers in London were enlisted to provide capital, and, in keeping with the Treaty of
Lausanne, a fresh contract was offered to the holder of a 1912 Ottoman concession. The new
agreement also enabled the concessionaire to construct and operate electric trams on city
streets.34 When news of these provisions reached the Iraqi Council of Ministers, they strongly
objected to the bundling of a transportation concession with electricity, adding that consumer
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costs would rise too quickly and that shares in the original 1912 concession would be
worthless.35 Consequently, the Ministers put the contract through a series of committees that
delayed ratification until 1930. Attempts to replace the tramway concession with buses were
unsuccessful, and in the end, the Baghdad Light and Power Company retained tram rights as
well as rights to set prices for electricity, to maintain and expand the grid, and to hire engineers
and linesmen. In exchange, the Iraqi government received half of revenues after the deduction
of a regular maintenance fee.
Iraqi politicians, for their part, had entered into negotiations over the concession with a
particular understanding of what the Baghdadi public thought about electrification. On April 25,
1927, Muhammad Amin Zaki, the Minister of Public Works, wrote to the President of the
Council of Ministers that public opinion was against the creation of a tramway on Rashid
Street.36 If the Iraqi negotiators wanted to act in the public’s interest, they should propose to
buy concessionaires out of their right to build one. This tactical suggestion took note of the fact
that the prospective shareholders in London were eager to finalize their investments, and that
further delays threatened to cost the electrification project its financial support. A dissenting
opinion among the Iraqi ministers held that the negotiators should instead propose to amend
the concession to allow for buses instead of trams, as buses would obviate the need to
construct a tramline on Rashid Street. This alternative was sensitive to the fact that, a decade
prior, Baghdadi homes had been cut down and their occupants cast out in order to make Rashid
Street. However, bus lines did not make use of the electric grid, so the British roundly rejected
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the proposal. In the case of both proposed amendments to the contract, the Iraqi negotiators
were hemmed in by the fact that the electric grid was already in place on a scale that favored
certain concessionary terms, like tramways, to the exclusion of others. Electricity could claim
“facts on the ground” for itself that effectively blocked what public opinion could do.
From early on in the negotiations, electricity itself continued to participate in the
formation of new political groupings in the city. As talks entered their second year in 1927, the
branch of the Royal Air Force in charge of the Baghdad power station pressured the Air Ministry
in London to intervene. Funds had not been allocated for station maintenance past 1926, and
there were allegedly voices among Baghdad’s property owners calling on government to bury
the transmission wires that were hindering development of their land.37 It is entirely possible
that some property owners were in fact looking to build on land occupied by transmission
wires. Or the Royal Air Force officers may have reasoned that property owners soon would be
interested in urban development, and that such an economic rationale would be heeded by the
other branches of the mandatory government. In either case, the transmission lines enabled a
kind of thinking that privileged the interests of property owners over the interests of other city
residents. And it did so before those residents were aware of what their interests might be. No
one spoke for the safety of children playing near the wires, for example, even though decisions
were being made that would affect where and how generations of Baghdadi children could
play.
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Once the final concession was signed in 1930, ownership of Baghdad’s electric grid
passed from the military to the Baghdad Light and Power Company. The terms of the final
agreement effectively ceded control over where Baghdad’s power and transportation networks
would expand to a company headquartered in London. Article 3 empowered the Company to
construct an 800-kiloWatt generating station, using either hydroelectric or steam power, to
supply electricity to “all principal streets which contain at least 200 houses in the town of
Baghdad” as well as all houses “not greater than 300 metres from the net-work of the first
establishment.” Additionally, the concession required the Company to build tramway lines
running along the northern shore of the Tigris from the “suburb” of Azamiyya to the
southeastern edge of the old city at Bab al-Sharqi. The contract did not specify which route the
tramway lines were to take, but the most direct route between its start and endpoints would
have taken the trams down either River Street or Rashid Street, Baghdad’s two largest
thoroughfares. The contract also granted the Company the right of first refusal to build branch
lines for ten years.38 These terms ensured that commercial and residential growth would
continue along a thin strip of the eastern half of Baghdad, and that it would continue to spread
predominantly along a north-south axis. The hotels and department stores along River Street
were to receive a boost from the increased numbers of passengers riding the tram into central
Baghdad from its suburban peripheries.
How quickly the tram lines would be constructed and electricity sold to the public
depended on the Company’s board of directors, who met monthly in London. The directors
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counted on a fixed annual payment of 2,000 Turkish liras from Baghdad’s municipal
government to defray the costs of constructing and maintaining the electricity and
transportation networks. They also kept half of net profits from selling electricity and threequarters of net profits from tramway fares.39 When and how these profits were to be invested
in capital improvements was entirely at the board of directors’ discretion. Iraqis, whether as
citizens of Baghdad or as government officials, had next to no say as to when and how service
would be extended or cut off. While Baghdad’s municipal government could and did
successfully lobby for rate reductions, these small gains paled in comparison to the discretion
that the Baghdad Light and Power Company retained over virtually every aspect of the city’s
electric grid.
Negotiations over the tramway concession illustrate what both the London shareholders
and the Ministers thought was at stake in electrifying Baghdad. The London shareholders
wanted assurances that demand for electricity was ample and regular. An electric tram
provided both. For the Iraqi Ministers, the tram required that streets be made to meet certain
requirements as to width, levelness, and paving. It also placed restrictions on how many
vehicles and pedestrians could use a street if it had a tram running on it. Roadwork would
disrupt vehicular and foot traffic on Baghdad’s busiest streets, raising tensions between those
responsible for the concession and residents of the affected areas, many of whom remembered
the destruction of homes to make way for Rashid Street fifteen years before. These hesitations
did not mean that the Iraqi Ministers were against developing public transportation. The
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counterproposal for buses indicates that they were open to having a foreign company operate
it. Their ultimate concern was that electrification not be tied too tightly to a separate profitseeking venture. Ultimately, the Ministers’ delay tactics bore fruit. When the concession was
finalized in 1930, the Baghdad Light and Power Company retained tram rights on paper, but
with the beginning of the Depression, discouraging economic forecasts prevented them from
ever building it.
Over the first few years of its operation as a private corporation, the Baghdad Light and
Power Company quickly established a reputation for charging high rates for electricity in the
midst of a severe economic depression. After the Iraqi government’s request for a reduction in
rates was rejected, the labor unions of Baghdad acted to bring them down themselves, calling
for a complete boycott of the Company’s services. On November 5, 1933, they distributed
leaflets instructing citizens in how to join the boycott. Soon thereafter, Baghdadis switched off
their electric lamps and went out to buy wax candles and lamp oil. The labor unions then sent
letters to the hotels on River Street, by now the Company’s most reliable customers, requesting
that they discontinue their services. Many of them complied, prompting the Company to reenter negotiations with the Iraqi government and lower rates by two annas per kiloWatt-hour.
The boycotters were not satisfied, however, and entire sections of the city went dark for weeks
until the government decided to exile the union leaders from the city.40
As with the general strike two years before, the labor unions had disrupted one of the
city’s networks for the distribution of goods and services and thereby imperiled the interests of
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capital in the smooth running of the city’s economy. Electricity ceased flowing along
transmission lines running above the same streets on which laborers had earlier stopped trucks
delivering food.
From the perspective of Sir Francis Humphrys, the British ambassador, the boycotters’
grievances about high rates were justified, in defense of which he cited his own exorbitant
electric bill. He was troubled, however, by what the boycott spelled for the future of British
interests in Iraq. Shortly after the boycott had ended, Humphrys sent a confidential report to
the Foreign Secretary, insisting that Iraqi cities were the main area of concern about future
violence against British interests. In the ambassador’s view, protests over the electricity
concession threatened not only to be co-opted by the opposition; they risked re-aligning the
Iraqi government with protestors against foreign companies.41 Over the next two decades, as
the citizens of Baghdad endured wartime privations and suffered through expensive and
inadequate electricity, Humphrys’ concerns would prove to be well founded.
The Passenger Transport Service
By the mid-1920’s, cars and buses saw extensive use as passenger transport vehicles for
voyages to other Iraqi cities, out west across the desert to Syria, and east to Iran. Garages to
service these vehicles sprung up throughout the city. Ahmad al-Shaykhali ran two garages, one
near Suq al-Safafir at Rashid Street and another with his business partners at the Ghazali tomb
at the northern edge of Rusafa. Cottrell and Grieg ran another garage on Rashid Street near the
Zahawi coffee shop, and the famous Nairn Transportation Company that ran buses from Syria
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to Baghdad had its own garage owned by a Jewish entrepreneur named Shafiq ‘Ads, who was
also the local agent for the American Ford motor company. As demand for transportation grew
within the city, double-decker buses assembled at the Ghazali tombs entered service on Rashid
Street, taking passengers from Bab al-Mu‘azzam to Bab al-Sharqi for one anna or about four
piasters.42 These buses ran from late morning through evening.43 Increases in traffic caused for
accidents and congestion, both of which the municipal government sought to minimize through
regulating the driving side of the road and limiting the loads placed in donkey carts, but neither
of these measures was sufficient to solve the problems of vehicular traffic.44
Running a public bus service presented the municipality with an opportunity to ease
traffic, make drivers more responsible, and generate an additional stream of revenue for the
city. Once it was clear to Iraq’s politicians that the Baghdad Light & Power Company wished to
build a tram on Rashid Street, setting up buses also became a matter of preventing a foreign
concessionaire from capturing more of the city residents’ income from municipal government’s
control. In 1938, the Iraqi government passed a law to establish this passenger transport service
as a branch of the Ministry of Interior. The remit of this office was a ten-kilometer radius
centered on the gas station at the Bab al-Mu‘azzam end of Rashid Street. Unlike other
government offices, the passenger transport service was set up to become self-sustaining
through fare-box revenues after an initial capital infusion of two hundred thousand dinars. 45
The first bus lines became operational in 1943, and in 1950, a new law made the successful
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passenger transport service independent of the municipal government, assigning it a separate
board of officials to oversee its operations.46 On the back of its route map for 1952, the
passenger transport service displayed a sketch of its headquarters in Bab al-Mu‘azzam
alongside a list of its garages and service areas throughout the city as well as a list of its twentyfour routes.47
Official sources for the passenger transport service in Baghdad touted a narrative of
progress commensurate with the state’s interest in regulating the spaces of its city streets. The
1952 map presented its readers with a short history of the service, citing the laws given above,
to present it as a model of success and progress for the city that could be disseminated across
the nation. Reinforcing this sense of progress was a set of photographs depicting transport
vehicles from the 1882 horse-drawn tram to Kazimiyya through to the sleek buses of 1952, each
vehicle seemingly more modern than the last.48 The progress that the passenger transport
service symbolized for the nation continued into the 1960’s, when the service entered its tenth
year of publishing a journal that identified the accomplishments and professionalism of its bus
operators and fare collectors.49
As the film al-Jabi makes clear, however, Baghdad’s buses were sites for more hustle
and bustle and, of course, “fowl play,” than the official publications admitted. Crowding on long
bus trips through the city raised concerns of thievery and molestation. To defray these
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concerns, the Passenger Transport Service promoted its reputation for professional
responsibility. One persistent manifestation of this professionalism was its lost and found
program. In its monthly publication, the Service described all those lost items its drivers had
collected on their routes, including “a nylon handbag containing pins and necklaces bearing
Jesus (peace be upon him), a wallet containing two dinars, a khaki army duffel containing
construction tools, and a biology textbook with two notebooks belonging to a Samira,” among
many others.50 The lost and found registry described each find in very precise language, often
noting whether abandoned clothing, a frequent find on Service buses, was men’s, women’s, or
children’s and in new or used condition. By publishing this list, the Service aimed to reassure its
riders that the buses were safe to ride and that lost property could be retrieved from the
Service’s headquarters. In making this appeal to its readers, together with advertising its
drivers’ athletic and charitable activities, the Passenger Transport Service sought to project its
authority over its bus routes and minimize the appearance of lawlessness on its vehicles. If
buses were a new kind of space that could be commandeered by different groups within
Baghdad, then the Service was aware of the need to control it for the betterment of the public
good.
Conclusion
The streets of twentieth-century Baghdad underwent two spatial transformations that
opened up new fields of political contestation for striking city residents, British mandate
officials and their allies in business, and Iraqi politicians. The first of these transformations was
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the widening of streets, most notably Rashid Street and River Street, into spacious
thoroughfares lined with hotels, boutiques, shops, and cafes. Trucks delivered goods to these
streets more rapidly than donkeys and porters had in the narrow streets of the nineteenth
century, but they were also more susceptible to disruption through street actions, exemplified
in the strikers who overturned the watermelon trucks. Consequently, Iraqi politicians contested
the terms on which their thoroughfares were filled with vehicles, most notably in their
negotiations with the Baghdad Light & Power company over the right to operate a tram on
Rashid Street. Buses emerged as a more popular way forward for improving public
transportation without ceding too much control to foreign interests.
The second transformation entailed the electrification of Baghdad’s streets. Electric
lighting and cooling fans raised the commercial profile of hotels and boutique shops, but the
restriction of its use to places frequented by elites sharpened class distinctions in the city. The
boycott of the Baghdad Light & Power company temporarily turned this class cleavage into
solidarity in the pursuit of more favorable rates. Consequently, the Iraqi government slated
nationalization of its electricity as a long-term goal in its bid to diminish foreign influence over
city affairs. Streets, and the food and electricity networks that ran through them, were newly
contestable terrain in the beginning decades of Iraqi nationalism.
Finally, the Passenger Transport Service renewed the political contestation of city
streets at the same time that it sought to celebrate its work as a national triumph. Maps
showing the progression of public transport from horse-drawn trams to sleek double-decker
buses sought to convey not only the material progress that Baghdadis had achieved for
themselves, but also the success of the Iraqi government in preventing foreign powers from
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privatizing municipal transportation. But buses were not always the orderly conveyors of
citizens that the Service made them out to be. The sighs of As‘ad ‘Abd al-Raziq’s fare collector in
Al-Jabi spoke to the new challenges that this moving public space posed to Baghdadis in the
course of negotiating the streets to accomplish their daily goals.

52

Chapter II.
Hakeems for Whom? Hospital and Clinical Practices in Baghdad, 1917 – 1957

Introduction
In his anthropometric study of the peoples of Iraq, the anthropologist Henry Field wrote
admiringly of the advances Iraqis had made in medicine up to 1940:
During the past decade the Director General of Public Health and the faculty and graduates of
the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad have entirely reorganized medical care and
prevention of disease throughout Iraq; the hospitals in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra, and
Amara have made rapid strides in the dissemination of medical practice throughout the
country. Furthermore, the staff doctors of the Iraq Petroleum Company, not only near the
trans-desert pipeline stations but also at Kirkuk, have taught thousands of their native
workmen to appreciate the benefits of medical care and the elements of preventative
medicine.1

Field likely saw medicine as effective in Iraq because it conformed to the geographic
distribution of medicine that prevailed in the United States and Europe. Cities needed the
highest density of hospitals and public health initiatives because disease was becoming
increasingly concentrated there, as new populations arrived from the countryside and from
abroad to live in crowded conditions beyond state regulation. The progress of medicine, and
with it a healthier and more productive population, was therefore to be made in cities. Najem
Abdul Wahab, writing fifteen years after Field, also saw progress in the expansion of Iraq’s
hospitals from a reputed two in 1915 to 100 in 1953. Nevertheless, of these one hundred
hospitals, Abdul Wahab conceded that ten were built before enough doctors had been trained
to operate them.
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Ten empty hospitals, lying in wait for the personnel to operate them, offer a fitting
image of the state of medicine in Hashemite Iraq. Able to fund the construction of facilities at a
faster pace than it could train and retain qualified medical professionals, the Iraqi government
followed a pattern of using medicine to enhance its control over its citizens at the same time
that it increased access to medical care. These two goals, though often intertwined and running
together, were never pursued in equal measure. As I demonstrate in this chapter, the
challenges of training and retaining doctors and other health professionals combined with the
conceptualization of diseases in spatial terms to enhance state control over subjects through
medicine. Sometimes, this progress came at the cost of opportunities to increase access to
medical care and medical education.
The idea that diseases exist apart from the bodies they infect predates the beginning of
germ theory in the second half of the nineteenth century. Once proponents of germ theory
found some success in managing epidemics, as Waldemar Haffkine did with an anti-cholera
vaccine in India and Alexandre Yersin and Kitasato Shibasaburo did with the plague in Hong
Kong, a new field of possibilities emerged for limiting the passage of disease from environment
to host.2 With this field in view, colonial states assembled a discourse of public health that they
inserted into legal frameworks regulating international trade and transit. To secure their
interests in a colony, colonial governments increasingly found it necessary, especially in the first
half of the twentieth century, to manage the health of their subjects. This they did through
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medical missions and programs for the promotion of personal hygiene, but no less significantly,
through the remaking of space itself.
The remaking of space, as the case of twentieth-century Baghdad demonstrates,
constituted a double move of making hospitals and clinics into sites where the full force of the
state’s resources could be impressed on its citizens, while simultaneously reducing the profile
of disease in environments where it might otherwise appear to overwhelm or elude the reach
of the state. This double transformation began in Baghdad with the first efforts to rein in
epidemic and endemic diseases in the early 1920s, as best illustrated by the Health
Department’s coordination of municipal garbage removal with the filling in of swampland
around the city. It continued with the consolidation of legal medical practice into the isolation
hospital and general hospital on the respective Karkh and Rusafa sides of the Tigris River, a
consolidation that reveals how the exertion of state control over sick subjects differed
according to their geographical origin and socioeconomic background. By the 1950’s, however,
the limitations of an approach to public health that prioritized controlling space over leading all
members of the population to take charge of their health were coming into view. Not only did
the empty hospitals Abdul Wahab identified signal that the state could not meet its citizens’
needs, but slow or entirely lacking responses to certain health risks, such as tuberculosis and
the ingestion of poison, pointed to the need for a new approach that would circumvent the
limitations of a resource-intensive remaking of space.
Omar Dewachi has identified the 1920’s as the decade in which the management of
human life became the guiding principle behind medicine and public health in Iraq. Outbreaks
of plague and cholera from neighboring Iran and India continued to threaten Iraq during the
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early years of the decade, as they had periodically over the prior century, but now British
physicians were sufficiently in control of Iraq’s health resources to take action. Dewachi has
found that, as the volume of trade and pilgrimages increased with the improvement of regional
steam and rail transportation networks, “the change in conditions and technologies of
transport engendered new ‘pathologies’ for the [public health] directorate. The compression of
distance and travel time was an express ride for vectors and carriers of disease.” 3 New scrutiny
was applied to persons and goods arriving in Baghdad from the port of the Basra and as part of
the overland visitation (ziyarat) traffic to Shi’a sites in Karbala and Najaf. This new scrutiny was
predicated on what Arnold T. Wilson, the officer in charge of Iraq’s occupation until 1920,
understood as the importance of uniting the functions of hakeem (doctor) and hakim (ruler),
medicine and rule. 4 Dewachi confirmed the continued salience of Wilson’s wordplay through
the operation of a Health Department as a subsidiary unit of the Ministry of the Interior, which
also oversaw the police and the prison system. In the union of these functions, and in the
state’s management of the cholera outbreak in 1923, Dewachi sees state medicine as a matter
of biopolitics and, no less importantly, a break from the environmental determinism that had
characterized British knowledge of disease in Mesopotamia prior to the First World War.
Sara Farhan has examined medicine in Iraq through the lens of professionalization,
documenting extensively how the Royal College of Medicine took shape in Baghdad over the
1920’s and subsequently functioned as a site for the production of a class of medical
professionals. Iraqi doctors and their students participated in Arab nationalist politics as they
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contributed to the curing of disease and the adoption of preventative health measures. Farhan
contrasts this professionalization of medicine with the many who practiced local traditions of
medicine in Iraq before the First World War. Although these practitioners of Galenic and
prophetic medicine were brought into the monarchical-era fold only selectively, they
nevertheless enjoyed considerable reputations as healers among the wider Iraqi populace.
Farhan’s extensive compilation of the names of physicians from both eras illustrates a spatial
division of medicine into a political center of medicine located at the College of Medicine and a
periphery characterized by practitioners continuing to offer their services on an informal basis.5
Farhan’s focus on doctors as a class reveals how the medical profession reproduced itself over
the decades in a political environment populated with government bureaucrats, teachers, and
other professional classes.
Having shown how enmeshed the practitioners of medicine were in the politics of
monarchical and republican Iraq, both Dewachi and Farhan point the way forward to the study
of how doctors’ political power insinuated itself into the urban fabric of Baghdad. If doctors in
Iraq used medicine to manage the bodies of the state’s subjects, as Dewachi shows, then how
did they balance the management of bodies with the environments in which those bodies
lived? And if doctors were as motivated to burnish their reputations for professionalism as cure
the ill, as Farhan suggests, then how were the institutional spaces of medicine and public health
– the hospitals and the clinics – made to participate in this medical politicking? The answers to
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these questions, as I have averred above, lie in the examination of how different elements
within the medical and public health services remade the space of the city to suit their needs.
An important precedent for attending closely to the spatial dimensions of medical
practice lies in a milestone earlier work in Arabic, A History of Medicine in Iraq with the
Establishment and Introduction of the Iraqi Royal Medical College. Written by Hashim al-Witry
and Mu‘ammar Khalid al-Shabandar in 1939, A History of Medicine in Iraq weaves the history of
medieval Islamic medicine together into a centuries-long narrative of medical progress and
achievement followed by stagnation in the early modern period. A History of Medicine in Iraq
sought to explain this stagnation in terms of environmental challenges to the practice of
medicine. It was destructive hordes, plagues, and floods that prevented the practitioners of
medicine from improving their ability to fight disease, and pointedly not any lapse in the
aptitudes of medical practitioners. Mindful that plagues and floods continued to threaten the
stability of Iraqi society, Witry and Shabandar addressed the doctors among their readers
directly, urging them that “your deeds (a‘mal) for this nation (umma) will deliver it to the
shores of safety, God willing.”6 In order for Iraqi doctors to make progress as their antecedents
had, they needed to confront the spatial challenges of the environment directly, seeking
explanations for disease in the standing water left by floodwaters or the movements of pilgrims
into Iraq from abroad. But if this directive succeeded in taking space into account as a dynamic
force affecting national health outcomes, it did so only partially, leaving unaddressed how the
spaces of the hospital and clinic themselves might affect public health. In their narrative,
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hospitals and clinics acted as mere containers for the achievements of distinguished physicians
past and present and did not pose any health challenges to the urban environments in which
they were situated.
Many of the sources for the history of medicine in Iraq are reports and retrospective
studies written by Iraqi doctors who were themselves intimately involved in the work they
describe. Saniha Amin Zaki, Hashim al-Hashimi, and Salim al-Damluji were all doctors at Royal
Hospital and either students, professors, or both at the College of Medicine. Their proximity to
the events and trends they describe affords readers a wealth of detail, often in exceptionally
well-written Arabic prose, as to the social dynamics of learning and doing medicine in Baghdad
hospitals. The same proximity, however, tends to reproduce an emphasis on the actions of
doctors as determinative of what medicine was in Iraq. Patients, nurses, dressers, orderlies, and
their loved ones are relegated to a marginalized position within these sources, if they are
mentioned at all.
While the Arabic source base has been underutilized for the history of medicine in Iraq,
it must be examined in relation to the reports of British and American doctors and outside
observers. Iraqi doctors wrote with keen appreciation for the significance of medicine to the
cultivation of a nation, while their British and American contemporaries understood their own
work, as well as the work of their Iraqi colleagues, as the bringing of enlightened practices for
scientific discovery to a land suffering from centuries of mismanagement. Both camps, with
one or two exceptions in each, tended therefore to focus on medicine and public health as they
operated on the large scale, i.e. with comparatively less regard for the social consequences of
medicine in the course of daily life. Reading the sources in relation to one another brings
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together a corpus of statements about patients, nurses, dressers, and other medical subalterns
with which to piece together a fragment of medicine’s institutional effects on daily life. This
fragment allows us to say that medicine and public health served to collapse distinctions among
Iraqis of geographical origins, while at the same time accentuating class differences.

The British Occupation
When the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force occupied Baghdad in March of 1917, the
cholera and malaria that had hobbled it over the preceding three years followed them into the
city. Vaccination campaigns against cholera and malaria were soon made necessary by the new
task of managing an occupied city.7 Shortly after declaring that his army had liberated Baghdad
from Ottoman oppression, the leader of the Expeditionary Force, Sir Stanley Maude,
succumbed to a cholera infection after a visit to a local school.8 Maude’s death must have made
quite the impression on the minds of contemporary Baghdadis, as Iraqi historians contrast his
demise with the BritIsh victory over the Ottoman Sixth Army in their battle for the city. Jamil
Abu Tabikh notes that “after a few short months, this leader fell victim to cholera just like the
previous occupant of the Khudairi palace,” a reference to the German general Von Der Goltz,
who also died of cholera.9 Qasim al-Jumaily makes a similar appraisal of the event in his history
of epidemics in Iraq: “Cholera had a dramatic role in the end of late Ottoman Iraq. General
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Maude, who had defeated the Ottomans on the battlefields, was himself defeated by cholera
and met his end in Baghdad on November 17, 1917.”10
In response to their new epidemiological environment, Indian Medical Service doctors
attached to the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force took health measures designed for Indian
soldiers and applied them to the city populace. Indian Medical Service officers set themselves
up in the old Namik Pasha-era hospital to better take care of soldiers and inoculate Baghdadis
against plague and cholera. Until their departure from Iraq in 1921, Indian Medical Service
doctors were preoccupied with preventing cholera and plague epidemics. Inoculation and
sanitation measures comprised most of their interactions with the local populace. From their
medicinal stronghold near the newly occupied Ottoman palace and barracks, the
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force doctors reestablished the close ties between municipal
administration and medicine that had existed before the war.
After the League of Nations awarded Great Britain the mandate to administer Iraq,
colonial medicine expanded its remit to include building permanent hospitals in Baghdad and
providing training for Iraqis as health professionals. Because the nominal goal of the mandate
was to prepare Iraq for self-rule, British colonial officers reported yearly on the progress of
medicine in Iraq to the League of Nations. In these reports, numbers of hospital beds were
made the most significant measure of progress in the country, followed closely by the number
of hospitals. In 1925, the Royal Hospital was reported to have 250 beds, the Meir Elias Jewish
hospital a further 100, and the Civil Isolation Hospital 100 beds. The remaining fifteen hospitals
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scattered throughout Iraq had an average of 40 beds each.11 Numbers of beds enabled British
health officers to report on the progress of medicine in a simple, linear fashion that identified
room for improvement as largely a matter of more – more beds, more funding for said beds,
and eventually more hospitals. Regional differences were reduced to the manageable
distinction between major cities and rural villages and towns. As the Health Department
succeeded in adding more beds and, eventually, new wings to the hospitals scattered
throughout Iraq, it concentrated the medical resources of the state in a few sites with
considerable in-between distances that were bereft of medical services. This distribution of
medical resources augmented the rationale that Iraqis living in under-serviced rural areas to
travel inward to towns and cities equipped with hospitals. So long as it was less costly to
improve services at an existing hospital than it was to create a new one, the creation of new
nodes of care lagged behind, and the growth of medicine in Iraq contributed to the accelerating
migration of peasants to the cities.
An Iraqi effort to curb this tendency toward the centralization of healthcare took the
form of a disagreement between Iraqi government officials and British health officers in 1923.
During the first six months of 1923, Iraqi ministers in Baghdad insisted that the central
government should no longer fund hospitals and dispensaries throughout the nation, and
instead their costs should be met by the local municipal governments. The decision met with
“strong representations from the Health Directorate that this policy would result in an almost
complete disappearance of medical facilities throughout the country with an equal loss of
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control over the spread of epidemics.”12 When the municipalities could no longer afford these
expenses and a shutdown of hospitals and clinics loomed, Iraqi ministers in Baghdad changed
course to fund the hospitals from central government funds. British reports to the League of
Nations laid emphasis on the visitation (ziyarat) season as an explanation for why the Iraqi
government had changed course and why the British-run Health Department needed Iraqis to
heed its expert advice.13 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Iraqi government
officials were shortsighted in their reluctance to commit to centralized funding. Shifting costs
to the municipalities might have exposed Iraq to a greater risk of epidemic disease in the short
run, but in the long run, the precedent could have encouraged budgeting more for rural
healthcare that could meet local needs without exacerbating rural outmigration.
Sanitizing the City
To reduce the threat that waterborne diseases posed to Baghdad, the Public Health
department undertook to transform how waste was removed from the city. At the start of the
Public Health department’s intervention, brick-lined cesspits in house courtyards and cambered
city streets collected waste and runoff water, an arrangement that depended on the soil and
the elements to absorb the refuse slowly. Donkey-drawn carts made three daily trips along
regular routes to collect household trash from rubbish bins before depositing it in pits that had
been dug to raise bunds during flood seasons. These dumps were kept burning and sprayed
periodically with oil to keep down flies. Manure deposited there was sold to vegetable farmers
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at rates that brought in around 450 rupees per month.14 Much of this system likely predated
the creation of the Public Health department, whose intervention was to consolidate efforts
across the city into a single organization with fixed routes and regular terms of employment for
donkey drivers, sweepers, and managers. Early efforts were insufficient, however, to prevent a
typhoid outbreak in 1921. Poor subsoil drainage was held to be the cause. Garbage collection
also found that its placement of rubbish bins encouraged some Baghdadis to sort through the
trash and strew the remaining bits about.15 In response to these challenges, the waste removal
section stepped up its efforts in 1923, cleaning out 575 cesspits, burying 2000 animal corpses,
and carrying off 3,890 wagonloads of offal for burial.16 The coordination of so many garbage
collection routes and cesspit cleanings bound Baghdadi neighborhoods together as the
collectors moved from one part of the city to another.
The waste removal section’s major achievement came in 1924, when the Ministry of
Finance and Baghdad’s municipal government succeeded in coordinating with the Public Health
department to fill in eight swamps around the Rusafa section of Baghdad. The swamps covered
149,490 square meters and together had a volume of 363,992 cubic meters. For six months out
of the year they filled with rainwater that attracted insects and water-borne parasites. Waste
removal teams calculated that, at a rate of 1,000 donkey loads of trash removed from the city
each day and five donkey loads to fill in a square meter of swampland, the Public Health
department could fill 72,000 cubic meters each year and fill in the swamps entirely within a
space of 5 years. The Ministry of Finance agreed to pay Public Health at a rate of 1 rupee per

14

T. Barrett Heggs, City of Baghdad Annual Report of the Health Department for the Year 1920, 6, 40-41.
T. Barrett Heggs City of Baghdad Annual Report of the Health Department for the Year 1921, 16, 41.
16
T. Barrett Heggs, City of Baghdad Annual Report of the Health Department for the Year 1923, 72.
15

64

cubic meter. To expedite efforts, farmers were told they could barter fill dirt for the fertilizer
and thereby save money. This project saw the successful coordination of several branches of
government to turn a disease vector problem into a land reclamation project. By filling in
swampland, the Public Health department effectively got into the business of conserving city
space for future development, all while regulating the amounts and types of material that could
occupy the marginal spaces of neighborhoods.
The Clinics
Clinics enhanced the ability of the Health Department to screen for epidemic and
endemic diseases at the level of individual neighborhoods. How effective they were at reducing
the spread of disease was important, but more important to British health officials was the
demographic information they generated about each neighborhood. The two busiest clinics
were located next to the Gilani mosque in Bab al-Shaykh, with over 20,000 visitors in 1920, and
next to the Haydarkhana mosque, with over 13,000 visitors that same year. Smaller clinics that
saw over 5,000 and 7,000 visitors were located in the Shorja bazaar and on the Ras al-Jisr road
to Kazimiyya, respectively. The clinics rented space piecemeal. The Haydarkhana clinic occupied
a single upstairs room that served as a combined reception area, waiting room, and exam
room. The Bab al-Shaykh clinic suffered from overcrowding and poor lighting, while the Shorja
clinic, though receiving the fewest patients, had separate rooms for each clinical function.17
Health officials did not find these spaces satisfactory, but allowed the clinics to operate in them
anyway, in return for the figures they provided as to the incidence of disease across categories
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of gender, religion, and ethnicity. With these figures, health officials could redefine each
neighborhood in terms of the nature and extent of the challenges it posed to public health, and
accordingly, make decisions as to what sort of improvements, as related to health or other
municipal services, should take place when and where.
Trachoma, a progressive eye disease monitored through the clinics, further reveals how
health officials prioritized the management of neighborhood space over the success of their
intervention in individual cases. Examining a patient required the dresser to evert the eyelids
and check for the granulomas that indicated a buildup of Chlamydia trachomatis bacteria in the
upper eyelid and diverticula. A forceps, buttonhook, or even the examiner’s forefinger and
thumb were used to evert the eyelid. All three methods saw wide use in early twentiethcentury Europe and the United States.18 Iraqi and Indian dressers were trained in the same
manner. For a patient found to have accumulations of scar tissue that impaired eye function,
treatment consisted of cold compresses administered in a darkened room over hours,
intermixed with painful eyewashes containing boric acid, argyrols, and silver nitrate solutions.19
These examination and treatment protocols risked exposing clinicians and their patients to
infection if instruments were not sanitized properly, but they were advantageous from the
standpoint of gathering neighborhood health demographics because Iraqi and Indian dressers
could administer the test and treatment quickly to a large volume of patients.
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The diagnosis of trachoma and other conditions was also carried out in the city’s
schools, where it furthered the Health Department’s efforts to create knowledge of the health
habits of children and their families. As early as 1918, the Health Department experimented
with creating individual health cards for students, but budgetary limitations forced it to instead
have the visiting inspector recommend cases for treatment by a doctor. On his inspections, Dr.
Stavros Anagnostidis found mostly diseases of the eyes, scalp, and skin, along with the
occasional malaria case.20 During routine school visits, three out of four Iraqi schoolchildren
were found to have trachoma.21 The intervention at the school was borne out of the conviction,
then widespread among British doctors and public health officials, that the school environment
and its hours of study actually worsened a child’s physical well-being. For about a half-century
prior to the British mandate, school officials in the United States, Great Britain, and continental
Europe understood the climatic conditions of public schooling – overcrowding, poorlyventilated classrooms, and unsanitary latrines – as threatening the health of entire generations
of children, and with them, the future of the nation. This concern included the long-term
effects on the eyes of reading and squinting at chalkboards.22 British medical officers and their
coworkers trained in other European medical traditions approached schooling in Iraq with the
same concern. It was not simply enough to educate the child; he or she had to be educated
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properly, in this case, by avoiding the debilitating effects of confinement and overly rigorous
academic study.
New General Hospital
Outside of clinics and classrooms, the Health Department worked to consolidate
medical care into a few physical sites where it could better manage the lives of doctors, nurses,
orderlies, and their patients. This focus on consolidation is reflected in the importance the
Department attached to improving hospital facilities. In 1921, a rabies research facility, which
had been the pride of British Civil Surgeons in Iraq since before World War One, was moved
into new facilities at the New General Hospital under the auspices of its Director, Lieutenant
Colonel A.E. Hamerton.23 As early as 1922, the New General Hospital also operated its own XRay Institute with valve tubes large enough to prompt its director to write about the risks of
radiation exposure in the British Medical Journal.24 The grounds of New General Hospital also
maintained an outpatient facility, a lunatic asylum, and housing for nurses until 1926, when
they were all destroyed by floodwaters from the Tigris River.25 Plans were quickly set in motion
to take advantage of the opportunity that nature had presented; from the Maude Memorial
Fund, 16 lakhs, or 1.6 million rupees, were allocated to rebuild these facilities in 1927. 26 This
construction effort coincided with the founding of Iraq’s medical school on the hospital’s

23

“Meetings of Branches and Divisions – Mesopotamian Branch” Supplement to the British Medical Journal 1922
Jan 28; 1(3187): S18.
24
A.C. Norman, “The Protection of Radiologists” British Medical Journal 1922 Jul 29; 2(3213): 190–191.
25
Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of
‘Iraq for the year 1926, 51-2.
26
Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of
‘Iraq for the years 1927-8, 77.

68

grounds in that same year.27 The relocation of the rabies facility to New General Hospital,
together with the decision to rebuild on the Tigris River, despite the risks of another flood,
points to the deliberate consolidation of specialized medical services within a single campus.
British and Iraqi health officials invested their resources in a single medical campus that could
project state power across the city and into the provinces.
The consolidation of medical care at New General Hospital continued to serve Iraqis as
an important benchmark of national progress in medicine long after the hospital was renamed
the Royal Hospital. Writing the history of medicine in Iraq, the physician Hashim al-Witry, dean
of the College from 1937 to 1939 and again from 1946 to 1953, noted in 1939 that the facilities
that Iraqi medicine had inherited from the Ottomans spoke in symbolic terms about the poor
state of Ottoman-era medicine in general:
The houses that comprised the hospital were sinking into the ground almost half way. Their
dusty walls and roof were falling apart and did not protect against the intense summer heat
and its hellishness nor the cold of the winter and its rains. And we still remember that dusty,
dirty, plague-written spot as it stood before us when we were children.28
Witry’s description of the old hospital facilities demonstrates his mastery of a medical idiom
that not only evaluated quality of care in terms both climatological and hygienic, but which
could also act as a lens through which to understand medicine’s recent history. Witry was not
alone in bringing a hygienic eye to the past, present, and future of the Iraqi hospital. Saniha
Amin Zaki, who was a student at the Royal College of Medicine in the early 1940’s, took it upon
herself to restore the hospital’s old tennis court. With support from professors and classmates,
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she reinvigorated the space. Along with her student committee members, Zaki arranged to
“buy the red clay, chain-link fencing, tennis nets, and an iron door with a lock to keep outsiders
out.” After this, they wrote “on the silver gate, in bright red letters, ‘A Sound Mind in a Sound
Body.’” Subsequent tennis competitions enabled men and women students to socialize more
easily with one another.29 Professors of Medicine and medical students took pride in the
facilities at the Royal Hospital. They considered physical improvements to the hospital campus
a necessary part of transforming it from the supposedly weak state of Ottoman-era medicine
into a premier health institution for the new Iraq.
For the Iraqi doctors who taught at the College of Medicine and who lobbied on behalf
of its hospital with the government, history showed that the Royal Hospital had inherited an
illustrious tradition of medical achievement from the early centuries of Baghdad’s existence.
Witry and Shabandar wrote their history of medicine with Iraqi medical students as one of their
intended audiences. One edifying anecdote they shared with their students concerned several
‘Abbasid doctors whose malpractice had met with dire consequences from a justice-minded
caliph and his chief physician. It was a tale designed to impress upon readers that professional
accountability had existed earlier in Iraq’s history.30 Recent history was also on the minds of
Iraqi doctors who saw in the College of Medicine a marker of national progress. Hanna Khayyat,
a professor and dean of the College from 1934 to 1936, was an ardent nationalist and a
politician whose medical students remembered him for delivering lectures in mellifluous
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Arabic.31 Reflecting on the College’s accomplishments in 1944, Khayyat wrote that a ten-year
plan he presented to King Faysal in 1922 had succeeded in raising the number of Iraqi doctors
from an alleged 9 to 81 in 1932 and to 632 by 1942. In the same period, the number of foreign
doctors had dwindled from 177 to 160 to 38.32 The accuracy of Khayyat’s figures
notwithstanding, Khayyat’s narrative of the College’s first two decades saw its function as
generating new medical professionals with Iraqi citizenship.
Among students at the College in the 1940’s, there were many who saw their studies in
terms of fostering a sense of national unity. At the outset of the military conflict between Great
Britain and Iraqi nationalists in 1941, students prepared to do their part to defend the nation by
treating wounded Iraqi soldiers and barricading the College against British attack. 33 Other
students were mindful of the ways in which medical education presented opportunities to
make friendships and professional relationships with Iraqis from different backgrounds. During
her rotation through obstetrics, Saniha Amin Zaki shared a small hospital bedroom with three
other women students, one bed to a wall. They were two Muslim women, an Armenian
Christian woman, and a Jewish woman united in common purpose and respectful of each
other’s religion.34 Widad Bazzoui, a student at the College in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s,
wrote of him and his colleagues that they were “almost unaware of the religions of the kids
sitting beside us while working on the same projects. A certain respect and interdependence
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were the prevailing feelings for each other.”35 Bazzoui goes on to describe how he and his
classmates studied together at his family house into the late hours together, those having
studied English for longer in high school helping the others with medical terminology. 36 For
medical students and their faculty, national unity and progress was not only an ideal to be
written about; it was the product of collaboration within the strictures of medical practice. The
College of Medicine served to concentrate these activities within the space of the medical
campus, while the history written by its faculty gave that space a chronological depth that
bolstered its significance to the nation-building project.
The focus on improving the resources of the hospital and touting its successes, however,
belied difficulties in extending the reach of medicine and hospitals to towns and rural areas.
Admissions practices for the College of Medicine reveal how the state prioritized the
improvement of hospitals in Baghdad and other cities over the dissemination of doctors to the
provinces. Between 1940 and 1944, the College regularly received applications from 300 men
and 30 women for between 50 and 70 seats. Some of these seats were reserved for applicants
from the provinces, and in the event that there were no applicants from a given province, those
seats were released to applicants from neighboring provinces.37 While this policy aimed at
increasing the number of graduates who might practice in rural areas, it was not very effective.
In 1955, there were still too few doctors in the small towns and villages outside of Baghdad,
Mosul, and Basra for morbidity reports to include medical explanations for cause of death.38 At
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the same time that admissions to the College tried to recruit more students from outside of the
cities, it maintained a tacit policy of quotas for students from minority backgrounds. Quotas for
Kurdish, Christian, Jewish, and Mandaean students led qualified applicants to be rejected for no
better reason than that there were other applicants from the same group.39 As large numbers
of Kurds and Mandaeans lived in rural northern and southern provinces, the quota system
effectively worked against the provincial recruitment policy.
With few options for advanced treatment in the provinces, Iraqis from rural
communities traveled in greater numbers to Baghdad for medical care as the reputation of its
main hospital grew. This influx of patients contributed to the ongoing migration of villagers to
the city in search of work and freedom from tribal law, among other incentives. At Royal
Hospital, these patients provided another opportunity to prove that modern medicine could
cure the sick no matter their place of origin. Donald M. Douglas, a British surgeon at Royal
Hospital, described his course of treatment for around two dozen women who had traveled
from the provinces suffering from vesico-vaginal fistulas:
During the last three years 29 cases of vesico-vaginal fistula have been admitted to the
gynaecological wards of the Royal Hospital, Baghdad. Of the 29 cases, 25 came from outlying
villages or the desert. In all of them the infant was stillborn. The average time in labour was
about 120 hours, but six women were known to have been in labour for 168 hours and one for
240 hours. As a rule the infant was extracted manually by an unskilled woman in the desert,
although six cases had had a forceps delivery in a provincial hospital…On the whole the physical
health of the women appeared to have suffered very little, but mentally they were miserable
and life was a burden to them.
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The article maintained its sterile point of view as it described a novel surgical procedure to
restore excretory functions for eleven of the women, two of whom died of complications on
the operating table. For Douglas, the “unskilled woman of the desert” was as familiar to him as
the ancient Sumerian civilization that received the customary laudatory remarks in his article’s
introduction. Similarly, the “forceps delivery in a provincial hospital” was one procedure of
many preceding the need for an advanced surgical intervention. The patient’s medical history
neatly paralleled her movement through progressive echelons of civilizational development,
culminating in care at the Royal Hospital. The cumulative effect of treating these cases was to
reinforce the existing distribution of the state’s medical resources. City hospitals performed
their work well, so despite widespread appeals for more doctors to practice in the countryside,
it continued to be the cities that received the most aid for state-run hospitals. The growth in
new hospitals that Najem Abdul Wahab identified in his thesis, raised at the beginning of this
chapter, was predominantly within Baghdad.
The Isolation Hospital
The Isolation Hospital, used for the containment of persons suffering from epidemic
diseases, enhanced the state’s control over its subjects by removing sick persons from their
homes and restricting their family members from visiting them. The architects of the Isolation
Hospital were the British Director of Public Health, T. Barrett Heggs, and the Assistant Director
of Public Health, an Iraqi doctor named Sami Shawkat. 40 Heggs was adamant in one of his
reports about the role the Isolation Hospital played in the public health of the city, calling it the
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“main weapon of the city Health Department in fighting epidemic disease” that “certainly has
served its purpose in the past and is steadily gaining the confidence of the public.” 41 It was in
altogether different terms, however, that patients at the Isolation Hospital experienced modern
medicine. Between 1919 and 1923, those suffering from typhoid fever, measles, syphilis,
tuberculosis, and other contagious diseases were isolated in a sulfur chamber upon entry to the
hospital. There, a Clayton machine operated by one of the hospital staff produced a sulfur
dioxide gas to disinfect their bodies. Clothes and other personal items suspected of
contamination were taken from the sick person and put through a Thresh disinfector or were
soaked in cresol.42 The gas used in the sulfur chamber was invisible and produced an odor
similar to that of burnt matches. Cresol, the chemical used to disinfect personal effects,
irritated the skin and had the potential to damage internal organs after prolonged exposure.
Subjection to this health regimen did little to instill confidence in the Isolation Hospital as a
place in which the sick got better. Those who survived the ordeal of confinement at Isolation
Hospital had good reason to tell others to avoid it at all costs, sometimes having the sore throat
and irritated skin to prove their point.
Staffing issues at the Isolation Hospital in its early years tells a story commensurate with
the sufferings of its patients. In 1921, the hospital employed 31 Arabic-speaking men and 18
Arabic-speaking women as orderlies and nurses. The following year, 1922, the Hospital had
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fewer native speakers of Arabic: 25 men and 16 women. In 1923, only 3 men and 8 women on
staff were native city residents who spoke Arabic. This decrease posed a significant problem to
the director of the hospital, who noted that most patients spoke Arabic or Persian and the
majority of the medical staff spoke only Armenian and Turkish. In those same years, the
Isolation Hospital changed its visitor policy several times, banning visitors altogether in 1921,
only to reinstate limited visitation in response to complaints.43 Whatever the reason for the
departure of the Arabic-speaking staff, the hospital’s failure to replace them meant that the
Isolation Hospital compounded their patients’ bodily sufferings with a lack of staff who could
communicate easily with them.
Isolation Hospital enabled the Health department to study and, to some extent,
determine who lived in Baghdad neighborhoods. Health officers thought of lepers, for example,
primarily as migrants from the tribal areas of Iraq who came to Baghdad to beg.44 Treating
lepers aimed at preventing begging and vagrancy in addition to the disease itself. From August
of 1922 until April of 1923, T. Barrett Heggs, the Director of Public Health, ran a trial for a new
treatment at the Isolation Hospital. Patients were given intramuscular injections of oscol
stibium, a colloidal solution of antimony in increasing doses from 1 to 5 cubic centimeters. He
recorded that patients felt good after receiving the injection and took a liking to it. Skin
thickness and hair were also observed to start returning to normal. Skin nodules and the
leprosy bacillus remained, however, until treatment was switched to the better-reputed course
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of chaulmoogra oil. The leprosy trial was conducted amidst discussion of establishing a leper
colony at Baghdad, one of the many specialized centers that would combine treatment and
research and that would enhance the standing of modern medicine in Iraq. Discussion stalled
by 1927 on the matter of finances, however, and treatment continued at individual hospitals
and dispensaries.45
The forced removal and detention of sick persons at the Isolation Hospital provided a
spatial fix for the problem of preventing transmission by persons to whom the vaccine was not
administered properly or whom the vaccinators did not reach. When health officers inevitably
identified sick cases in a neighborhood population, their removal to the Isolation Hospital and
the restrictions against family visitors bolstered the idea that some residents of any
neighborhood required an admixture of discipline and debilitating treatment in order for
disease to be kept from the population. Force made up for any shortcomings in the vaccination
and sanitization efforts of the Health Department. Furthermore, isolation acted as a
preventative measure against the transmission of diseases for which there was no vaccine, as in
the case of leprosy.
New laws governing the practice of medicine also served to define where and how
medicine could be practiced in Baghdad. To curb practitioners from working outside of official
parameters, a 1922 law instituted prison sentences for vaccinating using smallpox harvested
outside of government laboratories, i.e. from other infected persons. The 1925 Medical
Practices Law followed suit, empowering the Public Health department to interdict the practice
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of medicine in a given area, fine violators, and seize their medicine stores. And in 1926, an
Infectious Disease Law threatened sick persons who used public transportation with prison
sentences or removal to the Isolation Hospital. The treatment of lepers sought to remove rural
migrants from city streets while bolstering the city’s claim to be a center for advanced
medicine, while laws passed in 1922, 1925, and 1926 aimed at capturing the largest share
possible of infected persons for treatment at Isolation Hospital.
Over the next three decades, the Isolation Hospital continued to serve its original
purpose of confining individuals with infectious diseases, especially smallpox and tuberculosis.
During these years, the hospital facilities remained largely the same. A brick mortuary, car
garage, and surrounding wall were completed in 1921, but electricity and better road access
had to wait.46 The surrounding wall was topped with barbed wire to prevent unauthorized exit
and entry.47 When Saniha Amin Zaki was a student in the early 1940’s, she noted that the
hospital consisted of a modest single floor bungalow with separate corridors. Its only
redeeming feature was its garden, planted with mulberry and banana trees, which reminded
her of the Iraqi countryside and which served as a pleasant distraction from the hospital’s
gloomy interior.48 The doctors at Isolation Hospital tended to share in Zaki’s ambivalence
toward the institution. One doctor, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Pachachi, transitioned from working there in
the late 1930’s to overseeing Ward 6 at the Royal Hospital and lecturing in clinical medicine at
the College.49 He continued to live on the campus of Isolation Hospital, however, in the house
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that had been provided him and his wife during his directorship there.50 Shortages of suitable
houses for the growing numbers of professionals and their families was a chronic issue in Iraqi
cities throughout the monarchical period. The Public Health department must have provided a
house for the director of the Isolation Hospital in order to keep the position filled. Pachachi’s
promotion to Royal Hospital shows, however, that such benefits were not enough to keep an
ambitious doctor at the Isolation Hospital for long. The modest facilities at Isolation Hospital
underscored a consistent policy of minimal investment in an institution designed primarily to
confine contagious individuals, almost all of whom were too poor to be seen by a doctor in
private practice. The comparative lack of investment, in turn, dissuaded many doctors from
working there for too long.
Throughout the monarchical period, the treatment of tuberculosis proceeded on the
wisdom that treatment depended almost entirely on early prevention and isolation of sick
cases. A bacterial infection of the lungs, tuberculosis was transmitted via aspiration of water
droplets released into the air wherever a sick person coughed. Early on in its existence, the
Public Health department focused its response on hygiene education and proposals for
sanatoria that would provide space in which the very sick could recover.51 Until funds were
allocated for these proposals, however, there was little the Public Health department could do
other than admit tubercular patients to the Isolation Hospital on a voluntary basis. This policy
stayed in place despite estimates of 1 in 8 deaths in Baghdad for the year 1921.52 The
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comparative lack of resources allocated for tuberculosis was one of the driving factors behind
the creation of a Directorate of Preventive Medicine, but it did not occur until 1941. In
defending the decision to form the Directorate, Hashim al-Witry complained of what he saw as
an overemphasis on curative medicine:
Until 1940 the main emphasis in Iraq’s health policy was on the treatment rather than the
prevention of disease…If more of the money which has until now been spent on hospitals and
treatment had been allotted to prevention it would have been possible to combat many of the
country’s epidemic diseases and decrease the amount of endemic disease… The only real way
in which to fight [tuberculosis] is spend more on preventive measures, but apart from this it is a
pity that more facilities for curing the disease do not exist in Iraq .
Witry’s assessment of the status quo in 1944 concurred with the proposals of Public Health first
formulated in 1920, and it acknowledged that the allure of hospitals and curative medicine had
taken from the efforts of preventative medicine. Although the Directorate committed seven
doctors to improving tuberculosis treatment, it too was unable to overcome the trend in favor
of curative medicine. By 1955, tuberculosis remained common among poor urban populations
in Iraq, whose malnutrition increased their susceptibility to the disease and who were often
unable to seek treatment in hospitals until the disease had progressed to its most virulent
stages.53 Preventative efforts still paled in comparison to the vast sums given to the
construction of dedicated tuberculosis hospitals.
Throughout the monarchical period, doctors and public health officials tended to view
Iraqi women as being in need of guidance in the proper care of their children, lest superstition
and ignorance threaten the reproductive success of Iraqis. Iraqis who studied medicine in
Istanbul and later at the College of Medicine in Baghdad tended to associate certain home
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remedies with both women and quackery. In his condemnation of medicine in Iraq, Hashim alWitry wrote in one breath that Baghdad was “an open field (maydan fasih) for the trickery of
charlatans and crooked men, and a fertile grazing ground for quacks and peddlers of hokum
remedies” and that women “played doctor prescribing medicines and poisons, harming
health.”54 In the early 1920’s, Public Health department officials and their allies among Iraqi
doctors and legislators put together legislation that placed strict licensing requirements on
midwives. Shortly after the College of Medicine was established on a firm footing, the Iraqi
doctor Sami Shawkat further developed the regulation of midwives with his creation of a course
on midwifery. Taught at the Royal Hospital, the course instructed women in anatomy,
medicines, vaccinating against smallpox and inoculation against cholera and plague. In 1923,
there were 315 registered midwives in Baghdad, 197 of whom had taken Shawkat’s course and
110 of whom had succeeding in obtaining their license.
Conclusion
Public health and medicine in Iraq were as important for shaping citizens’ expectations
for the future of the state as they were for saving lives from epidemic diseases and ending
suffering from endemic diseases. The professionalization of Iraqi doctors that began in the
1920’s enhanced the state’s control over its citizens, not just in countering threats to public
order, but in bringing Iraq’s fourteen provinces together under a government situated at
Baghdad, as Omar Dewachi and Sara Farhan have shown. To appreciate fully the effects that
medicine had in the lives of Iraqis, however, one must extend the analysis into the ways in
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which medicine and public health conditioned the production of space. During the British
mandate, British and Iraqi doctors and health officials transformed what had been a piecemeal
distribution of state medicine into a national one that made the host neighborhoods in
Baghdad into major destinations for patients coming from the provinces and residents of
distant city neighborhoods.
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Chapter III.
“Lest the Flower of This Country Become an Idle Tool”:1
Work and Space in Baghdad, 1920 – 1958

The quote in this chapter’s title is from a pamphlet in Arabic anticipating the founding of
Baghdad University, a project that saw the consolidation of Baghdad’s many colleges into a
single institution with a new main campus in the Karrada neighborhood. A reference to what
Iraqis risked in not giving the youth access to higher education, the concern that the flower of
the country would become an idle tool reflected Iraqis longstanding concern that a strong work
ethic was not only essential to Iraq’s progress as a nation, but also that it needed to be honed in
the neighborhoods that made up the nation’s capital, Baghdad. The concern for a national work
ethic germinated in the Iraqi public consciousness as the monarchical government took shape
in the early 1920’s and it went through several permutations in the 1930’s and 1940’s before
embracing the university education as a mainstay of a modern work force.
Beyond charting the path of this ethic through the monarchical period, this chapter
seeks to show how the concern for a strong work ethic manifested itself in the ways Baghdadis
appropriated space for themselves in the course of everyday life. An individual’s commitment
to the habits of mind and body that would best bring about national progress were legible in
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her and his behavior in public spaces that were being transformed into an urban stage on which
the nation would enact itself for the benefit of Iraqis living in the provinces.
This concern for the relationship between urban space and work runs through Iraqis’
writings on life in Baghdad, as evidenced in the reminiscences of its memoirists. In Memories of
Days Gone By, ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Barrak attributed the following to a member of Iraq’s Chamber
of Deputies: “Iraq did not reject the treaty; it was Rashid Street that rejected it, and it does not
represent the Iraqi people!2” For Barrak, however, as for many Baghdadis who lived through
the demonstrations against the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948 and those that came after it, Rashid
Street did in fact epitomize the positive and negative consequences of development in Iraq. To
illustrate exactly how this parliamentarian was wrong, Barrak takes his readers on a walking
tour of Rashid Street, pointing out the Haydarkhana mosque and cafes where protestors rallied
to hear speeches and march against imperialism, before concluding that “that is the whole of
the nation’s history (al-tarikh al-watani) for Rashid Street.”3 The conclusion is not the end,
though, as Barrak cannot help but point out the old movie theater where he and his friends
used to watch the silent films of Charlie Chaplin. Rashid Street is no mere container of places,
having a fixed beginning and end. There is always more that a person who lived there can
remember for his audience.
As Barrak’s walking tour suggests, the politics of space was a major concern of Iraqis
throughout the twentieth century, as government officials came into conflict with professionals

2

Abd al-Qadir Barrak, Dhikrayat Ayam Zaman [Memories of Days Gone By], (Baghdad: Ittihad Newspaper, 1989),
14.
3
Abd al-Qadir Barrak, Dhikrayat Ayam Zaman, 17.

84

and laborers over the character and function of paved thoroughfares, of bridges spanning the
Tigris River, of school grounds, hospital clinics, and new housing developments. Of these
spaces, Rashid Street has been one of the most historically significant because of its centrality
to this conflict. In the late Ottoman period, wartime need for a wide passage through Baghdad
spurred the cutting of Rashid Street through an old neighborhood.4 During the monarchy,
traffic engineering and public health ordinances served to rectify Rashid Street and govern its
use. But laborers and professionals saw the street differently, indeed lived it differently.
Students, teachers, tradesfolk, clerks, and day laborers of Baghdad insinuated their own
meanings into that space in the course of their daily lives, seeking through such gestures to
maintain a measure of personal autonomy over making meaning. Barrak, writing in the 1980’s,
showed something of how an earlier generation fared in this pursuit, perhaps as a way to
ensure that posterity will learn from it how better to make sense of space for themselves.
Tensions between the forces of neighborhood development and popular “takes” on the street
were unresolved then, as the Iraqi government embarked on another urban renewal program.
These tensions continue to reverberate throughout Baghdad and throughout Iraq right up to
the present.
In this chapter, I take Barrak’s postscript reflection on the Rashid Street cinema as an
invitation to explore the relationship between space and politics further by examining what
kinds of work in and around Baghdad contributed to the tension between multiple spatial
praxes. As I discussed in the introduction, space is political from the moment that two or more
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ways of thinking, some bearing the imprimatur of scientific knowledge but most having no such
formal recognition, stake separate claims on how space should be ordered and inhabited. What
discriminated between scientific and non-scientific forms of knowledge was the inclination to
do work deemed productive, distilled from capitalism in the late modern era and made
increasingly available for personal adoption in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Iraq was
not alone in experiencing this entanglement of space and work in the Middle East, the
seductive superiority of the sciences having proliferated in Egypt under the rule of Mehmet Ali
in the first half of the nineteenth century and in the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon during
the second. In these earlier examples, the proponents of disciplining work under the sciences
sought consciously to create new configurations of space – the self-sufficient agricultural estate
in Egypt and the tolerant, multi-confessional state in Mount Lebanon.5 With the Ottoman and
British colonization of Iraq, however, the emphasis shifted to mastery over population centers
within a region usually conceived of as too vast, remote, and thinly populated to allow for
politically powerful configurations of space to emerge. Those having the inclination to do work
deemed productive sought accordingly to strengthen the unity of Iraq through policies that
would assign each constituent population a space within the national framework. But in
devoting their attentions to the creation of a national space, Ottoman, British, and Iraqi
governors and administrators frequently underestimated the power of smaller configurations
of space to challenge their authority. The rising of Shi’a tribes from the central Euphrates region
in 1920 and of Assyrians in 1935 attest to the power that more intimate configurations of space

5

Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 43.
Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 50-51.

86

could bring to bear against the forces of national and international order. Where the national
and intimate configurations of space intersected, was Baghdad, its population swelling from the
displacement effects of economic integration. This trend brought vastly different notions of
work into conflict with one another over shared space.
The chapter seeks to show how the production of standards for work were contingent
upon the particular configurations of space that Iraqis created as the state inaugurated its own
projects of bolstering national unity, increasing economic vitality, and articulating a
commitment to cultural pluralism. I first show how, on the eve of monarchy in Britishcontrolled Iraq, the work patterns of boatmen on the Tigris demonstrate that Iraqis continued
to lay claims to the use of river space long after British steamship companies had operated
there. The chapter transitions to the activities of a growing professional class in the early
1920’s, when journalists and public intellectuals began a discussion about work in the new Iraq
that adapted international exemplars of diligence and success to the particular needs of Iraqis
in Baghdad. New expectations for a commitment to work were gradually put into wider
circulation through primary and secondary schools in the 1920’s and 1930’s. The chapter then
documents two changes starting in the 1940’s that precipitated a shift in what Iraqis thought
about work in the context of space. First, the diversion of Iraqi resources to the Allied war effort
gave new life to the idea that Iraqi resourcefulness had been mismanaged by a ruling elite
implicated in imperialist takeover. Second, rising class inequality manifested itself in the
separation of Baghdadis into middle class neighborhoods, the sara’if, and the cramped living
conditions of the old city. The shift toward a more favorable assessment of Iraqis’ innate
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capacity for work did not square with the material evidence present mounting in the streets
and alleyways of a sprawling capital city.
Recent scholarship on Iraq has uncovered ways in which the production of space and
work were mutually constitutive during the monarchical period. Schools have defined one of
the most important types of space in Iraqi history. In the 1930’s, the debate over how best to
inculcate sound work habits touched on the advantages and disadvantages of the classroom
format. Reeva Simon finds that Fadhil al-Jamali, a Ministry of Education official, was concerned
with how school reform could shift attitudes toward work, noting that “the democratic concept
that all boys between the ages of eighteen and twenty spend six months at manual labor in the
country appealed to Jamali, who always advocated practical, technical education and work with
the hands…for a people who eschewed even the concept of manual work.”6 Here, Jamali’s
beliefs about the salutary effects of working in the country described a kind of open space that
could correct for some of the aptitudes inculcated in confined city and town classrooms.
Indeed, the capacity of certain outdoor spaces to produce workers was extended in the
postwar years to landless citizens who had not spent many years at all inside of a classroom.
Sara Pursley has found that, on the Dujayla agricultural settlement project, landless tribesmen
were allowed to settle only if they were heads of a family consisting of a wife and children, and
even then they were allowed to settle only onto plots of land designed to prevent the
recreation of villages or tribes that impeded the integration of peasants into Iraqi society as
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individual landowners with a stake in national economic progress.7 As with Jamali’s plans for a
student labor corps, rural areas were reimagined into rule-bound spaces that could direct the
energies of individuals toward work capacities desired by the state.
Rural labor corps and the Dujayla land settlement are only two instances of the
monarchical government’s numerous short- and long-term projects to control work habits
through new configurations of space. With many of these projects, the state underestimated
the capacities of its citizens to make of a space what they will, whether through defiance of its
laws or through the creation of new meanings resonant with deeply-ingrained historical
experiences. Hanna Batatu gestures briefly toward these capacities in his remarks on the social
geography of Iraq. It was “the presence of Shi’i sanctuaries at Najaf and Karbala” that gave Shi’i
religious sensibilities their persistence in the middle Euphrates region; similarly, the “contagion
of the environment” effect won itinerant tribes to Shi’ism as affording its adopters a powerful
discourse of dissent from government.8 Here, Shi’ism should not be understood as a marker of
an essential cultural difference. For Batatu, Shi’ism was just one particularly salient set of
discursive and ritual practices that enabled Iraqis to make meaning in space. As this chapter
aims to show, other discourses could operate in a similar manner, simultaneously deriving
significance from one space and enabling its adherents to create new meanings in others. The
development projects of the Iraqi state did not take full account of how Shi’ism or other
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discourses might allow individuals to persist in making meaning for themselves.
Casting Off the Old Paradigm
A legacy of much scholarship on Iraq in the late Ottoman period is a relationship
between space and work in which open land exists as frontier territory to be brought under
control through the development of modern industries. That relationship, however, obscures
within itself an older way of relating space and work in which personal familiarity with the
particularities of the land serves as the basis of working knowledge. This paradigm is to be
found in many modern industries in Iraq, but is perhaps best illustrated in the rise of
steamships navigating the Tigris and Euphrates river. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, steamships established a foothold for British interests in cities and tribal areas along
the banks of the Tigris River, leading from ports on the Persian Gulf as far north as Mosul. As
early as 1846, the Lynch Brothers were the beneficiaries of an Ottoman firman to run regular
steamship routes carrying passengers and goods from Basra to Baghdad.9 River navigation was
made especially difficult, however, by seasonal changes in the Tigris’ depth. On at least two
occasions, ships ran aground upriver and were stuck for nearly a year. It took arrangements
with local tribes for protection and labor to eventually free them.10 The position of the
Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company was tenuous at best, a fact not lost on the Ottoman
governors of Baghdad. In 1872, Midhat Pasha established a school to train boat builders as part
of a bid to win back control over river navigation.11 One of his successors continued his efforts
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by establishing an office for river navigation that could compete with the British over shipping
from Basra to Baghdad. The competition continued until after the First World War, when the
last descendant of the Lynch Brothers sold his stake in the company to his Iraqi business
partner and its riverside offices were converted into a shoe store.
Of the many trades he observed to be obsolescent in the 1920’s, ‘Abbas Baghdadi’s
briefly discusses the nukhadha, a leadsman who sounded the depths of the river and alerted a
ship’s crew to steer clear of any shoals. A good leadsman needed to be highly familiar with the
Tigris River’s topography, a task made more complicated by the fact that it changed with each
seasonal flood.12 It is difficult to ascertain from available sources whether British or Ottoman
steamship crews counted any Iraqi nukhadhas among them, but the Baghdadi merchants who
relied on river shipping, and who regularly dealt with British and Ottoman representatives,
were familiar with the nukhadhas and the rudiments of their trade. Other Baghdadis would
have had contact with the nukhadhas in their capacities as fishermen and balamjiyya, captains
of flat-bottomed sailboats that ferried individuals from one spot on the riverbank to another.
Even though their role in river shipment was eclipsed by British steamships, the nukhadas
remained a fixture of the Tigris at Baghdad, whether as a pool of experienced river navigators,
as lighter captains working to unload steamships, or as ferrymen and fishermen. Aziz al-Hajj
recalled in his memoirs how lighters delivered watermelons and cantaloupes to the shore,
where another crew of porters transported them along with other goods to the city’s
warehouses.13 The nukhadhas furthermore maintained historic links to a regional culture of
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sailing and river navigation. The term nukhadha itself was a contraction of Persian nav and
khoda, and his call of “nimshomay” was likely another borrowing from Persian.14 It would be a
mistake, in view of their efforts to maintain relevance in Baghdad’s port economies for close to
eight decades, to accept uncritically Baghdadi’s description of them as obsolescent. The
nukhadas in fact reveal how the dominant discourse of a frontier territory to be mastered
through modern industry in fact depended throughout its existence on the older way of
understanding space in relation to work, in which the personal familiarity of river pilots with the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers sustained the movement of goods and persons by steamship. We
have therefore a classic example of how modern expertise, even as it seeks to supplant older
forms of knowledge, never truly succeeds in dispensing with them altogether.
Reshaping the Citizen’s Spatial Consciousness
The changes that steamships brought to trade at Baghdad did not escape the attention
of the city’s intelligentsia, who searched for new contexts in which to understand the recent
commercial and political interventions of European nations, in particular Great Britain. In a
series of lectures delivered at the Scientific Institute in 1922, Yusuf Ghanima articulated a global
history of trade that put the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, followed by the Abbasids and
finally the Ottomans and the British, at its center. The lectures were arranged chronologically.
In the first lecture, Ghanima posited a first commercial exchange between a prehistoric
fisherman and a farmer, followed soon thereafter by a tribesman’s discovery that he could
receive fruits cultivated in an orchard in exchange for his tribe’s handmade goods. These
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prototypical figures presaged trade between ancient Egyptians, Babylonians and Assyrians in
the fifteenth century B.C.E., noting that “the mention of Babel and Ashur brings to mind images
of architecture (Ar. ’umran), civilization (hadara), fertile land (khasab) and abundance
(ghina).”15 In subsequent lectures, Ghanima described the dazzling array of goods traded in Iraq
under the Abbasids, economic exchange with the Crusader states, and the devastating effects
the Mongols had on trade, before narrating the incursion of European, especially British,
commercial agents into Iraq up through the nineteenth century. The industrializing nations of
Europe had “turned their gaze upon Iraq’s famed fertility, its irrigation waters, and its flocks”
and had “struck out all over the earth and built up their factories day and night, encircling less
fortunate (maskuna) countries, with their products gushing forth in search of merchants to buy
them.” For Ghanima, Iraqis were not the mere victims of more powerful industrial nations, an
impression his audience might have taken if he had characterized Iraqis’ circumstances only in
present terms. Coming at the end of his lectures, after Ghanima had already highlighted several
respects in which Iraqis were perennial leaders in import and export on a hemispheric scale, the
threat posed by British commercial and political control was at most a temporary setback, if
not also a host of opportunities for Iraqis to reassert themselves.
The kinds of reasoning Ghanima employed in his lecture series demonstrate how the
Scientific Institute and similar educational programs in Baghdad sought to affect the spatial
consciousness of city residents. In his first lecture, Ghanima alleged that the Persian Empire at
the time of Darius I had a budget that measured 3,311,997 pounds sterling, which, if adjusted
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for inflation, amounted to twenty-six million pounds in 1922.16 Ghanima offered no explanation
as to how he arrived at this figure, but his decision to employ an anachronistic type of economic
analysis showed that the educated student of history could interpret the distant past as part of
a continuum with the present. In his second lecture, Ghanima interpreted the tri-consonantal
root of the word Quraysh to mean that the tribe had had a talent for commerce from preIslamic times. In his third, he gave his listeners a summary of commercial terms in European
languages that derived from Arabic.17 The marriage of linguistic and economic forms of
reasoning to the narration of history does not simply reflect the liberal arts education Ghanima
had received in Beirut. It modeled for listeners some of the rhetorical tools they might use to
further the idea that Baghdad was not merely the victim of foreign economic interventions, but
a city whose history reached farther back than the events of the preceding decades and farther
afield than the port and warehouses where transactions took place.
Raising public awareness of the connections between urban space and work were not
limited to lectures at the Scientific Institute. Print journalism expanded during the early years
of the British Mandate, with many new dailies and monthly journals published in Baghdad
joining the Syrian and Egyptian periodicals that had circulated in private homes and cafes across
the city since the second half of the nineteenth century. As the new Iraqi monarchy took on a
more definite shape in 1923 and 1924, Baghdadis turned to the press to share their hopes and
concerns about the directions in which a new national society would develop. The possibilities
of democracy in the new Iraq were a major concern of the Arabic dailies.18 However, it was on
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the pages of monthly periodicals that Baghdadis read and wrote about issues of intimate
concern to family life and personal conduct. There, the articulation and thoughtful
consideration of these issues were ultimately responsible for shaping a work ethic with which
Iraqis could manage the challenges of urban economic restructuring. Davis has found that the
integration of Iraq’s markets with the world economy, a process that had been ongoing since
the mid-nineteenth century, had “created the preconditions for the emergence of new
structures of thought, particularly those that transcended regional, local, and ethnic
identities.”19 Among these new structures of thought was the capacity to conceive of urban
space as contestable in regard to international economic competition. The cultivation of a new
work ethic aimed to strengthen this capacity through the production of edifying anecdotes
drawn from eastern and western societies.
In discussing how Baghdadis could practice a work ethic that would harness the
globalizing forces of capital let loose within their city, Baghdadis set before themselves the
delicate task of praising good personal traits witnessed in abundance abroad without
demanding slavish devotion to them. As important as emulation in this regard was the
management of one’s passions, an obligation for which western literature provided some useful
guidance but which depended also on insight into problems specific to Baghdadi society. Given
the precariousness of this balancing act, it was no surprise that many of its earliest adepts were
Palestinians and Syrians active in Iraq as teachers and journalists. They were in a unique
position to view Iraqi society as both familiar and unfamiliar, and to read Iraq’s recent history of
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engagement with Europeans in comparison to Egypt’s and the Levant’s more extensive records
of doing so. They were not always successful, as the Syrian Anis al-Nusuli’s publication of a
controversial, anti-Shi’i textbook in 1927 would demonstrate, but even their failures had a
major impact on the ways in which Baghdadis thought about their own capacities for work and
self-improvement.
Paulina Hassun came to Baghdad from Palestine in 1923 to work as a school inspector
for the Iraqi Ministry of Education and to participate in women’s organizations there. 20 She
publish Layla, a periodical that later generations of Iraqi feminists and historians consider the
first to take up the women’s struggle in Iraq. Over the course of its five-year run, Layla
intertwined arresting anecdotes of European and American success in careers and marriage
with reflective pieces on the state of women and the family in Iraq. It also issued several
appeals to Iraqi politicians to take the improvement of Iraqi women’s condition seriously, and it
did not shy away from criticizing the elite for not doing enough to support all levels of Iraqi
society. Although it spoke most often in a national idiom, Layla helped to achieve for its readers
in Baghdad a reputation as active participants in the synthesis of a city of cultural refinement on
a par with Beirut, Damascus, or Cairo.
Layla carried numerous articles describing the personal qualities Iraqis should have in
order to be productive and successful in life. It lionized examples of constancy, perseverance,
and self-sacrifice through analytical and narrative pieces, many of which were translated from
the English-language press. In its second issue, an article titled al-thibat al-haqiqi (true
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constancy) held that a good work ethic entailed a commitment to finishing tasks despite
adverse circumstances, as well as the awareness that the will to accomplish any given task is
not a permanent characteristic of some and not others, but a transient state of mind. These
qualities stood in contrast to a weak will (al-irada al-wahina al-wahiyya) that is predisposed to
blame inability on bad luck or unfortunate circumstances. Recent history attested to the
importance of a strong will, as nations on the verge of collapse during the World War had
managed to survive and prosper, sometimes even despite defeat. For Iraqi readers, this last
assertion gained credence from the postwar performance of the Turkish republic as well as the
resilience of the survivors of genocide, which examples may not have borne on readers of the
article in its original English. Finally, the article linked willpower to new technological capability,
concluding that:
In a firm hand, iron and steel are as pliable as wax, and mountains come to have tunnels. Have
they not bent the ocean and the air to the whims of mankind, so that they may dive under it or
float on it or do as they will with it, and cover vast distances in the wink of an eye? Have they
not forced electricity and lightning to do their bidding? Even today, they attempt to hear
without ears and see without eyes - shall we see what is come next?21
Even though this description of willpower alludes to national feats of engineering and industry,
its central metaphor of bodily activity maintains the readers’ focus on what individuals might
accomplish through the adroit deployment of limbs, gestures, and glances. These units of
individual performance, which revealed themselves through the marriage of technique and
practice, were the foundation of a strong willpower, and as such could be learned by anyone.
By doing away with the misconception that willpower was knowable only in view of its fruits,
which were disproportionately abundant in Europe and the United States, Layla positioned its
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readers as perfectly capable of cultivating the habits necessary to control Baghdad’s
development and further the progress of the nation.
As important as conviction and hard work were to the editors of Layla, they tempered
its praise of these qualities with poems, adages, and other delightful turns of phrase that
promoted tenderness, love, and cooperation as necessary adjustments to the singlemindedness of personal growth tied to professional development. The May issue of 1924
contained a poem by a certain Fadil Anbari about a young woman with tuberculosis visited on
her deathbed by a childhood friend. The friend compares his friend’s frail health to that of a
flower fading in the sun, before recounting the wonderful times they had together in their
youth amidst the orange and lemon groves in the Karkh area of Baghdad.22 In its issue for April
of 1925, Layla printed a collection of statements on love as understood by the practitioners of
various professions. “Love is a dreadful disease that is its own cure,” offered the Doctor, to
which the Pharmacist replied, “Is there a salve or a medicine, oh dear one, that could heal my
aching heart? I have tried all of my concoctions, but to no avail.” Then, for the army general,
the editors wrote, “I have challenged the best of mortals and beaten them, emerging from their
midst victorious. But a young woman’s glance struck my heart, and I am brought low before an
army of passions.” The collection concluded with similar observations by the judge, the artist,
the eye doctor, the watchmaker, and the shepherd.23 Beyond extolling love, these archetypes
suggested that professionally-minded individuals should not only think of working hard to
better themselves; they should be gentle with themselves and with others, not letting the
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accumulation of wealth consume them completely as individuals. Far from rendering a verdict
on feelings, Layla invited its readers to reflect on these vignettes, an invitation which they made
clear in an article on the American psychologist G. Stanley Hall. Hall’s “eight conditions for
personal success,” reprinted from a piece that also ran in al-Hilal, included knowing how to
control one’s emotions, marrying them to one’s sense of morals, and working on letting go of
harsh, negative feelings.24 According to Layla, true success rested not on hard work and
conviction alone, but on introspection and nurturing good, positive feeling as well.
In keeping with its progressive stance on gender relations, Layla saw husbands and
wives as having to support one another in the fostering of a good work ethic and emotional
maturity. It held that wives should read useful literature so that they could better encourage
their husbands to be their most productive, and it obliged husbands to be firm, but not
capricious, in making their wives treat them as equal partners instead of servants. Additionally,
husbands should dedicate their efforts to providing their partners with a good home and accept
the sacrifices that such efforts would entail. The editors did not claim to have the last word on
how couples were supposed to achieve these goals, preferring to publish anecdotes about
marriage customs in the United States and Great Britain that could provoke discussion.
Space animated the discussion of good personal qualities throughout the pages of Layla.
Stories of personal and professional success from Boston, New York, and Detroit highlighted
what was curious and edifying about American society without presenting the United States as
as a superior nation that could dictate what hard work meant for the entire world. The May
issue of 1924 made only a brief mention of American hotels having 190 floors and 6,000 rooms,
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a rather fabulous claim for which its only comment was that Iraqis were usually impressed by a
palace with a hundred rooms.25 Similarly, the editors’ only comment on an American expert’s
speech on delaying marriage was to clarify that Americans changed careers frequently.26
America was not, in other words, the model of successful development to which Iraqis should
refer in considering their own work habits. Neither were Great Britain and France, nations that
received even less attention in the journal, except as the countries where several exemplars of
personal and professional success happened to have lived. Instead, it was Baghdad to which
Layla’s pages returned repeatedly, as the starting point for combatting social and political
injustices and as the homes in which the projects of national development and personal work
ethic were tightly intertwined.
The conception of space particular to Layla encouraged its readers to conceive of
themselves as embarking on a project of national self-definition, inspired and informed by the
concerns and livelihoods of remote societies, yet committed to the emotionally charged
exigencies of local challenges. The first article in the January issue of 1924 captured this focus
best. Looking forward to the new year, the editors wrote that
Our dear Iraq, in whose heart pulses the love of life, expects the spirit of true renewal to spread
across its lands! For the lights of learning to spread among its boys and girls everywhere! For
munificence to gush forth onto dried land, and for its peoples to find the inroads to success and
happiness to be many! As for Layla, woman of Iraq, together with the fair sex of the entire
nation, her wish is that the women’s awakening will extend through the country in its entirety,
crowned by complete success.27
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A year’s time did not bring to fruition what the editors had hoped for, however. This change in
sentiment was remarked upon in a letter from a reader, who criticized the women’s movement
for being more talk than action, and who urged the “residents of Iraq” to do more for the vast
majority of women who went without basic education or necessary life skills. In place of the
lofty aspirations of an Iraqi nation, in other words, women’s advocates should recognize what
needed to be done first in the city where most of them were concentrated: Baghdad.
The new way of understanding work in relation to national space reached the masses
via the cafes, where illiterate Iraqis listened to newspapers and journals read aloud. As the
notion that Iraq had historically been powerful in world trade spread, and with it the message
that the cultivation of good work habits could renew that national standing, it become
increasingly thinkable that the goings-on of the neighborhood could be held up to this standard
and adjusted so that persons from all walks of life could contribute to national progress. One of
the neighborhoods where this news spread was Dangachiyya, which took its name from the
clamorous threshing floor implements used there for grinding grains.28 In the 1920s,
Dangachiyya was home to Baghdadis from multiple social classes.29 Mumayyiz tells us that one
Hasun Abu al-Jibin, who sold cheese in Dangachiyya’s market, learned about politics from the
Ahali newspaper, whose views he took to advocating from his shop, nicknamed the socialism
shop (dukkan al-ishtirak.) Mumayyiz also relates that Fatuma al-Mu‘idiyya, known in the
neighborhood for selling gaymar, a breakfast dish similar to clotted cream, took care to serve it
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using a long needle instead of her fingers.30 It was not the case, however, that Hasun simply
transmitted socialist values of work to his customers, or that Fatuma had taken an interest in
hygiene after hearing about it in a journal article. Neighborhood attitudes toward work and
their related practices were various and incommensurate with one another before the advent
of a print discourse on work. At least some of these attitudes coincided with the visions
lecturers and journalists had of how work should be. If Mumayyiz chose to highlight examples
in his memoirs that match the work ethic espoused in the press, it is because Mumayyiz himself
was committed to those same notions of work from his upbringing in Baghdad and education at
the American University of Beirut. The plurality of work ethics in a socioeconomically mixed
neighborhood was not new when he was a child living in there in the 1920’s or when he moved
out as an adult in the 1940’s. Instead, change came to Dankajiyya in the form of a consolidation
of certain work practices, such as cleanliness and awareness of its political significances, around
the idea that Baghdad, as the center of the Iraqi nation and a hub in global trade networks,
should also be the stage on which Baghdadis, and Iraqis after them, aligned their work ethic
with notions of national unity and progress.
The discursive alignment of work ethics with national progress etched new behaviors
and expectations into the routines of neighborhood space. This was the case in Jadid Hassan
Pasha, the neighborhood between Dankachiyya and Suq al-Saray that was known in the 1940’s
for its many bookstores. Ghazi Karim, who grew up in Jadid Hassan Pasha during the 1940’s,
attests directly to this aspect of neighborhood life in his reminiscences:
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The period of the 1940s that is being considered reflects on a society, city and a country that
had many positive features – cohesion, aspirations, and strengths – that deserve
documentation, with due credit given to the many ordinary people who were hardworking,
honest and worthy of being remembered as good and valuable citizens.31

Karim goes on to describe how, during the early morning hours in his neighborhood, shops
opened at eight o’clock to catch early customers, such as students on their way to class, and
stayed open until seven or eight at night. Shop owners who could afford a day off took one on
Fridays and public holidays; others were open seven days a week. Also in the early morning
hours, metal carts drawn by donkeys delivered brown bread to military forces throughout the
city from army ovens in a large Ottoman-era building known as the Akmak Khana. Prior to the
expansion of the press in the first two decades of the twentieth century, these labors
contributed to an idea of the neighborhood as more nearly self-sufficient in purpose and
without any claims to a role in the shaping of a national space. By the 1940’s, however, two
decades of abundant reading and listening to newspapers had inaugurated popular reference
to a national spatial framework in which neighborhoods, including Jadid Hassan Pasha, were
more tightly interwoven into the city of Baghdad as a whole. In this spatial framework,
neighborhood goings-on that had, prior to the 1920’s, involved labor necessary to sustain the
communal identity were, by the 1940’s, legible as work that made lasting contributions to
neighborhood identity and collective memory.
The rising profile of city as national space did not simply transform the labor of its
inhabitants into work. Work had instead become a standard of literalness according to which
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neighborhood activities were legible. Activity in Jadid Hassan Pasha that involved walking
illustrates the particular nature of this legibility as work. The act of walking “is to the urban
system what the speech act is to language or to statements uttered.” It appropriates space for
the pedestrian, it acts it out, and “it implies relations among differentiated positions.” 32 Male
students on their way to class in Jadid Hassan Pasha sometimes got distracted, roughhoused
with each other, or played hooky. A student dallying on his way to school could be seen as
exhibiting a defect of character, a lack of commitment to his studies. Or his dalliance could be
seen as symptomatic of schools’ shortcomings more generally: why weren’t boys more
motivated to study? Or even still, onlookers could read the dalliance more charitably, as a welldeserved break in anticipation of a long day of classes. All of these perspectives take work as
the standard of literalness with which to understand the student’s behavior. Of course, a
student dallying on his way to school may not mean anything to some onlookers. As residents
of Jadid Hassan Pasha read and heard more about national progress from the newspapers in
circulation, and as they heard from their own children speaking about lessons from school, it
became increasingly common for all neighborhood residents to see in the benign movements of
each other some signification of the capacity to do work and, relatedly, the future of national
progress.
Ali al-Wardi’s observations on Iraqi cities confirm the pervasiveness of work as the
standard of literalness for interpreting human behavior. For Wardi, cities are distinguished from
rural areas by the high density of preachers and moralizers who seek to engage in the kind of
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talk that identifies good behavior from bad. Consequently, within cities, one notes a spectrum
of behavior marked by the ashqiya’, who are the least beholden to moral virtues, and the
atqiya’, the most beholden. The behavior of most individuals, Wardi finds, falls along the
middle of this spectrum.33 While the standards of morality certainly comprised more than one’s
work ethic - an individual might be of the atqiya’ because they treat others fairly, for example it was work that gave the seemingly benign movements and gestures of neighborhood
residents a bearing on their behavior. Similarly, it was the discourse of work, together with its
nationalist overtones, that granted the capacity for judgment to a wider array of neighborhood
residents, who were not motivated solely or even chiefly by matters of religion.
Neighborhood residents did not sit in judgment of each other’s actions in uniform
fashion, predictably assigning merit to the same persons for the same kind of activities. There
were double standards when it came to the activities of women in public and the activities of
recent arrivals from Iraq’s rural provinces. Karim tells us that on a street near the bookstores in
Jadid Hassan Pasha, women and girls with tattooed chins and hands told fortunes using bits of
stone and colorful pottery pieces spread on a cloth before them, chatting and flirting with their
mostly male clientele.34 Tattoos marked the fortune tellers as recent arrivals from rural areas,
where a separate legal code based on tribal custom was in force. At the time that the fortune
tellers were in Jadid Hassan Pasha, efforts were ongoing to bring all areas of Iraq under a
uniform code of justice in the name of national unity and progress.35 In the same years, the
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founders of the Women’s Awakening club had been criticized and a woman teacher castigated
for allowing girls to appear in public at a royal reception.36 The fortune tellers’ activities were
therefore not as easily, or perhaps not as widely, seen to align with the work of national
progress. For anyone who was aware of the violent threats that motivated rural women to seek
a measure of personal security in Baghdad, the persistence of the fortune tellers in engaging
with their newfound community may have held out the hope that the legal distinctions
between rural and urban Iraqis might be erased. For those who were unaware, however, the
fortune tellers’ persistence on the street, without the trappings of a structure in which to ply
their trade, might just as easily be read as idleness and disgrace. Had awareness of the issue
been as widely discussed in public as the importance of education was, then perhaps the
standard of work might have accommodated them more readily.
Thus far we have examined how public intellectuals and the press first sought to identify
historic accomplishments and good work habits with the nation’s future, and then how such a
manual for national progress was disseminated through the neighborhoods of Baghdad. As a
way of sounding out the merits of neighbors’ actions and appearances, notions of good work
habits remade the visible areas of the neighborhood as a proving ground for national identity
and cohesion. The sight of children on their way to school was no longer merely incidental nor
thinkable only within the specific trajectory of that neighborhood; it was a barometer for the
progress of Iraq as a whole, for progress that seemed especially important to take root in
Baghdad as the likeliest area from which it could be spread outward to the provinces. It is in the
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context of this remaking of space that Iraqi educators’ interest in engineering, the profession
most directly tied with the remaking of space, should be read.
Beginning in the 1930’s, Ministry of Education officials articulated a need for schools
that would train Iraqis in construction and machining parts. A school of land surveying had
operated under British auspices in 1917, graduating around thirty students every ten weeks,
but after the demand for surveyors had been met, the British discontinued any type of civil
engineering education.37 In 1936, the Ministry of Education opened a new technical school in
Baghdad to train in construction and machining parts under the assumption that its graduates
would help to meet Iraq’s material needs for renovating space with the minimum of foreign
assistance.38 Four British teachers were contracted to work in the school, and the Iraq
Petroleum Company donated used machine equipment for students to use in their final year of
study at the school.39 From the start, Ministry of Education officials were keen to prevent
British influence over the school’s direction from becoming too great. The British had
nominated Emrys J. Wheldon, a civil engineer who served at Ahwaz during the First World War,
to act as technical advisor for the school.40 Wheldon’s authority was checked, however, when
Sati‘ al-Husri, then Director General of Education, found Wheldon’s qualifications lacking and
relegated him to the position of headmaster. Wheldon quit his post eight months into his
appointment out of frustration.41 The British replacement, G.E. Hutchings, fared little better
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when, in 1941, the Ministry of Education appointed an Iraqi, Said Muhammad, to a position
above him. The two butted heads until March when the entire British teaching staff decided to
quit at the end of the school year.42 Although the school could not dispense with British
technical assistance entirely during its formative years, Ministry officials were confident that
British engineering experience did not translate into having the right vision for technical
education in Iraq and that an Iraqi administrator was better equipped to fill the role.
The Iraqi Ministry of Public Works also sought to keep engineering projects in the hands
of as many Iraqi graduates as possible. The minister, Amin Zaki, had founded Iraq’s School of
Engineering and in 1940 sought to have it upgraded in status to that of a college. The School of
Engineering was taken seriously by the British Council, which allowed for the School’s exit exam
to serve as a placement exam for admission to graduate studies in engineering at Durham
University. Graduates of the School regularly found employment in government, the Iraqi Army,
and the Iraq Railways. The School of Engineering deterred the impression that Iraqis could not
study to become engineers while remaining in Iraq, dispelling the notion that expertise only
flowed into Iraq from abroad. Between the commitment of the Ministry of Education to the
technical school and the advanced state of the School of Engineering, Iraqi officials and
members of its growing effendiya class recognized the importance of construction toward
realizing the autonomous development of the country’s urban and rural spaces.
Less than a month after the contest over the Technical School ended, Rashid ‘Ali alGaylani formed a second government that sought to break sharply with British assistance
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precisely when British policy was to keep Iraq in support of the Allies against the Nazi advance
into the Soviet Union. In May of 1941, British armed forces invaded Iraq and established a new
government that was more amenable to Great Britain’s interest in having Iraq serve as a
conduit through which Allied goods could reach Iran and the Caucasus. For the rest of the
Second World War, British decision-making sought to redirect resources that might have been
used for Iraq’s national development toward its military bases in northern Iraq, Iran, and
eventually British-controlled Syria. The Iraq Railway was especially important to this operation
as the main artery through which goods flowed. British demands on Iraqi labor, especially in
construction, swelled the number of migrants to Baghdad, causing widespread inflation and
shortages of food, clothing, and housing. Residents of Baghdad did not unilaterally accede to
British demands for labor and supplies, however. British army efforts to stop smuggling and
unauthorized construction projects reveal that Baghdadis sought ways to meet their immediate
needs for work, food, and housing despite official sanctions. Now that so much of Iraqis’
productivity had been forcibly aligned with British war goals, a good work ethic became part of
the struggle for national development.
The British Army’s demand for food was considerably more than Iraqi producers could
meet without causing considerable rises in prices. At a December 17 meeting in 1942 with the
Prime Minister, Nuri al-Sa‘id, and the Minister of Finance, Salih Jabr, British Ambassador Sir
Kinahan Cornwallis urged the Iraqi government to adopt price controls that would curb
inflation, noting that Iraqi currency in circulation had tripled to 22 million dinars. Cornwallis also
raised the possibility that the British would provide seed for vegetables to be sold exclusively to
the Persia and Iraq Force. Sa‘id and Jabr objected that British army purchases had been too
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great and had largely been allowed to take place without Iraqi government oversight.43 By
March of 1943, the situation had worsened to the point where Persia and Iraq Force generals
contemplated sending British troops to aid Iraqi cultivators in bringing in the harvest, before
ultimately deciding in 1943 to release Iraqi soldiers under its command to do the job instead. 44
The shortage of harvesters indicates that Baghdad’s demand for labor had soaked up too many
agricultural laborers, that British officials suspected there were more foodstuffs to be had than
Iraqi cultivators were turning over, or both. British control over Iraqi soldiers also supported
Sa‘id’s and Jabr’s view that the Iraqi government had been excluded from some of the most
important decision making as regarded the mutual welfare of British troops and Iraqi laborers.
The response of the Iraqi government was to press on with its own construction projects
to the fullest extent possible. In March of 1943, Cornwallis voiced his suspicions to the Iraqi
regent Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, that the Iraqi government had initiated too many civilian
building projects:
My attention has been drawn to the considerable volume of constructional work unconnected
with the war effort which continues to be put in hand in Iraq, whether by Government, the
Amanat al Asimah, the Municipalities or private enterprise. I refer not only to actual building
but also to demolitions, street-widening, laying-out of parks and the like.
However intrinsically desirable such projects may be, it is evident that their execution under
present circumstances depleted the already exiguous stocks of imported constructional
materials, forces up prices of locally produced materials (bricks, juss, etc.,) required for works of
military importance and diverts labour, already in very short supply, from essential
undertakings.45
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The mayor’s office (amanat al-’asima) continued to draw on Iraqi labor and supplies for
municipal construction projects in defiance of British wishes. Bricks and gypsum (juss) could be
purchased for municipal construction projects from kilns on city outskirts, but acquiring
imported materials (principally wood, glass, paint, and metal hardware) took some doing. If
their availability in sanctioned stores was limited, additional units could be had on the black
market. Imported building supplies were sometimes put in warehouses after reaching Baghdad
via train, where railway porters and warehouse guards occasionally conspired to have a
shipment go missing. While it is not possible to determine the volume of building material
stolen from train yards, the coordination between Iraq Railway workers, laborers, and guards
that smuggling required affirms the heterotopia of urban space in Baghdad. Warehouses,
alleyways, sheds, and railcars effectively delineated “liminal spaces of possibility” that gave
birth to a praxis arising not necessarily “out of a conscious plan, but more simply out of what
people do, feel, sense, and come to articulate as they seek meaning in their daily lives.”46 This
capacity for articulating new spaces of enunciation rested almost entirely with the laboring
classes of Baghdad, many of whom had become practiced in the subversion of established
transportation routes during strikes over taxes and utility bills in the 1930’s. Iraqi government
was the beneficiary of this spatial aptitude, but did nothing to direct it. In fact, regular court
trials sentencing smugglers to fines and prison show that the Iraqi government made a show of
complying with the British embassy.
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The influx of laborers to Baghdad accentuated the lack of good housing for the growing
city. Even as new neighborhoods were built on the periphery of the old walled city, Baghdadis
continued to live in cramped quarters during the war, several families to a house. The
continuation of the housing shortage, despite an abundance of labor and adequate building
supplies, highlighted for even more residents of Baghdad how the building of new space in
which to live came to depend on the maximal deployment of labor, including wresting away
workmen and supplies from the war effort, if necessary. Nevertheless, Iraqi government efforts
to meet demands for housing consistently came up short. A Municipal Council Bulletin issued
on May 21, 1944 gave official names to 152 streets and 17 gardens throughout Baghdad, but
made no mention of the structures it was necessary to level in order to widen the streets and
create the parks.47 After the war, journalists re-articulated city residents’ grievances in terms of
wartime sacrifices they had made on behalf of the British military presence. As early as March
of 1945, the scholar Abbas Kashif al-Ghita referred in the pages of ‘Alam al-Ghadd to “His
Eminence, The Building Materials” in a sarcastic jab at how reverently Baghdadis talked about
them, adding that laborers’ increased earnings during wartime had put single-family homes
within reach of their expectations. Without government-supported lending institutions,
however, those same laborers were bound to be frustrated in their efforts to build a home. 48
The populist newspaper Ahali reiterated this grievance in July 1945, after the war had ended,
adding that the departure of British military forces had left thousands of laborers and smallscale industrial workers without employment in their newly adopted city. Plans for better

47
48

“Municipal Council Bulletin No. 150,” Ahali, May 25th, 1944.
Abbas Kashif al-Ghita, “The Land Bank and Iraq’s Need for One,” Alam al-Ghadd, March 1, 1945, 201-202.

112

transportation and utilities were also lacking.49 The articulation of laborers’ concerns in the
press re-affirmed Baghdadis’ commitment to viewing the spatial configuration of their city
through the prism of a nationalist discourse of progress. Whereas, in previous decades, the
press had focused readers’ attention on the tremendous possibility that the cultivation of good
work habits promised, during and after the war, the press shifted the onus of constructing city
space onto the government. By then, wartime laborers had made it abundantly clear that the
well-meaning, consistent outlay of individual efforts was not enough on its own to realize the
full potential of Baghdad as a home for its many Iraqi citizens.
Preparing for Careers of the Future
The first major housing development in Baghdad, however, focused on meeting the
needs of the city’s middle classes and international companies, not its growing force of
laborers. Lands south of the Tigris near the village of Washshash were consolidated into the
Mansur Estates by Al-Mansur Company, whose chairman was a British citizen. As early as May
of 1947, representatives of the Iraq Petroleum Company were in talks with the Company to
purchase land for new offices there.50 This project paled in comparison, however, to the New
Baghdad development, a project with financial backing from the Egyptian business magnate,
Muhammad Abbud Pasha. Capitalized at one million pounds sterling, the New Baghdad
Company planned to build three thousand houses for middle income residents of Baghdad. The
site was projected to have its own schools, municipal buildings, clubs, and “an industrial zone
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besides which will be erected houses, clubs and playgrounds for the working class.”51 The only
consideration given to the housing needs of Baghdadi laborers was that they be accommodated
next to the industrial sites where they would work. The new housing development was
designed to separate Iraqis into discrete zones according to their typical work capacities. A
similar division of space according to expected income of occupants took root in the Mansur
Estates in the early 1950’s.
The marketing of new houses in Mansur and New Baghdad to the city’s growing middle
stratum of earners coincided with calls in the Iraqi press for government to back home
mortgages and transfers of land title after a certain number of years’ occupancy. Regulations of
land transfer and home purchases were in turn predicated on the notion that Iraq was
underpopulated and its population encouraged to expand in number and to exploit the
country’s vast undeveloped resources.52 Good government was to consist in the close
regulation of increases in land use that would simultaneously prevent urban sprawl and
promote the idea that homeownership awaited Iraqi citizens who worked diligently to pay off
their mortgages. With the mortgage, control over a parcel of land within one of the city’s
newest neighborhoods was tied to a work ethic defined by the schedule on which the
government expected to be repaid. The mortgage took away some of the individual’s freedom
to decide what counted for a good day’s work in exchange for the promise of future ownership
of a parcel. Mindful of the need to pay it off, the mortgage holder began to think of national
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progress more in terms of a distantly imagined future and less in terms of the present character
of the neighborhood in which his parcel was situated.
New housing development for Baghdadis accelerated after 1952, when the Iraqi
government put seventy percent of increased oil revenues at the disposal of its Development
Board, a panel of Iraqi, American, and British technocrats that instituted Iraq’s first public
housing projects in southwestern Baghdad. The Development Board gave contracts to town
planning and civil engineering firms from Great Britain, Greece, and the United States to
oversee specialized projects in the construction of roads, houses, and the municipal sewer
network, among others. The Iraqis that these firms employed and otherwise worked with were
laborers, foremen, office assistants, and occasionally salaried representatives of the
Development Board’s several Technical Sections.
While in many cases their working relationships were positive, it is the frictions between
the technical experts and their Iraqi coworkers that reveal important differences in
understanding about the relationship between space and work. In late October of 1956, an IBEC
Housing Corporation representative in Baghdad wrote his colleague in New York to voice his
frustrations over the latest contract approval process:
They have some new blood in the Housing Section, and it looks as if they were trying to ‘get off
the dime.’ Time will tell however. I tried to point out that we were approaching wet weather
and lower temperatures, and that we should all move with accelerated speed. The response
was a mild smile of understanding, but not necessarily of approval. This is as you know a land
of solemn meditation, and these American trained Iraqi engineers, are very much like our
American Indian that returns to his reservation from M.I.T. or even Cornell. They slip back
rapidly to the ways and manners of their environment.53
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The IBEC representative was concerned that delays would lead to washed-out roads and
flooded worksites that would decrease his company's house completion rate. But in offering an
explanation for the delays, the IBEC representative made recourse to broader prejudicial
thinking about Iraqis' attitudes toward work in general. In his view, Iraqi engineers simply could
not abide by their American “training” for very long before they returned to doing things at a
slower pace set by “their environment.” Exactly what made up “their environment,” the IBEC
representative could not describe without recourse to an American idiom of racial inferiority
and spatial difference. Wherever the putative Iraqi “reservation” was to be found, its defining
feature was that Iraqis, when a part of it, could not keep up the civilized habits that made for
good work. This assessment stood in implicit contrast to the IBEC representative’s
understanding that white, college-educated Americans could in fact take their sterling work
habits anywhere and expect them to be the same. Work habits, race, and environment were
thus inextricably linked in this worldview, and in it, Iraqis were fated to an everlasting
unproductiveness.
The IBEC representative’s lack of familiarity with Baghdad meant that his concern about
“wet weather and lower temperatures” did not take into account Baghdadis’ long experience in
preventing and even rectifying some of the disastrous effects rains and flooding had on urban
infrastructure. As early as the 1920’s, laborers from Baghdad had toiled to build up protective
bunds and divert sections of the Tigris River during its annual floods. In the 1930’s, one of the
primary functions of the futuwwa youth cadres was flood relief.54 Jamil Abu Tabikh has written
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of the flood prevention workers in Baghdad that their labors imbued them with a sense of
belonging to the city.55 The representative’s nameless Iraqi interlocutor in 1956 knew about
flooding around Baghdad as well as the capabilities of Iraqi laborers to mitigate its effects. His
familiarity with the connections between space and work were not communicated to the IBEC
representative, who had perforce to offer his own, prejudicial explanation instead.
As the number of infrastructural projects grew during the 1950’s, concerns mounted
that the benefits of new housing projects, roads, and bridges would not be enjoyed equally by
all of the city’s residents. For officials in the Ministry of Education, expanding postsecondary
education offered the best protection against a future in which inflation like that Iraq had
experienced during the war might once again threaten city residents’ access to stable and
sufficiently remunerative employment. More graduates with advanced training in technical
skills would help to diversify the economy while increasing the need for workers to provide
them with supporting services. Consequently, the Ministry of Education renewed its efforts to
found a university in Baghdad capable of providing advanced degrees in medicine, law,
engineering, and the arts and sciences. In March of 1951, the Iraqi parliament passed a law
that raised professors’ salaries at Baghdad’s existing colleges and provided for a number of
research sabbaticals to be taken every five years. That same month, Khalil Kunna, the Minister
of Education, met with a representative of the Rockefeller Foundation to discuss ways for it to
support higher education in Iraq.56 When the University of Baghdad was close to opening its
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doors a few years later, a government pamphlet published in Arabic touted it as the fulfillment
of an initiative begun in the 1920’s and a timely one, given the risk young Iraqis faced in not
having access to higher education:

This increase shows the extent of young people’s desire to avail themselves of the springs of
higher and technical education. It is a desire that must be encouraged and put in the right
direction, lest corruption steal the minds of the youth and the flower of this country become an
idle tool that cannot be fixed or used, a victim of vice and iniquities.57

The pamphleteer’s conflation of Iraqis’ desires with tools for national progress, reflects the
tension latent in Baghdad during the 1950’s between the decades-old confidence in the
nationalist expectations for hard work, on the one hand, and the emergent concern that
unplanned urban growth and economic fluctuations threatened Iraq’s national future.
Furthermore, the pamphleteer did not need to spell out which vices and iniquities he thought
the university would stave off. His readers could supply whichever ones they thought
appropriate to many young Iraqis’ urban surroundings. Petty crime, chronic ill health, sexual
deviance, and Communist sympathies were all conditions that the Ministry of Education sought
to address through its placement of the university far away from the crowded population
centers of the city at a bend in the Tigris River.
Higher education and public housing addressed some of the concerns shared among the
city’s middle classes, but its promised transformation of economic conditions did not reach a
sufficiently large segment of city residents, whose employment was tenuous and whose living
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conditions were harsh. Nor did it resonate with those whose dissent from government
intervention was met with oppression. To the degree that technical assistance was visible to
Iraqis living in Baghdad, displays of international expertise encouraged skeptics to reach the
conclusion that government had forsaken the promise of cultivating a national ethos of
progress rooted in careful attention to local spatial conditions.
Conclusion
As the population of Baghdad rose and the city expanded outward over Iraq’s thirtyseven years of monarchy from 1921 to 1958, residents of the city cultivated a sophisticated
response to the pressures of urban development. Journalists and intellectuals argued before
the public that Iraqis could cultivate the sound habits of mind and feeling that would enable
Baghdad to become the center of national progress. As this vision of what the future of the
nation could be was disseminated across the city, city residents of all class and ethnic
backgrounds took it to mean that activities in the visible areas of their own neighborhood were
neither incidental to the course of everyday life nor peculiar to their own neighborhood, but
representative of the tremendous opportunities for national advancement latent in the work
that Baghdadis could do. Observing the movements of neighbors as they completed various
tasks became a way of gauging the community’s commitment to national progress.
Concurrently, the pursuit of national development extended into the production of urban
space: the training of civil engineers and construction foremen became an issue of national
importance, not to be ceded to British oversight. During the war, the influx of laborers and
material goods for foreign military forces galvanized Baghdad’s laborers to do as much as they
could to divert human and material resources back toward national development, occasionally
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flouting martial law to do so. Dissatisfaction with how the Iraqi government and foreign
occupiers used Iraqi labor coalesced around the issue of housing, the extreme lack of which was
exacerbated by the rising number of laborers in need of it and the mounting evidence that
better management might have allowed them to meet that need better. But what had been a
socioeconomically diverse way of thinking about the relationship between space and work
before and during the war became the preserve of middle class professionals, government
elites and foreign experts in the first five years after it. It would take the labor of the sarifa
dwellers, the ones who built the first public housing in Baghdad, to reclaim the project of
building new space for the laborers.
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Chapter IV.
“Sending the Ball to the Stars”
Sports, Discipline, and Boyhood in New Configurations of Urban Space
Whoever could kick the ball highest among the children gathered to play football was
said to be “sending the ball to the stars,” a memory that ‘Abbas Baghdadi relates among his
reminiscences of playing football (soccer) in Baghdad in the 1920’s.1 Childhood games were
very important to many Iraqis who, as adults, looked back fondly on their childhoods. In 1948,
the literary journal Hatif printed a series of guest-authored essays reflecting on their childhood
experiences. In an introductory note to the series, the editors of Hatif opined that “the history
of childhood is an inexhaustible treasure trove of gems literary, societal, and historical” and
that, “when brought to light, the history of any child, whether alert or not, is of considerable
use in many different ways.”2 Like the articles that followed it, this introductory note was an
invitation to Iraqi readers to reflect on the lasting influence of childhood into one’s adult years.
Its openness to the experiences of any child, alert or otherwise, prioritized the act of reflection
over the particulars recollected, a literary endorsement of self-liberation from the doldrums of
material need and hopelessness that sometimes harried the adult. Childhood, to the editors at
Hatif, was meant to free the adult from the confines of his or her own thinking.
This particular interest in childhood echoed a wider understanding among Iraqis that
schools should not teach academic subjects only, but nurture the child’s social and
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psychological development as well. Neglect of this development led to bad personal habits
associated with excessive consumption and poor bodily health, and these in turn hampered
progress for the nation. Such concerns belonged to the generation of educators that had
overseen Iraqi schools in the interwar years, but by 1948, adults who had been students in the
1920’s and 1930’s articulated their own versions of them as well, as in the pages of Hatif. The
crucial difference, however, was that the younger generation had experienced both the
nation’s schools and its counterpoint diversions as children, and so were in a position to find
some good in the material developments of the interwar years that their parents and teachers
had found threatening. The younger generation bound “the accomplishments of technology to
the old words of symbol,” as Benjamin put it, and they gave those bonds “form not in the aura
of novelty but in the aura of the habitual – in memory, childhood, and dream.”3 These
memories were an important subject of inquiry for educationalists, reformists, and the udaba
of the postwar years, and it is from their reflections that we gain insight into the early history of
childhood in modern Iraq.
Sports present a valuable lens through which to examine attitudes toward recreation,
social conventions governing behavior and emotions, and the disciplinary effects of physical
activity that is strenuous and rule-based. In Baghdad of the monarchical and early republican
periods, football (soccer) and horseracing were two sports that attracted wide, if mostly male,
followings. Football could be played by many with little investment of time and resources, and
it taught cooperation and friendly competition to children while strengthening their bodies.
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Horseracing, though restricted to a small number of participants, nonetheless had appeal as a
mass spectator sport and brought with it opportunities for gambling. Both football and
horseracing illuminate transformations in the production of space – in particular, space that
was open and initially peripheral to the centers of habitation. They shed light on the processes
by which leisure activities variously acquire a reputation for being healthy and unhealthy for the
individual and the nation.
This chapter examines how sports influenced the ways in which male Baghdadis thought
of the spaces they inhabited – in their neighborhoods, their city, and the nation of which it was
the capital. It looks first at how the postwar generation understood physical discipline in the
context of the kittab and the public schools that largely supplanted them. It next transitions
outside to the racetrack, to see how horseracing gave rise to new uses of urban space and how
it situated Baghdad as a hub in a sporting culture that stretched from the Najd to eastern India.
It then charts the rise of football from an element of professional life under the mandate
government to a friendly neighborhood game and a mainstay of physical education. It
concludes with an examination of the pedagogical theories of physical discipline from the early
republican period.
Discipline in the Schools
Discipline in public primary and secondary schools was a major concern of Ministry of
Education officials, teachers, and students throughout the monarchical period. During the
mandate, British advisers were in favor of using corporal punishment to deter unwanted
behaviors in the youth, especially with regard to what they saw as boys’ proclivity for trading
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sex with men for spending money.4 Iraqi educators, including the Director General of
Education, Sati‘ al-Husri, opposed the use of corporal punishment, arguing that more attention
to Arabic, history, and the natural sciences would give students reason to act civilized and thus
constitute a better discipline.5 School discipline continued to operate in this manner, with some
adjustments, up through the Second World War, always with the goal of having students think
rationally, plan for the future, and avoid behaviors that might jeopardize their health or social
standing.6 The focus on discipline meant that schools did not always welcome either students’
unrestricted expression of their individuality or learning for its own sake. Nevertheless, many
Iraqis were enthusiastic about the opportunities that the primary and secondary school
curricula offered to learn, an attitude which they later expressed as adults in their writings on
the progress education had made in Iraq.
The discursive counterpoint to the public school was the kittab, known also as the
kuttab or maktab. In the writings of Iraqi educationalists from the 1940’s onwards, the kittab
often served as a foil for the progressive and modern public schools; where the kittab abused
children and taught them little, the modern school nurtured them and introduced them to new
realms of learning. It served as a vantage point from which to imagine a past in which an
inferior type of discipline was produced by the harsh, physical conditions in which a
rudimentary education took place. From this vantage point, teachers, Ministry of Education
officials, and members of the professional classes also looked forward to a future discipline in
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which the public school model triumphed and the cramped, unsanitary, and degrading physical
conditions of the kittab played almost no role.
Matta Akrawi was among the first to situate the kittab in relation to a present and
future of primary school education. In Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of
Iraq, the fruit of his studies at Columbia Teachers Training College in the 1920’s and 1930’s,
Akrawi described the kittab at length. Its focus was on imparting knowledge of the Quran,
arithmetic, and penmanship. Citing the mandate government’s Report on the Administration of
Iraq for 1923-24, Akrawi described the kittab further as “dirty and insanitary.”7 Its teachers
were for the most part disreputable because the position offered little in the way of
remuneration. Finally, Akrawi offered that the kittab stressed discipline because the schools
tended to enroll more students than a single teacher could otherwise manage. For the same
reason, discipline was also lacking.
Over the next two decades, commentators continued to use the kittab as a foil for
progressive, public education, emphasizing the corporal punishment of the kittab in contrast to
the beneficent pursuit of knowledge in primary and secondary schools. Sabiha al-Shaykh Daud,
the first woman graduate of the Iraqi Law College, used the kittab in this fashion to argue that
public schooling supported the women’s awakening in Iraq.8 In late Ottoman times, it was rare
for girls to attend the kittab. The notable exception in Baghdad was the school of a certain
mullaya Amina, who, according to Daud, taught no more than a dozen students at a time.
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Picking up where Akrawi had left off with discipline, Daud relates that pupils were not to raise
their heads from their work and were prohibited from making any objection or discussion of
the topic at hand. Transgressors had their legs bound and were beaten. Shafiq ‘Abid elaborated
on this practice further in a reflective piece he contributed to al-Mu‘allim al-Jadid, the official
Ministry of Education journal, in 1960. In addition to having their legs bound for the falaqa
(bastinado), ‘Abid relates that the switch, cut from a pomegranate tree, was known as a hayya
(viper). The third element in this “frightening trinity” (thaluth mufzi‘) of discipline was the
khuzayna (detention cell). Students detained in this manner would not be allowed to return
home for lunch and would have to ask a peer to bring their meal back to them.9 Continuing in
this vein, Anwar Sha’ul described a similar set of punishments in his Jewish kittab in Hilla, to the
south of Baghdad on the Euphrates River. There, students were suspended from wooden fans,
forced to crawl on pipes underneath the school building, and made to wear a humiliating
cotton badge and paraded in front of their peers.10 Neither Daud, ‘Abid, or Sha’ul mentions any
form of corporal punishment in the primary and secondary schools which succeeded the kittab.
Instead, they describe the public schools in glowing terms as places in which one could pursue
important subjects earnestly, if not always enthusiastically. Furthermore, the idea that the
kittab was especially noteworthy for its corporal punishment is remarkably consistent despite
differences in perspective among the commentators and despite their different audiences. This
consistency suggests that a wider circle of Iraqi urban professionals may have recognized the
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harsh discipline of the kittab, whether from personal experience or by reputation, in stark
contrast to the progressive education of public schools.
Many commentators linked patterns of corporal punishment in the kittab to the poor
conditions of the classroom. From Akrawi’s point of view, the kittab was one of many
institutions in which superstition and ignorance propagated unsanitary living conditions and
habits. Among these habits, Akrawi counted “putting the hand in the mouth,” “biting the finger
nails,” “neglecting to wash the hands and the face regularly,” and other personal hygiene
practices. Public school students could learn to replace these habits with clean ones, but until
most members of the community also acquired clean habits, it would be very difficult for
children to maintain good practices after graduating.11 The communal environment, therefore,
was ultimately more important in determining how often an educated child bathed or changed
into clean clothing. Daud and Abid, writing sixteen and twenty years later, evinced similar
concerns about learning conditions that were conducive to unhygienic habits. Both described in
some detail how kittab students wrote out their lessons on tin sheets using an ink made from
rust and crushed flower petals, which they would then lick off whenever the tin sheet needed
to be erased. Both also described the kittab classroom as overcrowded, dimly lit, lacking
adequate ventilation, and moldy. Daud added that students had to sit on flimsy wicker chairs. 12
These environmental factors shaped the popular imagination of the kittab as an institution in
which student health, both physical and mental, were sorely tested. Its cramped, dingy quarters
hindered effective student learning, as Akrawi, Daud, and ‘Abid understood it. More
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importantly, its miserable classroom environment testified that in the recent past, little
consideration was given to the space in which learning was to occur. Until the 1920’s,
instructors in the kittab did not seek to control how classroom conditions affected students’
lives. But space was not incidental to the last generation of kittab students’ learning
experience. If Akrawi, Daud, and ‘Abid are to be taken at their word, classroom conditions did
the most to shape how students understood discipline, giving students the impression that
schooling was oppressive and perhaps even dangerous to one’s health.
With the first public schools under the auspices of an Iraqi Ministry of Education,
physical education replaced corporal punishment as the primary channel through which
students acquired a sense of discipline. According to the Ministry courses of study for 1922 and
1928, physical education improved the bodies of young Iraqi boys and girls through “exercises
and games.” These games would “quicken the circulation of the blood, broaden the chest and
the lungs, strengthen the nerves,” and “prevent some bodily deformities (like round shoulders,
low chest, flat foot) and correct them.” Physical education also served “to accustom the pupil to
the quickness of attention, perseverance and action; to drill them in self-control, aggressiveness
and courage;” and “strengthen in their souls the willingness to action, the energy and the love
of discipline.”13 Similar prescriptions followed for lessons in arts and crafts that would
“strengthen in their souls the love of work” and singing that “trains the voice and breathing,
soothes the nerves, and makes the movements rhythmical on the one hand, and affects the
spirit with the tunes and the meanings of songs on the other.”14 These prescriptions posit the
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student as capable of refining innate physical and emotional capacities in such ways as to make
them active individuals. While the course of study was silent on the matter of why students
should be aggressive and courageous, its numerous exhortations to activity were more
important as an argument against continuing with physical punishment. British advisers had
favored more corporal punishment in order to dissuade Iraqi youths from engaging in immoral
behavior.15 The advocates of physical education, however, objected that corporal punishment
only degraded children’s spirits, and went so far as to enlist the sentiments of visiting
international educators against it.16 Physical education, in addition to its benefits for the
children in Iraqi schools, served Iraqi educators as a discursive defense against the
encroachment of partisan pedagogies.
New pedagogical theories in the 1930’s saw the remit of physical education expand
from discipline to preparing each student for all aspects of his or her professional and national
life. Under the auspices of Fadil al-Jamali, the Ministry of Education took the line that too much
of the curriculum consisted of rote memorization that produced passive citizens incapable of
making the most of their particular skills and circumstances. To remedy this, lessons needed to
educate “the whole child,” preparing him or her to tackle all of life’s problems. Nowhere did
this line of thinking leave more of an impression than in different curricula for boys and girls,
who took additional courses in home economics to prepare for a life of homemaking.17 For both
boys and girls, however, the greatest change came with lessons that favored a hands-on
approach to subjects that had previously been taught in the abstract. Hygiene lessons involved
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the actual washing of hands with soap, not merely the absorption of facts about microbes and
disease. Object lessons were supposed to impart trade skills that students could use in their
careers. Physical activity rose in significance across all subjects, including history and biology,
for which field trips to the Sasanian palace at Ctesiphon, the Iraqi Museum, and the countryside
served to activate students’ understanding of these subjects. This trend toward purposeful
physical education continued to develop in the last years of the decade, when the Ministry of
Education organized schools into military units with drills, uniforms, and ranks for students and
teachers alike.18 Students formed brigades prepared to defend the nation against invaders and
to mobilize relief efforts after floods.19 With this new emphasis on preparedness, physical
education, in all of its manifestations, was suited to a purpose beyond the refinement of
student capacities for their own sake.
The Ministry of Education’s investments in physical education should not be taken as
symbolic of Iraqis’ uncritical acceptance of either pragmatism or militarism. Many were
dissatisfied with the freedom either ideology left children to discover the world on their own
terms. Dhu al-Nun Ayyub, for example, spoke for his colleagues in the teaching profession with
his satirical take on pragmatist principles. In his short story, “Baklava,” Ayyub has a teacher
improvise a lesson on making baklava to meet his supervisor’s expectations for practical,
career-oriented education. The teacher describes the process in minute detail, using gestures
and sketches in place of the cooking materials his school cannot afford. The supervisor is
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satisfied that the lesson has met his standards for practical education and leaves. The teacher
and students then collapse in laughter at the supervisor’s expense, having duped him into
thinking that anyone took the lesson seriously.20 Pragmatism, in Ayyub’s view, placed too many
restrictions on how the classroom functioned, a problem compounded by the material
shortages produced by its stipulation that lessons be hands-on. Criticisms of school militarism
also appeared in the Iraqi press, including the social democratic newspaper al-Ahali and the
satirical Habazbuz. These criticisms of pragmatism and school militarism indicate that Ministry
of Education officials did not have the last word on what physical education could accomplish
for Iraqi students. Physical education was a topic on which anyone could engage who had
access to ongoing discussions in the pages of the public press.
Racing through Space
The institution of regular horse races at Baghdad should be understood in the context of
transition from six years of military occupation to the British mandate government. Horses, like
the many other means of doing violence at an army’s disposal, had to be pacified in the public
view before the military could have a role in civilian government. During the war, the cavalry of
the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force had been deployed not merely to take control of
territory, but to manifest that control over public spaces in cities and towns. On March 11,
1917, Expeditionary Force cavalry had entered Baghdad in a long column that stretched down
the main avenue, broadcasting their strength to onlookers and contributing to the cessation of
looting in the wake of the Ottoman army’s departure. A photograph of the cavalry’s arrival

20

Dhu al-Nun Ayyub, Al-Athar al-Kamila li-Adab Dhi al-Nun Ayyub (Baghdad: Wizarat al-I‘lam, 1977), 15.

132

served to furnish British propagandists with evidence that the men on horseback had
proceeded in orderly fashion through the streets, thereby effecting a liberation of the city from
not merely the Ottomans, but from the alleged violent tendencies to which the civilian
population was prone after centuries of Ottoman misrule.21 Here it should be noted that such
claims represent British aspirations to dictate order from the saddle better than they represent
the actual performance of cavalry in an occupied city. Years later, stories circulated in
Baghdad’s Hamam al-Malih neighborhood about how Abd al-Jabbar, its deaf guardian, had
been the first to sense the tremors of distant British artillery and had rushed on foot to protect
the neighborhood from looters.22 As city residents remembered it, Baghdadis had not in fact
been helpless before the looters, and thus the arrival of soldiers on horseback had not been
only an act of liberation. Soldiers on horseback posed just as much of a threat to peace as a foot
soldier, if not more so given the difficulties of navigating the city’s many winding alleyways on
horseback. At the same time, a city resident without the faculty of hearing could be trusted to
maintain public order because of his years of experience doing so. Familiarity with a
neighborhood counted for at least as much, if not more, than the supposed advantages of
higher sight lines and the commanding presence of a mounted officer.
When horseracing was organized as a spectator sport in Baghdad, it abetted the
mandate government’s transition from military occupation of Iraq’s cities to the strengthening
of a national government’s control over them. This strengthening was accomplished through
adherence to regular rules for competition, a decision that also stood Iraq in relation to other
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sporting nations. When the British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, sanctioned the
establishment of the Iraq Turf Club to govern horseracing, it was in order “to educate the racing
public in Iraq to enjoy their sport in conformity with other countries, where law and order exists
in the racing world.”23 This proclamation recognized that horseracing had already emerged as a
form of socializing among British officers and others living in Baghdad, but that without proper
oversight, it ran the risk of degenerating into a disordered pastime that would hamper Iraq’s
national progress. Ensuring standards of sport had long been a preoccupation of British
imperialists who believed that the physical superiority of Anglo-Saxon bodies justified British
rule over physically weaker subject peoples.24 By taking charge of an activity that might have
occupied the marginal spaces and free time of Iraqis and British alike, regulating horseracing
had the double effect of protecting Britons’ self-image as having strong, disciplined minds and
bodies and encouraging Iraqis to seek the same qualities for themselves. When such a state of
affairs prevailed in leisure activities, then Iraq could be said to have sport on a level
commensurate with the other nations that engaged in horseracing.
The selection of officials for the Iraq Turf Club presented opportunities for the
mandatory government to increase the extent of its contacts with allies from among Baghdad’s
political elites. Race stewards were placed in charge of all funds raised from horse racing. They
also wrote the rules for each race and established a schedule of fees for the registration of
jockeys and horses. During the races, they adjudicated disputes over which horse finished the
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race first and determined whether a horse had crossed into another horse’s lane.25 Their
decisions bore on betting outcomes and the fortunes of horse owners for the entire season.
Over the course of the 1920’s, many Baghdadi notables acted as stewards of the Iraq Turf Club,
including Dawud al-Haydari, Sa‘dun al-Shawi, Dawud al-Daghistani, and Salman al-Pachachi.
They collaborated with representatives of the mandate government’s various branches.26 The
devolution of authority to Iraqi notables put them in a new position of power over the horse
owners, jockeys, and spectators without regard to their nationality. Now, their authority
extended to the management of sporting events and the terms, both financial and in terms of
normative behavior, on which residents of the city could participate.
The Iraq Turf Club used a race track at the Hinaidi cantonment, near the Royal Air Force
base and about seven miles distant from the center of Baghdad.27 Races consisted of seven
heats on Saturdays and Sundays.28 Under the new organization formed in 1923, Iraqi jockeys
and horse owners were encouraged to participate as they had in the previous three seasons.
Statistics compiled by a pseudonymous Turfite show that ten of the top sixteen jockeys in
Baghdad had Arabic names. After these statistics were published, an editor for the newspaper
noted that there were, in fact, multiple jockeys competing under the names Dawud and Aziz ibn
Muhammad, so in all likelihood the participation of Iraqi jockeys was even greater than Turfite’s
statistics showed.29 Iraqi horse owners also participated eagerly in the races, with newspapers
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naming horses owned by such local notables as Najm al-Din al-Gaylani, Kazim al-Rashid, and
Ismail ibn Ibrahim Khalil. 30 While there are no figures for how well-attended the races were, a
reporter noted that the first class enclosure was at times “uncomfortably crowded” and that
“the crush in the second class was so great as to seriously impede the smooth running of the
cheap ‘tote.’” Moreover, the reporter contended that “probably a good deal more than fifty per
cent of the Stewards’ supporters among the public read Arabic and not English.” 31 It was both
British officers, their wives, and male Baghdadis who came to watch the races. While women
were given free admission to the race grounds, it is not evident from the available sources how
many women attended from each subset of Baghdadi society. At times, attendees were so
numerous as to make the viewing areas uncomfortably crowded. Whether or not such
perceptions of the crowd were widely shared, it is certain that horseracing was not simply a
pastime for the British in Iraq, nor were the races the performance of only British jockeys and
stewards. At all levels of the organization, Baghdadi boys and men participated in horseracing.
The institution of races at Hinaidi brought about a novel set of circumstances according
to which male Baghdadis conceptualized and consumed leisure. For some, the races offered a
respite from the political demonstrations taking place in Baghdad on Rashid Street. 32 Abbas
Baghdadi described spectators’ enthusiasm for the races in terms of the shared lingo through
which they communicated. Trainers of horses were known collectively as tranriyya; the wooden
barrier demarcating the outside edge of the track was called the rawn, from the English ring;
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and altogether spectators shouted haf to mark the start of each heat. Furthermore, spectators
could distinguish between the different kinds of guests based on where they watched: on the
ground, in raised bleachers, or from a private loggia at the top of the stand.33 At times, it was
possible for spectators to see themselves as part of a larger group defined by the collective
rituals, experiences, and vocabulary of fandom. Another part of the appeal of the event was the
freedom it afforded spectators to watch other members of the audience away from the more
closely regulated spaces of the neighborhood. Chance meetings between Baghdadis from
different parts of the city provided opportunities for exchange of ideas. These exchanges took
place in an environment that was no one’s home turf, and thus they were somewhat freer of
the conventions that might have governed such interactions in the city center.
Another appeal of the races, which often carried negative consequences, was the
betting. British newspaper reports tended to avoid discussion of an individual gambler’s
prospects, preferring instead to comment on the effectiveness of the totalizator or “tote,” the
system used to determine payouts upon the completion of a race. One journalist opined that
“the tote must be above suspicion in the minds of Arab supporters of racing,” adding that “it is
better to pay heavily for a mistake than that even a single Arab should leave the racecourse
with a genuine grievance.”34 Gambling had a rather different valence, however, for the
multitude of Iraqi race goers who staked their earnings on a horse and lost. If a ground-level
spectator paid his entrance fee and his horse did not place first, second, or third, he made the
miles-long journey back home “on his hands and knees, starving and parched of thirst.”35 Such a
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state of deprivation was not unknown among Baghdadis, nor was it unusual to travel a
considerable distance on foot for a day. What was new, however, was the opportunity that
races presented for thrill-seeking and the alluringly abstract simplicity of winning money on a
bet. To travel the many miles out to the race track and endure the deprivations of a crowded
stand with no water and little protection from the sun, and then to have one’s hopes dashed on
a bet, presented an enduring social problem which defied the ability of the individual to fully
comprehend. Space, as it had been set up by the horse races, had suddenly turned against the
individual in a new fashion.
At the same time that the races fostered a certain neglect for the well-being of
Baghdad’s laboring classes, competition to win races augmented interest in improving the
physical fitness of animals as a matter of military preparedness and economic resilience.
Horses, in particular, continued to be significant to the Iraqi police and army, even after
automobiles became available, because of the absence of paved roads throughout most of the
country. British, Indian, and Iraqi veterinarians worked to maintain horses’ fitness for these
purposes by inoculating them against diseases and breeding for adaptability to Iraq’s climate.36
The concern for fitness manifested itself in the race stewards’ decision to allow only Arabian
horses to race, as other types were deemed too slow and heavy for the racetrack.37 In a
reflection of British control over animal fitness, the Civil Veterinary Department comprised two
British directors, eight Indian veterinarians, two Iraqi veterinary officers, and six Iraqi assistants
with two years’ training and supervision. There were also five student stipendiaries enrolled at
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the Bengal Veterinary College in Calcutta.38 During their studies, it is likely that they gained
experience with the horseracing club there as well before returning to work in Iraq. Concerns
for animal fitness were instrumental in making connections between horseracing institutions
and veterinary institutions in Iraq and their counterparts in India. Decision making at the Hinaidi
racetrack was thus shaped by the exchange of knowledge and professional experts among
colonial subjects.
The Hinaidi racetrack also enabled Baghdadi spectators to conceive of India as a nation
to which storied athletes traveled in pursuit of sport. Ibn ‘Ubayd was one of the many jockeys
who came to race at Baghdad and Basra from Najd. Ibn ‘Ubayd did well enough at the Hinaidi
racetrack to acquire a following among Baghdadis, who spread a rumor that he raced drunk.
Later, Ibn ‘Ubayd went to Bengal to compete in races there for a number of seasons before
returning to Iraq to find that he could no longer keep up with the younger jockeys there. 39 The
arrival of Najdis to race in Baghdad during the early 1920’s coincided with a rise in political
tensions between Najd, Iraq, and Kuwait. ‘Abd al-Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Saud, the ruler of
Najd, instituted a blockade of overland trade with Kuwait that pressured the Bedouin tribes
there to conform either to his rule or to the rule of the Iraqi state taking shape to their north.40
Najdis who came to race at Baghdad did so under the auspices of a British mandate
government eager to see the issue of Bedouin and cross-border raids laid to rest. At the same
time that the Hinaidi racetrack afforded Iraq’s government to monitor its neighbors, it also
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afforded spectators of Ibn ‘Ubayd and his compatriots the chance to view Najdis in a somewhat
different light – as daredevil horsemen whose talent could take them as far away as the
racetrack at Kolkata. Horseracing thus reshaped old linkages between Iraq and its neighbors for
those Baghdadis operating at the highest echelons of government. For spectators coming to
Hinaidi from Baghdad, horseracing enabled them to conceive new relationships between the
imagined spaces of Najd, India, and Iraq.
The preparation of horses for the race was not only the work of the Civil Veterinary
Department, as the actual training and stabling of horses took place among the tranriyya, or
horse trainers, situated in the center of Baghdad on the Karkh side of the river. It was in Karkh,
in between race days, that horse owners, trainers, and jockeys interacted with one another
regularly. The cost of entering a horse in a race ran from fifteen to forty rupees, while the prize
for a first, second, or third place finish ranged from eight hundred to two thousand rupees. 41
Running a profitable horse depended on improving one’s chances at coming in first place and
on minimizing the cost of feed, stabling, and jockeys. These market conditions put strain on
relations among the different actors involved. In one instance, a horse owner named Jamil alSa‘idi al-Shawirdi was stabbed to death by his jockey after a heated argument.42 Because of the
racetrack at Hinaidi, a new economy of horses, their owners, trainers, and the threat of physical
violence took root miles away in Karkh.
The racetrack at Hinaidi involved Baghdadis in the production of new urban space, and it
did so differently for different classes. Members of the Iraqi government used the racetrack to
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socialize with one another and to engage in ceremonies meant to signal the existence of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq to onlookers. Baghdadis who could afford the second-class seating
mingled with one another as well and watched the other spectators watching from the ground
level. These gatherings for the common purpose of entertainment reinforced a collective, albeit
classed, identity that transcended that of neighborhoods into the realm of nationhood bounded
by the experiences of a single city. This identity was reinforced by the presence of King Faisal
and later his nephew, the crown prince Abd al-Ilah, to award trophies to the race’s winners.
Furthermore, the racetrack brought together the residents of Karkh into a new economy of
horse training and jockeying, and it brought India and the Najd into the minds of spectators as
areas that, however remote, were nevertheless intelligible in terms of a common interest in
equine entertainment.
Football On and Off the Field
The mandate government also organized team sport leagues to encourage orderly
recreation among the British personnel serving in Iraq. Starting in 1921, football (soccer), field
hockey, and rugby teams were organized according to service branch and then made to
compete within the framework of regular sport seasons.43 The most significant of these
matches were the ones played on the grounds within the walls of the old Ottoman saray in
Baghdad, where the mandatory government had its general quarters and where Faisal was
enthroned as the first king of Iraq. Service members played football and field hockey for
audiences that included Faisal and his retinue, the British High Commissioner, and others
visiting the saray to meet with government officials. At the saray, as with the horse races, it
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was important that the players demonstrate disciplined, coordinated play for all those
assembled to watch. One reporter conveyed the excitement that accompanied a successful
demonstration:
In the second half of the match much better football was seen and Baghdad soon scored. After
some pretty play in mid-field, Saggers shot from a good opening made by the inside forwards
which Snell had little chance of saving. Shortly afterwards the Baghdad inside right, O’Brien, put
in a very hard shot which Snell saved splendidly, conceding a corner. The corner kick was
beautifully placed by the Baghdad outside right into the centre of the goal mouth for Saggers to
head in, thus putting Baghdad two goals up.44
Good teamwork was the focal point of the reporter’s summary because, in addition to making
for engaging reading, displays of teamwork were what roused the passions of onlookers in a
controlled, measured fashion, as opposed to other aspects of the match, such as displays of
strength or aggression, that might excite onlookers to the point of becoming rowdy or
disordered themselves. This interest in regulating the emotions was, as Sara Pursley has shown,
central to how the mandate government conceived of its work in Iraq. In Iraq, it was only British
subjects who were expected to have such control over their passions until such a time as Iraqis
learned to engage in the same set of disciplining activities. Until that time, ever put off into the
future, British capability for governance was thought to be superior to Iraqi self-governance.45
Football was one such activity for both exercising that discipline on players and spectators alike
and disseminating the idea that sports were a sign of British strength.
Such claims to superior self-discipline should not be accepted at face value, however. In
fact, the circumstances under which sports were played at the saray grounds rather suggest
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that British discipline was on shakier ground than its champions claimed it to be. Only a small
number of colonial officials, Iraqi statesmen, and their guests spectated the matches at the
saray. Reporters for the Baghdad Times complained of the lack of transportation from the
cantonment at Hinaidi and the effect this had on drawing a large crowd. 46 This preoccupation
reveals British anxieties over whether it was possible to have football matches demonstrate the
supposed benefits of orderly recreation without the support of enthusiastic onlookers. Absent
an audience, a football match risked appearing contrived to the first-time spectator, and thus
the desired impression of British discipline and its salutary effects would not be conveyed to
visiting Iraqis. Its effect would then be limited to providing recreation for British soldiers –
perhaps its first and overt goal, but a missed opportunity to effectively model British teamwork
and sportsmanship to colonial subjects.
After football matches were re-organized at the Hinaidi cantonment, however, football
drew a considerable following of Iraqi spectators. The most significant effect of this move was
to change how Baghdadis conceived the distance between the cantonment and the city. ‘Abbas
Baghdadi and his childhood friends attended the matches at Hinaidi, paying eighteen piasters
to ride in a car that left from the Marjan mosque. After the match, they returned from Hinaidi
on foot, taking the dirt road back to Baghdad that was lined with pink oleander bushes. They
“paid no mind to how long the return trip was taking” because they were “a group of students
preoccupied with our commentaries on the match and our fierce disagreements over which
player was better and which goalie more capable.”47 Exciting matches at Hinaidi had the effect
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of keeping spectators’ minds on the events at the field long after their bodies had started the
return trip home. Such excitement rendered the seven-mile journey much shorter and more
pleasant in the minds of Baghdadi and his friends, and perhaps less onerous than a return trip
for a more mundane purpose would have been. Furthermore, the decision to pay for a ride out
to the field, but not on the return, suggests how the consumption of leisure could now be
managed strategically with the expectation that the trip out to the match had to proceed more
quickly than the more languid walk home.
It should be noted that the dirt road between Baghdad and Hinaidi was shared by
football and horseracing spectators. Even if members of each group seldom crossed one
another on the road, it was something that both racing and team sport aficionados could both
bring up in discussion, and there it bore meanings that only partially overlapped one another.
Given the steep odds at the race track, the journey was likely an anguished one for the
horseracing fan, whereas for football fans, it was a happy occasion. The road itself, however,
functioned to give events at Hinaidi an immediate afterglow in the minds and bodies of its
journeyers. Given the many valences that the journey had for sport spectators, there was room
for disagreement on the effect that sporting events had on the well-being of the individual and
the community, but as for the capacity of the road to shape the feelings, there was an
unspoken agreement. Because of the multivalent influence that spectating and the crowds had
on the city residents’ sensibilities, the space of the road to Hinaidi was not a mere container for
the transiting of persons, nor was it a space of singular significance.
As the popularity of both horseracing and team sports grew in the late 1920’s and into
the 1930’s, they began to figure into the aspirations of Iraqis for national independence and full
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sovereignty. After the mandate was terminated in 1932, the Iraqi government legislated new
registration requirements for the Iraq Turf Club and its finances. Law No. 42 for 1934 required
the Club to register with the Minister of Interior and to reapply for racing licenses on a yearly
basis thereafter. The law also required any betting organization to register with the Minister of
Finance; it further stipulated that bookmakers without a license should be fined one hundred
dinars and/or imprisoned for three months. It restricted bookmaking to races within Baghdad
and only to areas within the racetrack itself. The Iraq Turf Club also had to notify the state in
advance of the number of race days in a calendar year and to set fixed prices for bets and
entrance fees. Finally, the law forbade derivative bets outright.48 These restrictions attempted
to place the private business of bookmaking more firmly under the new government’s oversight
and to generate additional state revenues from the sale of licenses.
The 1934 law also imposed steep taxes on horseracing in order to raise funds for a
civilian airline and for the municipal budget of Baghdad. After the Iraq Racing Company paid
seven percent dividends on its issued share capital, it owed two thirds of its net profits to the
Iraqi government, to be earmarked for aviation. The law also taxed each race’s totalizator pool
at the rate of ten percent, to be collected by Baghdad’s city council executive, the amin al‘asima. However, the Iraq Racing Company managed to negotiate a reduced rate with the amin
al-‘asima of 2.5 percent or at minimum five thousand dinars. 49 Even though the Iraqi
government appears not to have been in a position to execute its law to the letter, it
nevertheless used the law to argue that the horse races took place on Iraqi soil, and should
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therefore be taxed to support national development. This effort paralleled others to have the
Hinaidi airfield brought under Iraqi control and the private electricity company at Kazimiyya to
be dismantled entirely. All three were efforts to assert Iraqi sovereignty over territory that
included its most important strategic, economic, and infrastructural resources. If Baghdad was
to be the city in which Iraqis modeled national development for the rest of the country, then
the institutional spaces of the city needed to be wrested from colonial control and influence to
the fullest extent possible.
Horseracing and team sports took on a nationalist character in the late 1930’s with the
founding of the Baghdad Racing Company and the creation of a new football league for
employees of the Iraqi government. The Baghdad Racing Company was formed in January of
1939 by Mahmud al-Tabaqchali, a lawyer and provincial governor, along with a group calling
itself the “Friends of Baghdad City,” which included ‘Izzat al-Farsi, Ibrahim Gayara, ‘Abdallah
Tayyar, Jazmi Sulayman, Qasim Sabri, and Qadri Ahmad. The Company directors and stewards
were all Iraqi, and they decided that only Iraqi horse owners and jockeys would be allowed to
compete at their new racetrack. 50 The football league was only somewhat more open to British
participation, allowing each team to have at most one British player and coach.51 Moves to
create a new racing company and football league demonstrate the growing acceptance of
orderly recreation for its disciplining effects. The exclusion of non-Iraqis, on the other hand,
suggests a concern that opportunities for participating in sports needed to be jealously
guarded, lest the new organizations reproduce the influence of British and other foreign
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interests. The same political climate also saw the creation of the Iraqi futuwwa youth groups in
the public schools, another institution meant to foster physical discipline and nationalist
feeling. Like the futuwwa, the nationalization of sports encouraged Iraqi participation in
strenuous physical activity on terms dictated by the state. Furthermore, whether in the
futuwwa or athletic competitions, it was specifically male Iraqis who would participate in
strenuous activities that defined the character of the nation. Women were to participate in
nationalist projects in other spaces. The construction of a new Iraqi masculinity entailed the
designation of certain spaces, such as the drilling field and the football pitch, as spaces of male
performance.
Nationalization did not prevent children and young adults from continuing to enjoy
playing and watching sports on their own terms. Football, in particular, escaped the control of
the Ministry of Education because it was played in areas where parental oversight was minimal
to nonexistent, as in a neighborhood clearing or in alleys near home. It was also easy for players
to improvise the necessary equipment and to adjust the rules as needed. A game quite similar
to football, called labida, used a ball made of cloth and a playing area circumscribed by the
buildings at the sides of the alley.52 In pickup matches of football on the field near the telegraph
building in Waziriyya, scoring areas were marked without nets, with players using tent poles or
piles of their own clothing instead. Spectators sometimes crossed through the playing field,
causing spats with the players. None of these conditions hindered play, however, as the players
deployed their own vocabulary of game terms to regulate the match.53 Such informal games
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entailed the appropriation of space for the novel purpose of self-organized recreation. While
some children may have learned rules for the game from school or from watching adult
matches, they made them their own through processes of adaptation and negotiation that took
place independently of adults. Players made each game their own, yielding no authority over
meaning to the project of nationhood.
On school grounds, however, sports were woven tightly into an education that
emphasized athletics as a crucial component of personal growth and, ultimately, the progress
of the nation. For Hashim al-Hashimi, a student at Central Preparatory school in Baghdad,
athletics activated a spirit of friendly competition and hard work in which one could take pride:
Central Preparatory was known for its excellence in sports (fa’aliyyat riyadiyya) like
soccer, basketball, volleyball, and hockey, and it took trophies every year. Mr. Abd alWahid al-Durubi and Mr. Mahmud al-Mula were the athletics teachers. Central
Preparatory’s arch rival was Karkh Preparatory, with whom tie games were regularly
resumed the following Thursday evening. But Faysal School in A’zamiyya was Central
Preparatory’s rival in hockey.
What’s more, Central Preparatory had the highest trophy in track and field. It had the
best times and got the best trophies and medals. The two athletics instructors counted
on regular drills to get the best results in every game or sport after class hours. It was
the area behind the school, on the basketball court, where you could see practicing the
skills necessary for that game.54
Intermural leagues served to calibrate the minute differences between one school and another
for the promotion of friendly competition, meted out in the form of trophies, play-off games,
and rivalries. These features in turn provided a continuity of meaning between matches and
between sport seasons, promoting the idea that individual and team athletic performance
might improve or fall behind over time as a function of coaching and practice.
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Starting in the interwar years, team sports enabled Baghdadi boys and young adults to
appropriate space in novel ways. Boys played pickup games of football and other games in
alleys and in clearings, adapting these spaces to their interests in sport. If it was orderly
recreation, it was not the order that adults might have championed: ideas of fair play and
process may have been adopted from school, but were then adapted to meet the needs of
players as needs became apparent. Baghdadi mentions that a common practice among pickup
football players was to see which child could kick the ball highest in the air. Whosoever could
launch the ball highest was a “praiseworthy player” said to “star the ball, i.e. raise it up to the
stars” and to be “the one with the greatest ‘shot.’”55 This act was an exploration of the vertical
dimension that was at once playfully innocent and transgressive of the bounds of a city whose
architecture was focused on expansion outward, not upward. School-aged children and young
adults also played team sports in the contexts of physical education and intermural athletics,
where the significance of sport was aligned more closely with progressive notions of time,
personal development, and national identity. Hashimi recollected how sports related to these
notions of time:
The open space in front of the school was for practicing volleyball. Hockey and soccer
were played in the scouting field, the ideal place for drilling. The scouting field was near
our house in Waziriyya. Some students participated in more than one sport; a soccer
player was at the same time an excellent hockey player. We would scrimmage with the
other hockey teams like the A’zamiyya secondary school one captained by Ahmad Abd
al-Razzaq, a.k.a. Abu Shihab, on which my friends Mamduh ‘Abd al-Hamid, ‘Adnan alDuri, and others played, every other day or so. Practice was intensive on Monday and
Thursday afternoons, when Mr. Mula and Mr. Abd al-Razzaq would play with us and
coach us on tactics and maneuvers and ways to go on offense, fall back, and play
defense. Practice would go throughout the afternoon until sunset. It was only natural
that players couldn’t focus on their studies after all that effort, invariably falling into a
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deep sleep and putting off their studies and getting bad test grades. Athletes’ grades
were low, so they would voluntarily sign up for military or police academy.56
These notions of time grew out of a different appropriation of space, or rather the calibration
of such seemingly inconsequential differences as neighborhood and school locality, to effect an
individual’s loyalties and engender friendly competition. Unlike the pickup games of football in
the field and alleys, intermural sports were a mechanism for translating the spatial differences
of neighborhood schools into a shared temporal framework of personal and national
development. A school in another neighborhood was not merely the equivalent institution of a
nearby place. It was a point of reference for young athletes thinking in terms of competition
and rivalry. Such a shift in a place’s meaning required a larger context than the neighborhood;
schools were now institutions of the city. So long as the city modelled national development for
the rest of the nation, then intermural sports were a part of that nationalist discourse.
The differences between pickup football games and school athletics were not so great
as to separate the children who played one type of sport from those who played the other
entirely. Throughout Baghdad, boys played sports in both manners and thus engaged in the two
different types of appropriating space outlined above. Difficulties in accessing primary and
secondary education, such as a family’s need for children to remain at work or a reluctance to
have children educated in a school, were, however, instrumental in determining how frequently
a boy could engage in either kind of sport. Even though the costs of participating in team sports
were small relative to horseracing and other personal endeavors, they were not negligible.
Soccer balls, squash rackets, and other sports gear had been sold in department stores on River
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Street and Rashid Street since the early 1920’s, forming a culture of consumption that excluded
some purchasers through price and marketing for a different kind of customer.57 Differences in
income and class tended to effect sport subcultures that, though not wholly different from one
another, were nevertheless predicated on inequality. There were some children who played
more pickup games because it was their only regular recreational outlet; others played sports
almost entirely within the context of physical education and athletics.
Children growing up without good opportunities for the orderly recreation provided by
sports were a concern of the postwar generation when discussion turned to the inequalities
pervading Iraqi society. ‘Abd al-Salam Hilmi wrote of these difficulties for Hatif as part of the
same series of childhood reflections that began this chapter. Hilmi related how, as a child, he
spent hot summer nights with his family on the roof. His father, gravely ill, wheezed in pain
until the young Hilmi fell asleep. On the morning of ‘Id, he awoke to learn that his father had
passed away in the night and was being buried. He and his friends went to an old trench,
thought to date to the ‘Abbasid era, filled with water and frogs. Together, they stoned the frogs
to death and then cut them open like surgeons. When Hilmi returned home, he felt terrible
remorse for what he had done to the frogs.58 Hilmi’s reflective piece wove together two spaces
in his childhood that were particularly important for him personally and to which many of his
readers could easily relate. Sleeping on the roof in summer was a common experience for most
Baghdadis who had grown up in a traditional house, where heating and cooling was largely a
matter of moving from one level to another as the day progressed.59 The disused trench, away
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from the more frequently trafficked parts of the city, was another area to which male Iraqi
readers related as a sort of refuge from the paces of communal life. Sick loved ones, for whom
there was no outside medical care, were another familiar aspect of childhood. Revisiting these
childhood spaces, as Hilmi’s reflections did, put them before the reader as a symbolic
manifestation of the stresses on the child and the disagreeable ends to which these stresses
drove him or her. Killing frogs did not deliver relief from anguish over a lost loved one; like
other coping mechanisms to which children sometimes resort, it actually pained them. But in
relating this story well, as Hilmi did, there was at least the hope that readers would find in it
their own versions of the tense family rooftop and the vexing despondency of the disused ditch.
With these spaces in mind, the reader might better contemplate how good childhood
entertainments might have nurtured the development of children into adults. Through such
stories, they might also better understand how the asocial diversions children resort to could
lead to the bad habits of adulthood.
Another tale from Hatif illustrates the mindset of adult men who had not had the proper
acculturation in wholesome entertainments. The protagonist of “Our Innermost Benevolence”
relates how he completely rejected the idea that anything more than the basest self-interest
explained personal relationships, in contrast to a friend, Mr. K, who held on to a more
optimistic view of human nature. The protagonist loses touch with his optimistic friend and
ends up wallowing in Baghdad’s brothels for years. However, when he hears that his old friend,
Mr. K, has died, he realizes that he had hoped some small amount of good would prevail in the
world, but now that hope is gone. Overcome with grief, he curses every sex worker he has ever
slept with, except for Ms. N, whom he had befriended only to find later that she had committed
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suicide.60 The story ends on this note, leaving the reader with a picture of the anguished and
pessimistic libertine to serve as a warning against the failure to pursue sports and other
wholesome diversions. Some good will is residual even in those who stray into the physical
spaces of debauchery and the mental cage of pessimism, but the libertine remains unconscious
of that good will until it is too late for it to do him much good.
The postwar generation’s interest in the salutary effects of physical education continued
through the 1950’s. As early as 1956, teachers wrote to each other in the pages of al-Mu‘allim
al-Jadid, the official publication of the Ministry of Education, about the manifest directions in
which physical education, broadly understood to include all aspects of student health, could
benefit their students. In many cases, these articles were teachers’ own translations from
English studies of physical education that they intended to further educate one another. In the
September 1957 issue, Adiba ‘Abd al-Amir Ja‘far, a teacher at the secondary school for girls in
Karakh, Baghdad, published a seven-page translation of W.B. Yapp’s Introduction to Animal
Physiology that explained how vitamins functioned in the human body.61 Ja‘far’s translation
was apparently well-received, for it was followed up a few months later with another on
hormones and the endocrine system, translated from Animal Biology by A.J. Grove and G.E.
Newell.62 Reaction to this second article must have been mixed, however, as the following issue

contained another contributor’s corrections of several alleged mistakes in Ja‘far’s translation.63
What is clear from this exchange is that al-Mu‘allim al-Jadid provided teachers with a forum in
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which to debate each other’s suggestions for knowledge that would be useful in a classroom
setting. Although published under Ministry of Education auspices, the journal nevertheless gave
teachers incentive to reflect on their own knowledge and best teaching practices, including in
physical education. Most importantly, readers were free to incorporate their interpretations of
this new knowledge into their teaching however they saw fit and to share it with their students.
In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, contributors to al-Mu‘allim al-Jadid raised the profile
of physical education to that of a subject with its own historical origins and established
procedures for understanding bodily health. According to two articles published in this period,
physical education variously had its origins in the survival methods of prehistoric man and the
myths of Olympic competitions in ancient Greece.64 The point in making these claims was not
to settle matters of historical fact or to situate Iraqi education in a long lineage of sporting, as
might have been the goals of a nationalist historian at this time. Rather, the articles offered
brief forays into understanding the underlying principles of games and sports. This emphasis
on refining the concept of physical education was continued in a semi-regular series entitled
“Exercise Corner.” Contributors argued that physical education was not a simple matter of
building up students’ muscles, nor that it could be effective without a more nuanced
understanding of play.65 An article on maintaining good posture also featured in this series,
replete with diagrams of different sitting and standing positions and an explanation for why
certain postures were healthier than others were.66 Other contributions were less concerned
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with taking an academic approach to physical education, offering their readers guidelines for
coaching volleyball, “the gentlemanly sport,” and instructions on how chess players could
fashion their own pieces in the school wood shop.67 To some extent, this direction in physical
education may reflect the thinking of teachers who had pursued advanced degrees from
universities in the United States and Great Britain. To a greater extent, however, the focus on
refining the concept of physical education reflects the desire of Iraqi educators to move beyond
a pragmatist and nationalist paradigm that was by then twenty years old. In their view, physical
education lessons needed to prepare students for life in their city and in their neighborhoods,
and not merely meet the policy prescriptions of a national administrative entity.
Conclusion
Sports became a major preoccupation of male Baghdadis during the monarchical and
early republican period. In the nation’s schools, educators held that sports strengthened the
physical bodies of boys and instilled in them a discipline that transcended the context of
athletics, preparing them for the important work of contributing to the nation’s progress as
adults. At the racetrack and on the football field, sports were significant to the fostering of a
national consciousness, but also aggravated socioeconomic differences through betting and
discrepancies in access to sports through the schools. At the same time, sports fandom became
a discourse that united Baghdadi boys and men across divisions of class and neighborhood
origin, bolstering the sense that Baghdad was the stage on which the nation of Iraq was
performed. After the Second World War, arguments in favor of playing sports in school took on
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a new form, that of distinguishing healthy childhood activities that promoted belonging to the
nation from the unhealthy ones that led to isolation and despair in the individual.
The production of space was inseparable from the social effects that sports had on the
consciousness of Baghdadis. The racetrack and the football pitch invited new forms of
socialization at the same time that they mediated differences of class and area of origin. The
staged seating at the Hinaidi racetrack provides the clearest indication of how space mediated
these differences, but the internecine conflicts of the horse trainers in Karkh and schoolyard
athletics were just as important as mediators of social difference. Boys who played football in
improvised neighborhood spaces as well as in intermural athletics were positioned to
understand this socioeconomic difference on intimate terms. Their experience of this
phenomenon in the interwar years prepared them after the Second World War to bring greater
attention to those children who did not have access to recreational activities deemed healthy
and in the interests of national development.
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Chapter V.
Homes for the Poor?
Public Housing and the Social Construction of Space in Baghdad, 1945 – 1964
The last years of the Hashemite monarchy before the 1958 revolution were marked by
stark differences in living conditions among socioeconomic groupings within Iraqi society. As
wealthy landowners and upper-level government officials continued to move into newly
planned suburbs of Baghdad, poor migrants from depressed agricultural areas lived without any
municipal services on city lands regularly threatened by floods and water-borne diseases.
Government officials, journalists, and intellectuals acknowledged these disparities and
publically discussed solutions to them, but almost never did they think in terms of poor Iraqis’
existing capabilities to help themselves if given the right resources. Because international
observers were influential in framing Iraqi development discourse in big-picture terms of
counteracting the appeal of Communism, public housing planners sought to redirect the
energies of migrant laborers away from independent action and toward ends of the planners’
choosing. In so doing, the planners lost sight of what the working poor in Baghdad were already
doing to ameliorate their own living conditions. Project archives for the town-planning firm
Doxiadis Associates and the International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC) reveal the lengths
to which public housing planners went in order to limit laborers’ autonomy in the construction
and inhabiting of new neighborhood space. The story of public housing in Baghdad begins
almost a decade before Doxiadis Associates and IBEC, however, as evidenced in the Iraqi
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newspapers Ahali and Zaman as well the journal ‘Alam al-Ghadd. It continues after the end of
these international firms’ tenures with the early republican period, as demonstrated in some of
the Iraqi republic’s laws and the company journal of Baghdad’s municipal bus service, both of
which shed some light on how Iraqi laborers acquired their first rent-free homes.
Public housing in Iraq has received scant scholarly attention as a subject in its own right,
having been approached indirectly by multiple scholars working within the history of
architecture and urban development. John Warren’s and Ihsan Fathi’s Traditional Houses in
Baghdad was the first work to highlight features of Iraqi houses in connection with expectations
for which amenities would be most beneficial to the public. They pointed out that the badgir,
an airshaft bringing cooler currents from the roof to the ground floor; the sirdab, a cellar used
as a living room away from the heat; and the sleeping area of the roof met inhabitants’ needs
for a suitable microclimate.1 Writing in the spirit of conserving houses that had been built to
these specifications, Warren and Fathi were concerned that the Iraqi government would
neglect this heritage in the course of redeveloping entire sections of Baghdad during the 1980s.
After war had devastated the infrastructure necessary to air-condition Baghdad’s modern
homes, Caecilia Pieri was able to confirm Warren’s and Fathi’s concerns. During the frequent
power outages in the decade after the American-led invasion, only houses that had preserved
these climate control features kept their inhabitants cool.2 As important as the badgir and
sirdab were when Warren and Fathi were writing in 1982 and Pieri in 2014, what is known
about their prevalence outside of the houses of urban merchants and notables remains quite
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limited. Suphi Saatci’s study of merchant houses in Kirkuk expands the geographic scope of
inquiries begun by Warren and Fathi, but it does not look at houses for other social classes
either.3 As Pieri herself observes for Baghdad, it is difficult to assess how far the analysis of
merchant- and notable-owned houses applies to the housing stock in general in a city like a
palimpsest that is effaced and rewritten every century.4 Therefore, analyses that remain
focused on individual houses can only reveal so much about the houses of other urban social
classes.
Viewed through the prism of the urban planning of Baghdad that took off in the 1950s,
public housing appears subservient to larger economic forces bent on modernizing Iraqi cities
and global efforts to contain Communism. According to this narrative, oil revenues empowered
a board of Iraqi, British, and American technocrats to commission a national gymnasium from
Le Corbusier, a university center from Walter Gropius, and an opera house from Frank Lloyd
Wright. With these commissions, foreign architects aimed to establish an architectural idiom
that would simultaneously meet needs for modern standards of living and draw inspiration
from Iraq’s Islamic and pre-Islamic past. Once developed on a large scale in the capital, the
architectural idiom could then be extended to other sections of the urban fabric, presumably
including public housing. At issue with this narrative is that, in search of Iraqis who held
contrastive views of what counted as modern Iraqi architecture, the narrative looks no further
than a canonical group of Iraqi architects made to appear subordinate to international currents
of intellectual exchange. Magnus Bernhardsson writes that Muhammad Makiya, Rifat Chadirji,

3
4

Suphi Saatci, The Urban Fabric and Traditional Houses of Kirkuk, (Istanbul: Kerkük Vakfi, 2014).
Pieri, Bagdad: La Construction d’une Capitale Moderne (1914-1960), xx.

159

and Hisham Munir “began their careers in the charged cultural and political environment of
Baghdad of the 1950s” and sought “to instill a new, modern Iraqi aesthetic into their designs.”5
Yet Makiya, Chadirji, and Munir are subsequently shown to have made their mark on Iraqi
architecture during the 1960s, that is, after the international architects’ heyday. At the same
time, another architect, Nizar Ali Jawdat, is quoted as having opined to his father “that ‘it would
be more advantageous to the country to engage some of the world’s great architects to do
their projects rather than the old line British engineering firms left over from the days of the
British protectorate.’”6 Whether Iraqi architects were truly enthralled by postwar American and
European claims to represent modernity or not, the preoccupation with international architects
and signature works, leaves no place for the vast majority of Iraq’s social classes to do anything
but react mutely to the changes to Baghdad being wrought in concrete and on paper. Public
housing cannot receive the attention it deserves for how non-elite members of Iraqi society
participated in the elaboration of a modern urban fabric and its attendant architectural idiom.
Panagiota Pyla’s work on the Doxiadis Associates architectural firm remains the only
published research to date that examines how houses were planned for the wider Iraqi public.
Beginning in 1955, the Greek architect Constantinos A. Doxiadis was hired by the Iraqi
government to design houses that would simultaneously be modern and meet the social needs
of Iraqis. Unlike other foreign architects active in Iraq at the time, Doxiadis had developed a
science of human settlements called ekistics that set out to discover a set of essential features
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of Iraqi village life. Doxiadis then sought to reproduce them within a hierarchy of progressively
larger neighborhoods that would meet residents’ needs at each stage of their lives, starting
from the child’s room up to the largest civic and governmental institutions. Pyla emphasizes
that certain of the features identified through ekistics did not translate effectively to the
regularized reproduction on a neighborhood scale, citing in particular the “gossip square,” an
enclosed area for small gatherings intended to mimic the casual meeting spaces observed by
Doxiadis and his team in their field research.7 Pyla’s analysis of Doxiadis’ work in Iraq accurately
represents the limitations of urban planning that does not allow citizens to have a more direct
role in shaping urban outcomes, but it does not explore either the more mundane ways in
which Doxiadis Associates worked with Iraqis or Doxiadis interventions in Iraqis’ education and
social work. This chapter will show that these aspects of Doxiadis Associates’ work reveal more
about how Baghdadis addressed the need for public housing before and after Doxiadis’ brief
five-year tenure. Furthermore, Pyla’s analysis does not take into account the handful of other
architectural and construction firms that worked directly or indirectly on Iraq’s public housing.
Of these firms, the IBEC Housing Corporation was the most involved in building houses in
Baghdad, coming into regular competition with Doxiadis Associates for influence with the Iraqi
government. 8
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Scholars of Iraqi houses, modern Iraqi architecture, and public housing have sketched a
narrative of the housing situation in Baghdad in which the Iraqi state and its international
collaborators had the most control of anyone over where and how Iraqis lived. The housing
narrative also takes place largely within the confines of an Iraqi decade of development that
begins with increased oil revenues in 1951 and ends with Doxiadis’ and other international
partners’ exit from Iraq after the revolution of 1958. This narrow timeframe reflects the major
turning points in Iraqi politics instead of the problems Iraqis faced finding suitable places to live
in Baghdad. Housing in Iraq, according to this narrative, is a story of architects and town
planners, not construction workers or prospective buyers and renters. Any narrative
lopsidedness in turn reflects the difficulty in accessing Arabic sources that give the perspective
of Iraqi construction workers, journalists, or critics of government housing policy, among others
with personal interests in the living conditions of housing. Arabic sources available outside of
Iraqi state archives tend to touch on housing indirectly, such as through critiquing a general lack
of commitment to public welfare or inadequate waste removal services. In the absence of
sources that lavish detail on construction laborers or homeowners, available commentaries in
Arabic cannot be ignored simply because they occupy the margins of the archive. Their
marginality puts them in critical tension with the archival material that has been used to
constitute what Lefebvre referred to as an “aggregate of (sensory) data” that reduce to “a form
imposed upon physical materiality.”9
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Public Housing before Iraq’s Decade of Development
Public housing emerged as a distinct concern of Iraqis in the years during and
immediately after the Second World War. Increases in Iraqi citizens’ purchasing power created
more demand for housing while the scarcity of building materials in the postwar years limited
supply.10 At the same time, the population growth rate of Iraq’s major cities increased
dramatically. Between 1947 and 1957, Baghdad’s population climbed from 515,000 to just
under 800,000. Of these new residents, just under 115,000, or about one in seven, were
migrant laborers from the southeastern ‘Amara and Kut governorates.11 While these figures can
give a sense of the scale of the housing shortage, they do not reflect how migrants in particular
or the laboring classes in general contended with the shortage’s attendant scarcities and
hardships. Scarcity, however, is itself the product of political decisions and its effects cannot be
reduced to government-produced figures.12 Any attempt to appreciate fully how scarcity was
negotiated among stakeholders in public housing must look at how both the intended and
eventual recipients of housing aid contended with the challenges of finding adequate places to
live.
The first resort of migrant laborers looking for housing in Baghdad was to build sarifas,
structures made of dried mud and thatched reeds, on the edges of Iraq’s major cities. Migrant
laborers first built the sarifas outside Baghdad in the 1930’s after facing penury and eviction
from their lands in the southern governorates of ‘Amara and Muntafiq.13 Residents of the
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sarifas occasionally found work in the homes of Baghdad’s professional classes in the new and
comparatively affluent Waziriya and Sulaykh sections of the city. After the British re-occupied
Iraq in May of 1941, however, supporting the war effort in labor, transport, and procurement
became migrant laborers’ main source of steady income, albeit one severely diminished by the
effects of inflation and material shortages. The shift in the standing of migrant laborers among
Baghdad’s middle class professionals is reflected in the difference between two articles that
appeared in the Arabic daily Akhbar in December of 1942 and July of 1943. The first article did
not distinguish the needs of migrant laborers from those of the poor in general, urging readers
who had benefited from God’s providence to care for the poor (is‘af al-faqir) chiefly by
providing them with food and clothing on the occasion of the ‘Id al-Adha holiday. The second
article, “Workers and the Future of Iraq,” was serialized over three issues, and aimed at
countering the false assumptions that Baghdad residents made about migrant laborers.
Education and healthcare, it averred, would not facilely transform laborers into Communists; it
would enhance their productive capacity and advance the well-being of the nation as a whole.
The shift toward identifying migrant laborers as a distinct source of communal anxiety and a
potential wellspring for national progress suggests the degree to which wartime economies had
accelerated labor migration to Baghdad.
The absence of either public housing or sarifas from either article in Akhbar likely
reflects the censorship of a wartime press, as any public discussion of houses invited
unwelcome attention to the diversion of building materials toward British military needs. By the
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later years of the war, however, Iraqi journalists found ways to continue the discussion of the
needs of migrant laborers by other means. The populist newspaper Ahali was founded in 1932
by Iraqi intellectuals who had theorized democratic populism, largely in opposition to the Iraqi
government, before the war. Under the thinly disguised title, Sawt al-Ahali in 1944, they
published a “Questions and Answers” column in which they elaborated on the differences
between medieval European feudalism and the Iraqi iqta‘ land tenure system that enriched
land-owning capitalists at the expense of migrant laborers. They connected the migration of
laborers from ‘Amara, where the iqta‘ system was strongest, to the idea that neither legal
emancipation nor mere increases in industrial production would overcome the flaws in the
nation’s economic structure. As if to drive their point home further, the authors portrayed the
initial question as coming from a person named Rifi, which could just as easily mean “from the
rural areas,” who lived in Kazimiyya, a shrine town neighboring Baghdad and a frequent starting
point for demonstrations in the decades prior to the war. After the war’s end, Ahali’s authors
wrote that now Iraq’s government had to make good on its promise to provide housing and
steady employment for the thousands of Iraqi construction workers and small-scale industrial
workers who had been employed by the Allies. In the same article, they pointed out that the
price of raw materials was still too high and that there were no plans as of yet to bring water,
electricity, or transportation services to the city’s more remote residential areas. Not content
merely to sound the alarm on pressing social issues, Ahali’s authors insisted that the
government could solve both problems at once by subsidizing the cost of raw materials for
houses and employ the unemployed workers to build them.
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The timing was opportune for the argument that migrant laborers possessed the skills to
build their own houses, as many of them had been involved in construction work for the British,
building and maintaining warehouses along the Iraq Railways supply chains. Even before the
war had come to an official end, Iraqi journalists sought curbs on rampant land speculation and
the setting up of a land bank to assist future homeowners with loans. Abbas Kashif al-Ghita,
writing for the “comprehensive, weekly cultural magazine” ‘Alam al-Ghadd, or World of
Tomorrow, noted that under the prevailing system, renters rented a plot of land for a fixed
number of years, after which any house built on it became the property of the landowner. This
system weakened renters’ resolve to invest in their homes. Instead, Kashif al-Ghita wrote that
the Iraqi Parliament should establish a land bank to issue bonds with a fixed resale value set at
the time of their origination. This instrument would isolate capital investments from risks
associated with developing specific properties and allow investors to exit the markets sooner
than they would as land speculators. Ultimately, Kashif al-Ghita held that the land bank would
encourage individuals to practice sound economy, invest in home construction, and allow
capital to grow securely. Another author for ‘Alam al-Ghad returned to the question of the
postwar economy in an article from the May 16th, 1945 issue, in which he claimed that the war
had been in fact a moral revolution. This revolution resulted from the incompatibility of a
nineteenth-century ideal, that individual self-interest would promote harmony between
national interests, with the limits of international markets to absorb production in the
twentieth century. The crux of the problem was the laissez-faire policy of “making goods flow”
(siyasat al-tasyib) despite the need for economic and societal planning. The authors of ‘Alam alGhad could concur with their peers at Ahali that migrant laborers were not an economic
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burden to be blamed for the housing crisis. With the right planning and preparation by
government, the structural conditions of the Iraqi economy could be adjusted to give laborers
the opportunity to hone skills in construction that could be put to further use benefiting the
nation as a whole.
Public Housing and Controlled Growth
Planning for public housing did not become a priority for Iraq, however, until 1955, by
which point the Development Board in charge of public housing committed to a course of
action that minimized laborers’ involvement in designing and constructing more houses.
Formed “to disburse funds and to oversee development projects in an atmosphere relatively
free of partisan and personalized politics,” the Development Board nevertheless comprised
eight career politicians, including the Ministers of Finance and Development, who were
responsible for allocating seventy percent of the state’s oil revenues.14 Negotiations with the
Iraq Petroleum Company increased these revenues nearly tenfold to 50 million Iraqi dinars by
1953.15 Iraq’s perennial prime minister Nuri Sa‘id served as chairman and two foreign members
served as liaisons to the American and British embassies.16 With the lion’s share of the state’s
income and a membership comprised of government elites, the Board approached public
housing in the same manner that it did national irrigation and road-building projects:
commissioning international experts to plan from the top down. Iraqi laborers were only relied
upon to provide the physical labor necessary to execute the experts’ plans.
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Although it was convened to create public housing on a national scale, the Development
Board prioritized housing in Baghdad for several reasons. Baghdad was the destination of most
migrant Iraqis and it was where members of the Development Board could act quickly to
manipulate the challenges of urban growth to their political advantage. A government
pamphlet published in English and Arabic identified the problem in 1955 as a shortage of
suitable places for Iraqis to live. 17 In other words, the housing problem was not one of preexistent homes in need of maintenance or remodeling, a formulation that would have ceded
government control over the design of homes to their occupants. In furtherance of their control
over public housing, the Development Board commissioned a town plan for Baghdad from a
British firm, Minoprio, Spencely, and MacFarlane. The Minoprio plan charted future growth
along an east-west axis that limited the construction of new neighborhoods according to the
availability of water brought from the Tigris.18 The future of public housing was thereby brought
in line with how the Development Board viewed constraints on the city’s resources. According
to this logic, recent migrants to Baghdad were not thought of as laborers capable of building
their own communities, but as mere occupants of squalid huts testifying to the need for
controlled growth. In April of 1957, two years after the Minoprio plan had been commissioned,
the newspaper Bilad reported that sanitation facilities were being constructed in the sarifa
neighborhoods and insecticides were being sprayed as temporary measures until new houses
could be built for the migrant laborers.19 The logic of deploying municipal resources to control
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these areas was still in force, and the migrant laborers were represented only as mute
witnesses to the takeover of their communities. In that same year, another government
pamphlet announced that “houses constructed in Baghdad have solved the housing crisis,”
under a picture of two laborers walking gamely down an alley between rows of freshly built
houses.20 Even though the sarifa dwellers remained where they were and much housing had
yet to be built, the Development Board had declared victory in the matter of public housing.
It was necessary for the Development Board to posture in this manner in order to
maintain the appearance of political control. In reality, however, public housing was held up by
a dilemma. In order to expand the rate at which houses were built, the sarifas had to be
destroyed and their inhabitants relocated so that the land could be developed. In order to
meet the high political costs of doing so, however, the government first needed to prove it
could deliver new housing units that would suit the needs of Iraqis and that it could deliver
them quickly enough and abundantly enough to meet demand. The conditions of this dilemma
may not have been clear to the Development Board when it first embarked on public housing in
earnest in 1955. Over the last three years of the Hashemite monarchy’s existence in Iraq,
however, work on public housing brought these conditions into greater relief.
The Western Baghdad Housing Development
Shortly after Doxiadis Associates received its contract in the summer of 1955, Doxiadis
selected a site west of the Tigris River for Baghdad’s first public housing scheme, referred to as
the Western Baghdad Housing Development. The site was chosen in consultation with
20
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Minoprio, Spencely, and MacFarlane for its presence along the desired east-west axis favored
by their town plan for future development.21 The site was also chosen because of the
neighboring village of Washash, a community that, in Doxiadis Associates’ working files, was
always referred to as a village and never as a collection of sarifa huts. This distinction between
village and sarifa was crucial to how Doxiadis understood culture in his science of ekistics. A
village provided the benchmarks for authentic patterns of communal life, whereas a sarifa
represented the haphazard and chaotic reproduction of rural forms in an urban context. The
tension between authentic and inauthentic patterns of communal life surfaced in Doxiadis’
concurrent work on housing in Karachi, where refugees from Pakistan’s partition with India
occupied a similar place to those of the sarifa dwellers. Ijlal Muzaffar’s contention that
Doxiadis’ houses in Karachi became “spatial frameworks that transform the inhabitants as they
traverse the modernization process” applied equally to designing houses for the Western
Baghdad Housing Development.22 An important contextual difference, however, was that the
sarifa dwellers had not arrived in Baghdad as the result of a seismic upheaval in political
geography. Their migration took place gradually over two decades, giving them time to begin
meeting some of their own needs for housing and employment and enter into city politics on
their own. The site for the Western Baghdad Housing Development was not only ideal for
Doxiadis’ practice of ekistics; it was at a necessary distance from sarifa dwellers who could also
claim to have solutions to the problems of urban living.
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The Western Baghdad Housing Development was also important as the site where
Doxiadis planned to build a few thousand houses quickly, within the first two years of his
contract. An outline for these fast-track construction projects warned that “if the policies and
programs for housing are not met at a national scale right from the beginning, experts,
architects, local authorities, etc. tend to present houses of a much higher value than the
reasonable one.”23 Projects that could act as experiments were therefore necessary in order to
discover what policies should be implemented at the national level. Once discovered, these
policies would enable Iraqi firms to carry out longer-term projects after Doxiadis Associates’
contract had expired.24 Pyla interprets Doxiadis’ insistence on “exhaustive surveys and research
programs” as aimed to “overcome the functionalist, universalist, and ultimately Eurocentric and
homogenizing preoccupations of other modernist interventions.”25 This goal would have been
reached more easily had the political implications of both short- and long-term projects been
equal. However, slum clearance, which entailed the destruction of the sarifa communities in
Eastern Baghdad, was one of these longer-term projects that had to await the discovery of best
practices in the Western Baghdad Housing Development. The experimental undertakings of the
short-term housing projects in Western Baghdad therefore had to take into account that their
findings would need to render the political costs of displacing sarifa dwellers more palatable.
The research behind Iraq’s public housing relied on Iraqis whose education enabled the
multidisciplinary work that was central to Doxiadis’ ekistics. A 1956 company report on
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appropriate colors for Iraqi houses, for example, received input from several Iraqi consultants,
one of whom appealed to Iraq’s history and another to its flora and fauna in making
recommendations. 26 Iraqi account managers and typists also contributed to the production and
maintenance of Doxiadis Associates’ housing research. On the strength of his command of
English and Arabic, Jamil Hamid was put in charge of preparing a weekly digest of Baghdad’s
newspapers focused on articles that would help the draftsmen better understand local housing
needs. 27 Hamid wrote daily article summaries in English for the Baghdad office and a weekly
digest for Doxiadis’ personal use at the Athens’ office.28 In a measure of how seriously Doxiadis
took the digest as a tool for gauging public opinion, Hamid was given a new title and
recommended to the Development Board for a raise.29 Once the consultants’ reports, Hamid’s
digest, and Doxiadis’ research were assembled, there were no recorded guidelines for
interpreting it, such as what to do if one consultant reported that Iraqi buildings were better
painted in dull hues when another consultant claimed the opposite was true. In his later work,
Doxiadis’ interest in designing from a multifarious knowledge base has been criticized for its
tendency to isolate decision-making from the majority of actors with a stake in the design’s
outcomes.30 If this tendency was present in Doxiadis’ Baghdad office, however, it was not as
strong as in later projects, when they spanned three continents and he could devote less of his
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personal attention to each. In Baghdad, although Doxiadis Associates architects had the final
say in how the knowledge they collected was used, they were at least free to reach different
conclusions from the reports their office generated. It would therefore be a mistake to
dichotomize views on public housing in Baghdad into the developers’ viewpoint and local Iraqis’
viewpoint.
Vocational Education
Where planning for public housing involved Iraqi laborers the most was the Industrial
School and Housing & Settlement Research Station. As early as November of 1955, Doxiadis’
Baghdad office proposed vocational schools to remedy what it perceived as a shortage of
construction workers in Iraq who could do the finishing work on houses. Training young
Baghdadis to become joiners, plumbers, electricians, welders, and glasscutters was among the
most rapidly successful projects undertaken in the Western Baghdad Development, with a wellsupplied functioning school operating by 1957. One hundred and twenty students enrolled in
the school’s first year out of five hundred applicants.31 Students boarded on a campus located
within the Western Baghdad Housing Development, where they could learn their trades
working on building rows of houses. In addition, students took classes in the national
curriculum of Arabic, history, and the sciences.
Doxiadis Associates’ plans for vocational education were closely connected to the
politics of perceived labor shortages in Iraq. In November of 1955, representatives of the Arthur
D. Little Company, an American management firm, asked the Baghdad office for input on a
31
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study of labor shortages in Iraq. The Baghdad office manager, Angelos Tsitsis, replied that their
report should be amended to include arguments in favor of expanding vocational education,
the lumber industry, and the production of prefabricated construction materials.32 In Tsitsis’
view, the potential to train skilled laborers was much like the potential to supply more wood for
construction or produce houses more quickly using prefabrication: it could be realized through
the exercise of proper management techniques. Doxiadis himself followed Tsitsis’ line of
thinking on vocational education two months later during a meeting with representatives of the
United Nations Relief Works Agency in Beirut. The problem with Iraqi vocational education lay
in recruiting capable individuals to become teachers in the vocational school. Doxiadis
wondered aloud to UNRWA representatives whether skilled Palestinian laborers might be
enticed to come to Iraq to meet the country’s need for vocational educators. He was told that
the number of skilled Palestinians in refugee camps was limited, and that at best these few
could act as English-proficient liaisons between foreign vocational educators and their Iraqi
students. Doxiadis then proposed that Palestinian refugees could produce prefabricated
components for export to Iraq, thereby obviating any hurdles associated with importing labor.33
This idea met with more favor from the UNRWA representatives, who said they would look into
it further, but it is unclear if anything ever came of the discussion. These exchanges with other
development organizations reveal that the perceived shortage of skilled Iraqi labor was
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predicated on the assumption that Iraqis could not teach themselves or each other to do
joinery, welding, or plumbing.
In the course of setting up the Industrial School and Housing & Settlement Research
Station, the Development Board and Doxiadis Associates agreed to staff it with teachers from
the Royal National Institute of Greece.34 Of the four to six vocational educators to be hired as
instructors at the new school, the headmaster was to be paid a monthly salary of 150 Iraqi
dinars, his deputy paid 130, and the other teachers 120 dinars each. Additional specialists were
authorized on an as-needed basis at 180 dinars per month. In total, the Development Board
allocated 100,000 Iraqi dinars to the project. While the hiring process was underway in 1956,
the school’s outer wall was built and it was connected to electricity and running water.35
Finishing construction on the school was assigned to the students and their teachers as both a
cost-saving measure and a boon to the school’s curriculum. Until the students built their
dormitory, they were provided with tents to stay in. Alexander Botsis, the Principal of the
Vocational School in Samos, was hired as headmaster, in part on the strength of his command
of English. The other three teachers came from small towns in southern Greece. 36 Preparations
continued until February of 1957, when the school opened its doors to its initial class of 120
students.37
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The curriculum of the Industrial School and Housing & Settlement Research Station
attached great significance to disciplining its students. The headmaster wrote in his report for
the Development Board’s Housing Section that the school’s aims were
the creation of Iraqi craftsmen, able to work for the realisation of the housing programme of
the country and at the same time the creation of good craftsmen which is inseparably
connected with the endeavor of creating good citizens, who will have full knowledge of their
duties toward their Country. This latter is necessary also for the harmonious functioning of a
boarding-school.38
For Botsis, learning a skilled trade went hand in hand with becoming a good citizen, which
meant cultivating a sense of obligation to the nation. Because the students would be living at
the school, the headmaster prescribed a strict and robust schedule of activities lasting from sixthirty in the morning to eight-thirty at night. The centerpiece of the curriculum was the thirtysix hours per week dedicated to what Botsis termed practical technical education. The teacher
would demonstrate the proper body movements in how to use each tool and then observe the
students’ ability to perform the same movements as they worked on simple construction
projects. In carpentry, students learned to use jigsaws, hammers, pliers, and planes on a supply
of timber and wire, while in masonry, they worked with cement, gravel, sand, and gypsum using
wheelbarrows and a cement-mixing machine.39 What separated the students’ lessons from the
construction work being done down the road was the emphasis instructors placed on students
acquiring the means to measure their own work. For four hours a week, students took dictation
in notebooks on how to draw diagrams, take measurements, and estimate the costs of
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construction projects. Unlike the construction workers from the sarifas, the students were
inculcated in the habits of checking their own work and envisioning projects from start to finish.
They were, in a way, to become their own supervisors. Moreover, because the students
boarded at the school, they received evening lessons in religion, history, and geography.
Physical and mental hygiene were also imparted through regularly scheduled intervals for
washing up, morning and evening prayers, and the daily raising and lowering of the flag. The
acquisition of technical knowledge and skills, old and new, was subject to a pervasive and
nationalist discipline that aimed to foster new habits of thought and purpose in what Doxiadis
Associates and the Development Board saw as Iraq’s first generation of modern, skilled
craftsmen. In a telling display of the school’s role in class formation, craftsmen from Baghdad
were only invited to participate in the school as visiting judges of student final projects.
The impact of Doxiadis Associates’ plans for vocational education was not limited to the
number of students it educated. As plans for it were coming together, the Industrial School and
Housing & Settlement Research Station occupied a prominent place in discussions between
Doxiadis, the Iraqi public, and the representatives of international aid organizations. In
September of 1956, around one month after the vocational school project was announced to
the public, the newspaper al-Bilad reported on a meeting between Doxiadis and Khalil Hanna,
the Minister of Finance. It stated that Doxiadis envisioned the number of students at the school
to rise to fifteen hundred and that its graduates would start work immediately on the various
housing schemes underway in Baghdad at the time.40 The projected enrollment of fifteen
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hundred, much higher than the number who enrolled when the school opened, was probably
chosen in order to attract support for the project. A month later, Doxiadis brought up the
vocational school in conversation with Ernest Weissmann, a representative of the UN Office for
Housing and Town and Country Planning, as a significant reason why it should hold its next
conference in Baghdad.41 Promotion of the Industrial School and Housing & Settlement
Research Station continued after its establishment. For the Development Week exhibition
arranged by the Development Board in 1957, Doxiadis produced a film that exhibited students
learning to assemble a kitchen sink, dining in the school’s mess hall, and working in their
workshops on various construction projects.42 Visitors to the Development Week exhibit, held
in the main hall of Baghdad’s central train station, viewed the film reel alongside displays that
explained the work being done to modernize Iraqi housing. One of the displays showed the
progress development would make in Baghdad from decade to decade up to the 1980’s,
suggesting that schools like the Industrial School and Housing & Settlement Research Station
would expand in number and enrollment as Iraq’s newest neighborhoods also increased in
number and sophistication. While the Development Week displays could not explain whether
the new vocational education would abet the construction of new neighborhoods or simply
accompany it, they did emphasize a new relationship between construction labor and material
progress rooted in a new pedagogical tradition. Such a connection, however imprecise, favored
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more state control over construction labor, including the construction labor of the sarifa
dwellers.
Laboring with Concrete
Construction of public housing in Baghdad depended on the sarifa dwellers for the
physically demanding tasks of building each house’s walls, lowering its roof into place, and
laying pipes for running water and sewage. For the developers who employed them, the sarifa
dwellers were not simply a cheap source of labor; they were a separate community within Baghdad that
needed to be educated into modern ways of living. Doxiadis Associates maintained a file on sarifa
dwellers that described them simultaneously as living in dangerously unhygienic conditions and forming
an integral part of Baghdad’s economy. The sarifa dwellers lived amidst “numerous ditches full of filth,
human defication (sic) and garbage” yet they were “greatly involved in the life of Baghdad…since they
are the labourers, policemen, street-cleaners, ferrashes, and guards.”43 Another report in Doxiadis’

files suggested that the sarifa dwellers were powerless, possessing “nothing else but their
muscles.” The report originated with the Development Board liaison to housing developers,
who reasoned that “by changing his home, the individual tends to change his social standing.”44
In the developers’ view, sarifa dwellers would benefit directly from working to build homes to
modern specifications. Knowledge of how to live properly was made to spring from knowledge
of how to build homes according to modern specifications.
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After years of planning between the Development Board, Doxiadis Associates, and the
American IBEC Housing Corporation, concrete emerged as the best construction medium
through which to use sarifa labor for building modern houses. As part of its bid for construction
contracts, the IBEC Housing Corporation subjected samples of Iraqi clays and other earths to a
battery of stress tests.45 IBEC’s president then sent the Development Board a detailed
description of their efforts to find the most economical, locally sourced aggregate for the Iraqi
concrete.46 IBEC’s promotional motion pictures and glossy portfolios portrayed the company’s
propriety construction method as necessary for building houses quickly enough to meet
skyrocketing demand. IBEC technologies, such as the crane that lowered finished concrete roofs
onto walls erected hours earlier, replaced skilled laborers with unskilled, increasing the number
of workers employable on a given site for faster completion. In December 1957, twenty months
of research and development paid off when IBEC was awarded contracts to oversee some of
the houses slated for the Western Baghdad Development.
In promoting its view of concrete as the key to making the best-managed use of Iraq’s
material and labor resources, the Development Board and its housing experts ignored an
interpretation of what concrete meant for the social construction of space that was
nevertheless latent in the actual work of building new houses on the fringes of Baghdad. The
view that concrete necessitated unskilled labor rested on the assumption that its commendable
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qualities were inherent in its material properties, and that the actual work of making it was
negligible. This view has prevailed wherever concrete has been associated with building on a
mass scale and for primarily functional rather than aesthetic purposes. However, in an essay on
the history of modern concrete, Adrian Forty has drawn attention to aspects of that history that
turn this view on its head. Concrete is not simply a material. It is a process for making
something. While process accurately describes all workable substances to some extent, as even
naturally occurring materials, like stone, must be manipulated into the right shape and position,
concrete takes its form and function in a building almost entirely through the labor expended to
make it. With concrete, there is therefore greater potential for laborers to claim authorship for
their work as against the claims of the architect and the capital behind the project.47
Efforts to shape the lives of sarifa dwellers through construction work followed
construction capital’s earlier attempts to disrupt labor’s hold on controlling the means of
production. According to Forty, this struggle manifested itself as early as the Saint-Simonians’
advocacy of concrete as a construction medium by and for the working masses, and it
continued with François Hennebique’s proprietary claim on a particular method for building in
concrete in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Fearful that the spread of
concrete would diminish profits, Hennebique relied on his company’s complex bureaucracy to
define standards and procedures for the medium that would ensure planning’s continued
relevance. Forty goes on to say that architects in the immediate postwar period had similar
fears about concrete, and consequently developed their own expertise and informed tastes to
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guide its use.48 The international experts working with the Development Board shared in these
concerns that concrete needed expertise in order to prevent it from becoming an unruly,
popular construction medium. In a June 1955 letter to IBEC, Fritz A. Deutsch advised his former
company that the much-touted labor cost savings of the IBEC method were simply not to be
found outside of developed countries, and that to make good on its word to foreign
governments, including Iraq’s, IBEC should reduce its reliance on expensive, imported
machinery. Deutsch recommended that the costly bomber crane used for lowering concrete
ceilings be replaced by smaller, wooden cranes. These cranes were cheaper because they could
be built on site by local artisans.49 Ironically, in advising how IBEC might lower their building
costs, Deutsch proposed restoring skilled labor to the low-cost housing equation. No matter
how efficient the method of building in concrete was, it was type and availability of labor that
made the difference between expensive and inexpensive construction.
Once the contracts for houses were awarded and the appropriate equipment brought in
from overseas, laborers from Baghdad’s sarifas got to work mixing, pouring, and arranging
concrete slabs into floors, walls, and roofs on a house-by-house basis. While detailed accounts
of their daily experiences are unavailable, it is possible to sketch the outlines of the labor
practices followed by Baghdadis who worked on IBEC contracts in Western Baghdad because
the IBEC method was well-documented at earlier sites where it was used, in particular, Norfolk,
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Virginia and the Las Lomas, Lomas Verdes, and San Cristóbal areas of San Juan, Puerto Rico. 50
To be sure, there were significant differences in labor culture between these cities and
Baghdad, but insofar as in all five locations, the same types of equipment and plans were used,
it is possible to speak in terms of experiences shared between laborers across geographic and
temporal distances. To build an IBEC house, the laborers began by pouring a rectangular,
concrete foundation on earth that had been plotted and leveled beforehand. This foundation
also served as the floor. Once it had set, the laborers erected lattice-like frameworks made of
reinforced steel bars (rebar) around the edges of the foundation and in lines running across it
for the walls. The frameworks reached a height of about ten feet. Arranging the latticework
required even spaces between bars in a rectilinear grid with gaps left for doorways, windows,
electrical sockets, and water pipes. While the frameworks were being assembled, another team
put together the appropriate component pieces of the wall molds to be lowered down over the
frameworks via crane. Once the molds were secured in place, laborers standing on top of them
poured concrete over the rebar framework sandwiched between the two sides of the mold to
make the walls. After the concrete had dried, the workers supervised the delicate process of
raising the mold up and off the walls without putting any pressure on them.51 At this point, the
concrete structure of the house was complete, and the laborers moved on to the next house.
Using this method, IBEC engineers calculated that they could produce around six houses per
working day. It is not clear how many hours were in a working day, but for a twelve-hour work
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day, the company’s production targets would have necessitated that the workers spend no
more than two hours per house, a remarkable feat given the precision, coordination, and
material output required of the laborers. Because of logistical problems, the workdays were
probably shorter and the targets were not reached. Nevertheless, the speed at which the
laborers must have worked was remarkable. If this was unskilled labor, it was so in name only.
The laborers drew on a host of interpersonal and manual skills to ensure that the construction
proceeded smoothly.
It remains unclear how the sarifa laborers were remunerated for their concrete work, as
they were hired by Iraqi construction companies, not the international development experts.
Nevertheless, it is possible to approximate how they were compensated using the salaries
which Doxiadis Associates paid its Iraqi workers for comparable tasks. According to a 1956
memo outlining salaries for the entire Baghdad office, Doxiadis Associates paid each of four
watchmen hired to protect the building site a monthly salary of six Iraqi dinars. This salary was
slightly more than it paid its custodial staff, the same as its lowest-ranking office assistants
(Arabic farrash), and half of what typists earned. With one thousand piasters (Arabic fils)to the
dinar, the watchman’s salary worked out to about two hundred piasters a day, or about $4.80
in 1956 dollars.52 Although small compared to what typists or draftsmen were earning, the
watchman’s salary was considerably more than the minimum wage of five piasters a day set by
a 1951 Iraqi labor law.53 The watchman’s salary offers the best approximation of what the
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construction workers earned because his duties kept him on the worksite and exposed him to a
similar amount of risk as a construction worker. On Saturday, November 3rd, 1956, Kan‘an
Qabud reported to his shift at the supervising engineer’s office at 5 PM. Six hours into Qabud’s
shift at around 11 PM, someone opened fire on the office, punching two holes in the door and
wounding Qabud in the arm and leg. Qabud managed to notify his coworkers Sa’adun Qassab
and Genghis Qadiri, who contacted the police. Whoever fired on Qabud disappeared before the
police could find them, leaving everything in the office in place. Shortly after the supervising
engineer, I.A. Dimitriou, arrived to work the next day at 7:20 AM, he sent off a report to his
liaison with the Development Board, in which he politely asked them “to take the necessary
steps in order to give our personnel the necessary protection in similar cases.”54 Unfortunately,
it is not clear from the report what became of the wounded watchman, Qabud. Even if an
extreme case of what could happen to someone on the worksite, it is worth bearing in mind
that Qabud’s shift usually lasted until 1 AM. He was putting his life on the line that night for
approximately twenty-four piasters an hour. A similar ratio of risk to reward likely prevailed for
the Development’s construction workers.
How were laborers from the sarifas able to build houses in concrete, a process and a
medium which had seen little prior use in Iraq? The contention of international experts that
concreting was unskilled labor within the capabilities of any able-bodied Iraqi male in fact
underrepresents the degree of skill involved and says nothing about the responsibility of the
laborers to work swiftly and carefully. A fuller explanation looks to the sarifas themselves for
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evidence of work aptitudes and experience that the laborers brought to working in concrete.
The sarifa was a house with walls made of dried mud and a roof made of thatched date palm
fibers. To ensure that the walls were stable, the sarifa laborers had to use soil with a high
enough clay content, mix it with water, and then shape the mixture into walls at a rate that
would allow the mud to set in place. The process was analogous to the one used by those same
sarifa dwellers when they were hired to work in concrete, as both dried mud and concrete
needed to be mixed and poured properly. It should also be noted that, from a construction
standpoint, the mud walls of the sarifa were more like the concrete slabs poured in the
Western Baghdad Development than the multistoried houses in Baghdad’s older
neighborhoods, which had been built by stacking sun-dried bricks one by one. Brick houses
could be built incrementally, with walls going up in fits and starts. Solid walls of mud and
concrete, on the other hand, required even expenditures of labor from start to finish in order to
ensure material consistency. Even though housing experts thought of concrete labor as
unskilled, there was in fact a considerable amount of skill involved, as building practices
cultivated in the sarifa neighborhoods were adapted to making houses out of concrete.
Public Housing in Republican Iraq
Shortly after IBEC completed its initial batch of houses, Doxiadis gave a tour of them to
Iraq’s young king Faisal II and his erstwhile regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah. Photos from that tour show
Doxiadis and Faisal inspecting one of the concrete houses’ interiors, dabbing the sweat from
their faces. It was a sign that despite IBEC’s and Doxiadis’ efforts to effect a cool indoor climate
in their houses, the concrete houses still trapped the heat. Months later on July 14 th, 1958, the
Hashemite monarchy was overthrown and Faisal killed at the start of the Iraqi revolution. The
186

governments that replaced him carried on the work of public housing in the name of the Iraqi
people. Despite their revolutionary rhetoric about bringing an end to imperialism and
colonialism, the first of these governments under ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim retained the services of
Doxiadis Associates until 1959 and used his plans for the Eastern Baghdad Housing
Development to build houses for migrant laborers in Madinat al-Thawra (now Sadr City).
The Qasim and subsequent Arif governments gradually improved workers’ access to
new public housing in Baghdad, although it is unclear from available sources to what extent
sarifa dwellers benefited. Amendments to the law for selling government land suggest that
laborers were systematically excluded from homeownership until 1964, when they could
establish a Home Builders’ Association to acquire housing plots. The 1936 law governing land
sales had decreed that all plots were to be sold at auction, and that in the absence of any
bidders, the Minister of Finance could sell the land directly to an interested municipality. 55 In
June of 1958, the monarchical government had amended the law to allow Iraqis who did not
own a home to pay for a plot and the cost of home construction with a twenty-year mortgage.
Government employees could also purchase the land through their Home Builders’ Association,
but on terms set by the Minister of Finance.56 These early Home Builders’ Associations must not
have been effective, however, because in 1964 the law was amended again to ban the sale of
land at public auction, with an addendum reasoning that auctions only benefited the “owners
of excessive capital.” The 1964 law also eased restrictions on government employees’ ability to
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acquire land “because of the worthy sacrifices” they had made “under all manner of
circumstances.” 57 Migrant laborers, to the extent that they could join a Home Builders’
Association through one of Baghdad’s unionized trades, were at last able to acquire some of the
homes they had worked on.
Collective purchasing power enabled members of a Home Builders’ Association to afford
a new neighborhood in which to live. In October 1964, the Association for Baghdad’s Passenger
Transport Service distributed plots in the Tha’aliba neighborhood to its members. In a petition to
the Directorate of Public Housing, the Home Builders’ Association noted that the housing plots it would
receive would “free sons of the nation from the burden of rent in this socialist age of ours.” One

hundred and sixty Association members received plots through this process, having only to pay
into an Association fund that covered the costs of renting a bulldozer and compensating the
land’s cultivators for their alfalfa crops.58 To meet these costs in full, the Passenger Transport
Service pooled its resources with the Home Builders’ Associations of the Ministry of Industry,
Post and Telegraph Workers, and two other Associations.59 In setting up workers with homes for
which they owed no rent, the Home Builders’ Associations heeded Abbas Kashif al-Ghita’s 1945 call in
the pages of ‘Alam al-Ghadd for a government program that would provide a path to homeownership
for Iraqis. Kashif al-Ghita’s concern with spreading investment risk and minimizing the incentive to
speculate were no longer part of Iraqis’ housing discourse, however. Instead, a new discourse
emphasized the merits of Iraqi laborers.
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Conclusions
Iraq’s first forays into public housing did not begin and end with the intervention of
international planners and architects during the oil-rich denouement of the Hashemite
monarchy. It began when Iraqi journalists and intellectuals articulated the need for government
to prioritize the welfare of its subjects following the material shortages and labor dislocations
Iraq suffered during the Second World War. The Development Board created to deal with the
housing crisis did not prioritize the housing of Iraq’s laboring classes, however. In assigning
public housing to Doxiadis Associates and the International Basic Economy Corporation, among
other international firms aligned with British and American interests, the Development Board
sanctioned a policy of admitting Iraqi laborers to live in new neighborhoods only as quickly they
could be expected to meet certain expectations for professional abilities and education. The
point of such a policy was to connect ownership, in the sense of having a legal right to a house
and a plot of land, to ownership of the means to maintain and eventually reproduce one’s
home independently, i.e. without continued government munificence. Doxiadis’ Industrial
School and Housing & Settlement Research Station, where children would learn self-discipline
along with valuable trades alleged to be in short supply in Iraq, represented an ideal form of
this connection between ownership and homeownership. The migrant laborers’ sarifas, on the
other hand, typified the negligence and ignorance that government officials sought to prevent
from occupying the city’s future residential neighborhoods.
The Development Board’s public housing policy, however, contained the conditions for
its own eventual unraveling. Writing of how British engineers worked Doxiadis and IBEC needed
sarifa laborers to build them.
189
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Postscript.
There is a real need for Iraq scholars to sound an old horn that too many others have set
down recently. None of us can visit the past.1 The merit of our study is not in following Leopold
von Ranke in attempting to recreate the past as it really was. It lies in making clear the
contingency of our observations of the past on the particular set of questions and concerns that
push us to observe in the first place. To that end, this dissertation concludes with a look at how
two fragmentary archives set the conditions for observation that historians inherit. After
interrogating those conditions, I propose that these two archives mediated the construction of
space in Baghdad through the determinations they made of the persons whom the state, at
varying points in its trajectory, sought to influence or otherwise control.
A medical examiner’s report. An arrest warrant. A passport photo. These are a few of
the files that the British Embassy in Baghdad decided to keep from its work in 1938, curiously
tucked away under the somewhat misleading heading of “Extraditions.” The heading is
misleading because, although the file does contain diplomatic correspondence on extraditions,
it is only in regard to a single case about a woman who had been indicted for the crime of
abortion, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment according to Baghdad Criminal Law as
well as the British, Ottoman, and French penal codes on which it was based. 2 The file is far more
valuable, then, for what it tells us about the status of women in Hashemite Iraq, and far more
valuable still for what the gaps in its narrative reveal about the limits of state power in
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regulating the conduct of its citizens. The case of Juweida Khayyat illustrates how medicine,
law, and geography in Iraq coalesced into a force for the expulsion and forcible return of
persons labeled criminals.
From the surviving documentation, we can piece together a few fragments of the life of
the woman in question. Juweida Khayyat was born in Aleppo in 1909 into a Christian family.
Sometime thereafter, the family moved to Baghdad, where Juweida grew up and was married
to a man named Ni‘matallah Artin Anderia.3 The marriage was not evidently a happy one, for in
1933 or 1934 Juweida Khayyat left Baghdad with a dentist, Enver Sa‘id, for Kolkata. Four years
later, in July 1938, the Iraqi Royal Consulate at Bombay initiated a request for the extradition of
Juweida back to Iraq to stand trial. In the months that followed, the Consulate furnished the
Government of India, External Affairs Department with an arrest warrant for Juweida and a
copy of the medical examiner’s report affirming that she or a skilled accomplice had aborted
her fetus in late 1933. The Iraqi government maintained that this evidence was sufficient in the
estimation of Iraqi and Indian courts alike that she be extradited to stand trial. To aid the local
authorities in her capture, they included a palm-sized photograph of a young woman labeled
“Juweida Khayyat.”4
The case against Juweida rested in large part on the findings of the forensic examiner, a
Dr. Ahmad ‘Izzat al-Qaisi and his supervisor, Dr. Sa’ib Shawkat, who examined Juweida on three
separate occasions at the Royal College of Medicine hospital in October of 1933. Qaisi’s report
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to the court explained that upon the initial examination of the patient, scarring was detected in
the uterine tissue, of which a sample was later confirmed by the laboratory physician, Dr. Mills,
to be consistent with the uterine tissue of pregnant women. The uterus was also deemed larger
than normal upon the first consultation but smaller six days later. From this evidence, Qaisi and
Shawkat concluded that Juweida had been pregnant, probably in her first trimester, and that
the abortion had taken place a few days before her initial examination. They further reasoned
that because a smell, typical of abortions performed by unskilled abortionists, was absent,
whoever performed this abortion was likely to have had some medical training. In the version
submitted to the court, the report was signed by Qaisi, Juweida’s husband, and a woman
identified as Sahra, daughter of Matti.5
From the available archival evidence, it cannot be determined whether Juweida had in
fact been pregnant or if the suspicions of her father and husband had merely activated medical
and legal protocols that produced authoritative statements consistent with the expectations of
male Iraqi doctors, judges, and other expert opinions on the propensity of some women to seek
an abortion. It is noteworthy that the medical examiners first stated that Juweida did not
appear pregnant upon visual inspection, a statement that implied the ability of knowledgeable
persons to determine a woman’s state of being from the mere act of looking. This initial
statement was followed by the evidence used to make a positive determination as to
pregnancy: the uterine palpation, the tissue sample tests, and the absence of an odor. The
decision to raise the matter of the visual test first and the physical tests second made the
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report conform to a rhetorical style in which the argument appears to become more convincing
the farther it is followed. This rhetorical style, in turn, rested on the assumption that modern
medical tests and the training of doctors were superior to other forms of knowing whether a
woman was pregnant, including the testimony of the woman herself. For the court system and
the doctors to be convinced, they had only to hear an argument that conformed to
expectations they had formed over the course of their professional careers, not necessarily an
argument that proved beyond a doubt that Juweida had been pregnant. It was therefore
possible that Juweida had not been pregnant.
The charge of abortion also reflects an issue that went unresolved in the Iraqi legal
system during the monarchical period, the competence of civil courts to try cases in which
questions of personal status law could be raised. The 1925 Constitution of Iraq stipulated that
personal status cases should be resolved in the religious courts: “shari‘a courts for the Muslims
and Spiritual Councils for other religious communities.”6 Personal status cases included matters
relating to marriage and divorce. If Juweida’s father or husband believed that she had been
adulterous with Enver Sa‘id, they could have made the case in terms of a violation of a marital
contract that should be heard in one of Iraq’s religious courts. However, jurisdiction over
matters of personal status was far from resolved by the language of the 1925 Constitution,
which stated that enabling legislation should be passed in order to clarify matters of procedure
and jurisdiction, including cases where the litigants were from multiple faith backgrounds. As
Noga Efrati has found, “there was an underlying power struggle over who should be entrusted
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with the authority to adjudicate disputes, which courts were to be involved, and who had the
authority to determine those rules that would govern personal status issues in Iraq.” 7 Abortion
provided a way out of these jurisdictional difficulties because, as a criminal charge, it was
prosecutable in the civil courts. There were likely strategic considerations that went into the
selection of abortion as the charge brought against Juweida.
The predisposition to accept the claims of medicine as authoritative combined with the
favorability of the civil court system to produce the charge of abortion against Juweida. These
discursive forces impeded Juweida’s freedom to determine for herself what, if anything, about
her physical condition and actions should determine her future as it appeared to her in 1933.
The power of these discursive forces, however, were dependent on the production of space in
Baghdad. It was from the Civil Hospital, the civil courts, and the police precincts that these
discourses emanated out into the city in the form of arrest warrants, court orders, and
correspondence between concerned officials. As pervasive as these forces were, they were not
to be found outside of Baghdad. Consequently, Juweida Khayyat and Enver Sa‘id fled Baghdad
and made their way to India in the hope that physical distance from the particular interests of
Baghdad’s courts and hospitals would allow them to live on terms closer to the ones of their
own choosing.
When the Iraqi government sought to extradite Juweida from India in 1938, it
attempted to persuade the Government of India that the evidence against Juweida was
compelling according to the standards of both the Iraqi and the Indian court systems. Because
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abortion was a crime according to both the Baghdad Civil Law and the Indian Penal Code, the
Iraqi government held that Juweida should be extradited to Iraq to stand trial. The Government
of India, External Affairs Department refused this request on the grounds that Article 312 of the
Indian Penal Code necessitated proof that the abortion had been caused voluntarily and that it
had not been caused in order to save the life or health of the woman. The evidence it had
received, which included the medical examiner’s report, did not prove either of these points
and so was insufficient to the terms of the 1932 Iraq-India extradition treaty.8 It is at this point
that the archival record ends, and our glimpse into the lives of Juweida Khayyat and Enver Sa‘id
comes to a close.
~
Colorful paintings. Full-page photo spreads. Short stories and interviews. The
government-issued journal Baghdad made extensive use of each of these media in a monthly
publication that ran from 1963 until at least 1974. Produced by the Ministry of Guidance and
Culture, it represents another kind of archive that was not unlike the British Embassy file from
1938 in its presentation of written and visual material that coincided with its parent
institution’s imperatives. As a magazine dedicated to Iraqi culture, however, Baghdad did not
employ any scientific expertise (medical, legal, or otherwise) to advance a singular
interpretation of its ministry’s interests in promoting Iraqi culture. In keeping with the populist
ideals of the early republican era, it ran articles that were broadly representative of Iraqi art,
music, theater, and home life, among other topics. But even if no scientific expertise was
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appropriate to the promotion of culture, the pages of the ministry’s journal were still
discriminating in their adoption of “raising the level of culture” as their criterion for inclusion
and representation.
The Ministry of Guidance (irshad) was legislated into existence by the Executive Powers
Law of January 1959, approximately six months after the July 14th revolution that had replaced
the monarchy with a republic. Law No. 50 of August 1959 specified that the Ministry of
Guidance’s purpose was “to direct individual members of the people in a sound and Iraqi
nationalist (wataniyyan) manner, facilitate their access to culture, and introduce the Iraqi
republic abroad through its accomplishments and facets of its undertakings and responding to
incorrect propagandizing against it.”9 The Ministry influenced Iraqi media through offices for
radio and television, the press, cinema and theater. In March of 1964, a new law added the
word “culture” to its name and upgraded its sub-divisions for tourism, antiquities, expositions,
and the national printing press to their own offices. In a move that reflected the rise of Arab
nationalism in ‘Arif’s government after the coup against Qasim in 1963, the new law changed
the Ministry’s purpose to directing the people in “a correct, humanitarian (insaniyyan) and Arab
nationalist (qawmiyyan)” manner and specified furthering individual connections to “Arab and
Islamic civilization” alongside “the great world civilizations.”10 The ideological reconfiguration
notwithstanding, the function of the Ministry remained to bring the activities of artists, writers,
and publishers into alignment with the state’s interests in local and international consumption.
The journal Baghdad was published in Arabic and English so that it could be sent to Arab and
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other international governments for it to represent the material and cultural progress of Iraq in
its republican era.
Representations of Baghdad took on many literary and visual forms throughout the
journal’s run, but among the most arresting was the drawing by Suzanne al-Shaikhli that graced
the cover of the September 1963 issue. Titled, “An Alleyway in Baghdad,” it depicted a pair of
ornate doors to a mosque at a bend in the alley, with houses on either side occluding the view
around the bend. The houses vary in height and design, featuring a plethora of window shapes
and sizes underneath the shanshil windows that were a traditional feature of Baghdadi homes.
A figure in a dark cloak stands in front of the mosque midstride and facing the viewer. Shaikhli’s
technique is to draw the outlines of the buildings in bold and then layer the buildings’ exteriors
with broad brush strokes of light blue, grey, and brown that run over the buildings’ edges. The
figure is the least substantially defined of the piece, making a contrast between bodies and
structures that could signify tension between the city’s residents and the spaces that have been
created for them. The drawing contrasts also with the photograph of the Ministry of Guidance
and Culture building on the inside cover, the film monochrome and the architecture defined by
the repetition of discrete forms. In its composition and in its choice of subject, “An Alleyway in
Baghdad” breaks starkly with the cartographic and schematic representations of the city that
characterized urban planning of Iraq in the monarchical era, offering instead an image that is at
once tethered to individual perspective and fleeting in its impressionistic qualities.
Another drawing in the September 1963 issue accompanied a short story called
“Dedicated to the Student’s Vanguard” by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Samarra’i. In the story, the
protagonist is being escorted to prison via train when he thinks back to the actions he and his
198

student colleagues at university took in defiance of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim’s regime, meeting the
jackboots and truncheons of his enforcers at the campus entrances in a tale that was calculated
to burnish the revolutionary credentials of the government that came to power in Baghdad
seven months earlier.11 The drawing was an ink sketch depicting a group of soldiers at the base
of two tall buildings at right angles to one another with the iconic arches of the University of
Baghdad in between. Searchlights stream down onto the soldiers, who are exchanging fire with
crowds in the upper stories of the tall buildings, and nestled in the clouds above are a minaret
and dome typical of many of the city’s ‘Abbasid-era mosques. The drawing brings together the
Islamic heritage of the city with the violence of revolutionary action and the modernist
aesthetic of the University of Baghdad, a combination that is consistent with the principles laid
out for the Ministry adopted in its law of March 1964, a few months after this issue went to
press. The minimal presence of human figures in the drawing is in contrast to the awesome
architecture around them, an echo of the tensions between built space and persons depicted in
Shaikhli’s drawing. Here, the fantastic imagery of conflict proves no barrier to the overriding
concerns of humans’ lives within a city that seems poised to demand great sacrifices and
achievements from the enlightened followers of the new government.
Alongside artistic representations of the city, Baghdad featured reports on its social and
educational institutions, including the Shaikh Omar Civic Centre in the eponymous Baghdad
neighborhood. Baghdad interviewers spoke with the woman who managed the center’s classes
for young women in housekeeping and literacy and directed the social workers who visited
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students’ homes to check on their progress in adopting the habits of a modern housekeeper.
They next spoke to a woman who had graduated from the center’s programs when she got
married, but who expected to continue her education at the center once her child was old
enough to attend its daycare program. Interlaced with these interviews were photos of women
and young girls at the center learning to read, sew, and make handicrafts for sale. How these
programs were developed, according to the manager, was a matter of patient engagement with
the neighborhood’s residents:
The main problem was to acquaint the area’s inhabitants with the Center and urge them to
make use of it. This we overcame by visiting the homes and studying the dwellers’ own
problems, their needs and what sort of service they wanted us to give them…We resorted to
leniency, magnanimity, and kindness, and organized recreational parties and performed plays
especially written for us, to which we invited the people.12
The center’s approach to social work consisted of fact gathering, demonstration, and above all,
self-help, all of which were hallmarks of international development work, but here were
entirely the work of Iraqi college graduates. The focus on uplifting women through practical
training was furthermore consistent with the educational models of Iraq’s primary and
secondary schools that dated back to the early 1930’s. It was, in these respects, simultaneously
the heir to the developmental theories and practice of Constantinos Doxiadis and the genderspecific pedagogy of Iraq’s pragmatist educators. For the purposes of the Ministry of Guidance
and Culture, the Shaikh Omar Civic Centre was a showcase of national progress at the level of
neighborhood development. Urban space was again, here made to stand for the nation as a
whole.
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al-Warrāq lil-Nashr wa al-Tawzi‘, 2009.
---------. Lamahat Ijtima‘iya min Tarikh al-‘Iraq al-Hadith. London: Kufan lil-Nashr, 1991.
Witry, Hashim al- and Mu‘ammar Khalid al-Shabandar. Tarikh al-Tibb fi al-‘Iraq ma‘a Nasha’ wa Taqdim
al-Kulliyya al-Tibbiyya al-Malikiyya al-‘Iraqiyya. Baghdad: Government Press, 1939.
Published Sources: Other Languages
Dihkhoda, Ali-Akbar. Lughatnamah. Tehran: Mu’assassah-i Intisharat va Chap-i Danishgah-i Tihran,
2003.
König, Wilhelm. Im Verlorenen Paradies: Neun Jahre Irak. Baden, Austria: Rudolf M. Rohrer Publishers,
1940.
Pieri, Caecilia. Bagdad: La Construction d’Une Capitale Moderne. Beirut: L’Institut Français du ProcheOrient, 2015.
Prussia (Germany). Landesaufnahme. Kartogr. Abteilung. Plan von Baghdâd Massstab 1:10,000 : Durch
die deutsche Irâk-Gruppe ergäntze und berichtigte Ausgabe des Stadtplanes von Reschid Bey
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